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THE  BALKAN  WARS 
1912-1913 

THE  STAFFORD  LITTLE  LECTURES 
FOR  1914 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https://archive.org/details/balkanwars19121902schu 


THIRD  EDITION 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 

1912-1913 


BY 

JACOB  GOULD  SCHURMAN 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON 

LONDON: HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
1916 


Copyright,  October,  1916,  by 
Princeton  University  Press 

First  Edition 
Published  June,  1914 
Second  Edition 
Published  December,  1914 
Third  Edition 
Published  October,  1916 


^■1 

65cln,-& 

n 

PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND 
EDITION 

The  interest  in  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912- 
1913  has  exceeded  the  expectations  of  the  pub- 
lishers of  this  volume.  The  first  edition,  which 
was  published  five  months  ago,  is  already  ex- 
hausted and  a second  is  now  called  for. 

Meanwhile  there  has  broken  out  and  is  now 
in  progress  a war  which  is  generally  regarded 
as  the  greatest  of  all  time — a war  already  in- 
volving five  of  the  six  Great  Powers  and  three 
of  the  smaller  nations  of  Europe  as  well  as 
Japan  and  Turkey  and  likely  at  any  time  to 
embroil  other  countries  in  Europe,  Asia,  and 
Africa,  which  are  already  embraced  in  the  area 
of  military  operations. 

This  War  of  Many  Nations  had  its  origin  in 
the  Balkan  situation.  It  began  on  July  28 
with  the  declaration  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 

v 


5278m 


PREFACE 


to  the  effect  that  from  that  moment  Austria- 
Hungary  was  in  a state  of  war  with  Servia. 
And  the  fundamental  reason  for  this  declara- 
tion as  given  in  the  note  or  ultimatum  to  Servia 
was  the  charge  that  the  Servian  authorities  had 
encouraged  the  Pan-Serb  agitation  which 
seriously  menaced  the  integrity  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  had  already  caused  the  assassina- 
tion at  Serajevo  of  the  Heir  to  the  Throne. 

No  one  could  have  observed  at  close  range 
the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913  without  per- 
ceiving, always  in  the  background  and  occa- 
sionally in  the  foreground,  the  colossal  rival 
figures  of  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary.  At- 
tention was  called  to  the  phenomenon  at  var- 
ious points  in  this  volume  and  especially  in  the 
concluding  pages. 

The  issue  of  the  Balkan  struggles  of  1912- 
1913  was  undoubtedly  favorable  to  Russia.  By 
her  constant  diplomatic  support  she  retained  the 
friendship  and  earned  the  gratitude  of  Greece, 
Montenegro,  and  Servia ; and  through  her 


VI 


PREFACE 


championship,  belated  though  it  was,  of  the 
claims  of  Roumania  to  territorial  compensation 
for  benevolent  neutrality  during  the  war  of  the 
Allies  against  Turkey,  she  won  the  friendship 
of  the  predominant  Balkan  power  which  had 
hitherto  been  regarded  as  the  immovable  east- 
ern outpost  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  But  while 
Russia  was  victorious  she  did  not  gain  all  that 
she  had  planned  and  hoped  for.  Her  very  tri- 
umph at  Bukarest  was  a proof  that  she  had 
lost  her  influence  over  Bulgaria.  This  Slav 
state  after  the  war  against  Turkey  came  under 
the  influence  of  Austria-Hungary,  by  whom  she 
was  undoubtedly  incited  to  strife  with  Servia 
and  her  other  partners  in  the  late  war  against 
Turkey.  Russia  was  unable  to  prevent  the  sec- 
ond Balkan  war  between  the  Allies.  The  Czar’s 
summons  to  the  Kings  of  Bulgaria  and  Servia 
on  June  9,  1913,  to  submit,  in  the  name  of  Pan- 
Slavism,  their  disputes  to  his  decision  failed  to 
produce  the  desired  effect,  while  this  assumption 
of  Russian  hegemony  in  Balkan  affairs  greatly 

vii 


52^896 


PREFACE 


exacerbated  Austro-Hungarian  sentiment.  That 
action  of  the  Czar,  however,  was  clear  notifica- 
tion and  proof  to  all  the  world  that  Russia 
regarded  the  Slav  States  in  the  Balkans  as  ob- 
jects of  her  peculiar  concern  and  protection. 

The  first  Balkan  War — the  war  of  the  Allies 
against  Turkey — ended  in  a way  that  surprised 
all  the  world.  Everybody  expected  a victory 
for  the  Turks.  That  the  Turks  should  one  day 
be  driven  out  of  Europe  was  the  universal  as- 
sumption, but  it  was  the  equally  fixed  belief 
that  the  agents  of  their  expulsion  would  be  the 
Great  Powers  or  some  of  the  Great  Powers. 
That  the  little  independent  States  of  the  Bal- 
kans should  themselves  be  equal  to  the  task  no 
one  imagined, — no  one  with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  the  government  of  Russia.  And  as 
Russia  rejoiced  over  the  victory  of  the  Balkan 
States  and  the  defeat  of  her  secular  Mohamme- 
dan neighbor,  Austria-Hungary  looked  on  not 
only  with  amazement  but  with  disappointment 
and  chagrin. 

viii 


PREFACE 


For  the  contemporaneous  diplomacy  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  was  based  on 
the  assumption  that  the  Balkan  States  would  be 
vanquished  by  Turkey.  And  its  standing 
policy  had  been  on  the  one  hand  to  keep  the 
Kingdom  of  Servia  small  and  weak  (for  the 
Dual  Monarchy  was  itself  an  important  Serb 
state)  and  on  the  other  hand  to  broaden  her 
Adriatic  possessions  and  also  to  make  her  way 
through  Novi  Bazar  and  Macedonia  to  Saloniki 
and  the  Aegean,  when  the  time  came  to  secure 
this  concession  from  the  Sultan  without  pro- 
voking a European  war.  It  seemed  in  1908  as 
though  the  favorable  moment  had  arrived  to 
make  a first  move,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government  put  forward  a project  for  connect- 
ing the  Bosnian  and  Macedonian  railway  sys- 
tems. But  the  only  result  was  to  bring  to  an  :i 
end  the  co-operation  which  had  for  some  years 
been  maintained  between  the  Austrian  and  Rus- 
sian governments  in  the  enforcement  upon  the 
Porte  of  the  adoption  of  reforms  in  Macedonia. 


IX 


PREFACE 


And  now  the  result  of  the  Balkan  Wars  of 
1912-1913  was  the  practical  expulsion  of  Tur- 
key from  Europe  and  the  territorial  aggran- 
dizement of  Servia  and  the  sister  state  of 
Montenegro  through  the  annexation  of  those 
very  Turkish  domains  which  lay  between  the 
Austro-Hungarian  frontier  and  the  Aegean. 
At  every  point  Austro-Hungarian  policies  had 
met  with  reverses. 

Only  one  success  could  possibly  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  diplomacy  of  the  Ballplatz.  The 
exclusion  of  Servia  from  the  Adriatic  Sea  and 
the  establishment  of  the  independent  State  of 
Albania  was  the  achievement  of  Count  Berch- 
told,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  The  new  State  has  been  a powder 
magazine  from  the  beginning,  and  since  the 
withdrawal  of  Prince  William  of  Wied,  the 
government,  always  powerless,  has  fallen  into 
chaos.  Intervention  on  the  part  of  neighboring 
states  is  inevitable.  And  only  last  month  the 
southern  part  of  Albania — that  is.  Northern 


PREFACE 


Epirus — was  occupied  by  a Greek  army  for  the 
purpose  of  ending  the  sanguinary  anarchy 
which  has  hitherto  prevailed.  This  action  will 
be  no  surprise  to  the  readers  of  this  volume. 
The  occupation,  or  rather  re-occupation,  is  de- 
clared by  the  Greek  Government  to  be  provi- 
sional and  it  is  apparently  approved  by  all  the 
Great  Powers.  Throughout  the  rest  of  Al- 
bania similar  intervention  will  be  necessary  to 
establish  order,  and  to  protect  the  life  and 
property  of  the  inhabitants  without  distinction 
of  race,  tribe,  or  creed.  Servia  might  perhaps 
have  governed  the  country,  had  she  not  been 
compelled  by  the  Great  Powers,  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary,  to  withdraw  her 
forces.  And  her  extrusion  from  the  Adriatic 
threw  her  back  toward  the  Aegean,  with  the 
result  of  shutting  Bulgaria  out  of  Central  Mace- 
donia, which  was  annexed  by  Greece  and  Ser- 
via presumably  under  arrangements  satisfactory 
to  the  latter  for  an  outlet  to  the  sea  at  Saloniki. 

The  war  declared  by  Austria-Hungary 


XI 


PREFACE 


against  Servia  may  be  regarded  to  some  extent 
as  an  effort  to  nullify  in  the  interests  of  the 
former  the  enormous  advantages  which  accrued 
directly  to  Servia  and  indirectly  to  Russia  from 
the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913.  That  Russia 
should  have  come  to  the  support  of  Servia  was 
as  easy  to  foresee  as  any  future  political  event 
whatever.  And  the  action  of  Germany  and 
France  once  war  had  broken  out  between  their 
respective  allies  followed  as  a matter  of  course. 
r-if  the  Austro-German  Alliance  wins  in  the 
War  of  Many  Nations  it  will  doubtless  control 
the  eastern  Adriatic  and  open  up  a way  for  itself 
to  the  Aegean.  Indeed,  in  that  event,  German 
trade  and  German  political  influence  would 
spread  unchallenged  across  the  continents  from 
the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  In- 
dian Ocean.  Turkey  is  a friend  and  ally;  but 
even  if  Turkey  were  hostile  she  would  have  no 
strength  to  resist  such  victorious  powers.  And 
the  Balkan  States,  with  the  defeat  of  Russia, 
would  be  compelled  to  recognize  Germanic 
supremacy. 


PREFACE 


If  on  the  other  hand  the  Allies  come  out 
victorious  in  the  War  of  Many  Nations,  Servia 
and  perhaps  Roumania  would  be  permitted  to 
annex  the  provinces  occupied  by  their  brethren 
in  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  Servian  expansion 
to  the  Adriatic  would  be  assured.  The  Balkan 
States  would  almost  inevitably  fall  under  the 
controlling  influence  of  Russia,  who  would  be- 
come mistress  of  Constantinople  and  gain 
an  unrestricted  outlet  to  the  Mediterranean 
through  the  Bosphorus,  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
and  the  Dardanelles. 

In  spite  of  themselves  the  destiny  of  the 
peoples  of  the  Balkans  is  once  more  set  on  the 
issue  of  war.  It  is  not  inconceivable,  therefore, 
that  some  or  all  of  those  States  may  be  drawn 
into  the  present  colossal  conflict.  In  1912-1913 
the  first  war  showed  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Monte- 
negro, and  Servia  allied  against  Turkey;  and  in 
the  second  war  Greece,  Montenegro,  and  Ser- 
via were  joined  by  Roumania  in  the  war  against 
Bulgaria,  who  was  also  independently  attacked 

xiii 


PREFACE 


by  Turkey.  What  may  happen  in  1914  or  1915 
no  one  can  predict.  But  if  this  terrible  con- 
flagration, which  is  already  devastating  Europe 
and  convulsing  all  the  continents  and  vexing  all 
the  oceans  of  the  globe,  spreads  to  the  Balkans, 
one  may  hazard  the  guess  that  Greece,  Monte- 
negro, Servia,  and  Roumania  will  stand  to- 
gether on  the  side  of  the  Allies  and  that  Bul- 
garia if  she  is  not  carried  away  by  marked 
Austro-German  victories  will  remain  neutral, — 
unless  indeed  the  other  Balkan  States  win  her 
over,  as  they  not  inconceivably  might  do,  if  they 
rose  to  the  heights  of  unwonted  statesmanship 
by  recognizing  her  claim  to  that  part  of  Mace- 
donia in  which  the  Bulgarian  element  predomi- 
nates but  which  was  ceded  to  her  rivals  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bukarest. 

But  I have  said  enough  to  indicate  that  as  in 
its  origin  so  also  in  its  results  this  awful  cata- 
clysm under  which  the  civilized  world  is  now 
reeling  will  be  found  to  be  vitally  connected  with 
the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913.  And  I conclude 


XIV 


PREFACE 


with  the  hope  that  the  present  volume,  which 
devotes  indeed  but  little  space  to  military  mat- 
ters and  none  at  all  to  atrocities  and  massacres, 
may  prove  helpful  to  readers  who  seek  light 
on  the  underlying  conditions,  the  causes,  and 
the  consequences  of  those  historic  struggles. 
The  favor  already  accorded  to  the  work  and  the 
rapid  exhaustion  of  the  first  edition*  seem  to 
furnish  some  justification  of  this  hope. 

Jacob  Gould  Schurman. 

November  26,  1914. 


* The  present  work  is  rather  a reprint  than  a new 
edition,  few  changes  having  been  made  except  the  cor- 
rection of  typographical  errors. 


xv 


\ 


V 


INTRODUCTION 


The  changes  made  in  the  map  of  Europe  by 
the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913  were  not 
merely  the  occasion  but  a cause  and  probably 
the  most  potent,  and  certainly  the  most  urgent, 
of  all  the  causes  that  led  to  the  World  War 
which  has  been  raging  with  such  titanic  fury 
since  the  summer  of  1914. 

Had  the  Balkan  Allies  after  their  triumph 
over  Turkey  not  fallen  out  amongst  themselves, 
had  there  been  no  second  Balkan  War  in  1913, 
had  the  Turkish  provinces  wrested  from  the 
Porte  by  the  united  arms  of  Bulgaria,  Greece, 
Servia,  and  Montenegro  been  divided  amongst 
the  victors  either  by  diplomacy  or  arbitration 
substantial  justice  would  have  been  done  to  all, 
none  of  them  would  have  been  humiliated,  and 
their  moderation  and  concord  would  have  com- 


XVII 


INTRODUCTION 


mended  their  achievement  to  the  Great  Powers 
who  might  perhaps  have  secured  the  acquies- 
cence of  Austria-Hungary  in  the  necessary 
enlargement  of  Servia  and  the  expansion  of 
Greece  to  Saloniki  and  beyond. 

But  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Balkan  War 
nullified  all  these  fair  prospects.  And  Bul- 
garia, who  brought  it  on,  found  herself  en- 
circled by  enemies,  including  not  only  all  her 
recent  Allies  against  Turkey,  but  also  Turkey 
herself,  and  even  Roumania,  who  had  re- 
mained a neutral  spectator  of  the  first  Balkan 
War.  Of  course  Bulgaria  was  defeated.  And 
a terrible  punishment  was  inflicted  on  her. 
She  was  stripped  of  a large  part  of  the  terri- 
tory she  had  just  conquered  from  Turkey,  in- 
cluding her  most  glorious  battle-fields ; her 
original  provinces  were  dismembered ; her  ex- 
tension to  the  Aegean  Sea  was  seriously  ob- 
structed, if  not  practically  blocked ; and, 
bitterest  and  most  tragic  of  all,  the  redemption 
of  the  Bulgarians  in  Macedonia,  which  was  the 

xviii 


INTRODUCTION 


principal  object  and  motive  of  her  war  against 
Turkey  in  1912,  was  frustrated  and  rendered 
hopeless  by  Greek  and  Servian  annexations  of 
Macedonian  territory  extending  from  the 
Mesta  to  the  Drin  with  the  great  cities  of 
Saloniki,  Kavala,  and  Monastir,  which  in  the 
patriotic  national  consciousness  had  long 
loomed  up  as  fixed  points  in  the  “manifest 
destiny”  of  Bulgaria. 

That  the  responsibility  for  precipitating  the 
second  Balkan  War  rests  on  Bulgaria  is  de- 
monstrated in  the  latter  portion  of  this  volume. 
Yet  the  intransigent  and  bellicose  policy  of 
Bulgaria  was  from  the  point  of  view  of  her 
own  interests  so  short-sighted,  so  perilous,  so 
foolish  and  insane  that  it  seemed,  even  at  the 
time,  to  be  directed  by  some  external  power 
and  for  some  ulterior  purpose.  No  proof, 
however,  was  then  available.  But  hints  of  that 
suspicion  were  clearly  conveyed  even  in  the 
first  edition  of  this  volume,  which,  it  may  be 
recalled,  antedates  the  outbreak  of  the  great 


XIX 


INTRODUCTION 


European  War.  Thus,  on  page  103,  the  ques- 
tion was  put: 

“Must  we  assume  that  there  is  some 
ground  for  suspecting  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary was  inciting  Bulgaria  to  war?” 

And  again,  on  page  108,  with  reference  to 
General  SavofFs  order  directing  the  attack  on 
the  Greek  and  Servian  forces  which  initiated 
the  second  Balkan  War,  the  inquiry  was  made : 

“Did  General  Savofif  act  on  his  own  re- 
sponsibility? Or  is  there  any  truth  in  the 
charge  that  King  Ferdinand,  after  a long 
consultation  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister,  instructed  the  General  to  issue 
the  order?” 

These  questions  may  now  be  answered  with 
positive  assurance.  What  was  only  surmise 
when  this  volume  was  written  is  to-day  in- 
dubitable certainty.  The  proof  is  furnished 
by  the  highest  authorities  both  Italian  and 
Russian. 

When  the  second  Balkan  War  broke  out 
San  Giuliano  was  Prime  Minister  of  Italy. 
And  he  has  recently  published  the  fact  that  at 


XX 


INTRODUCTION 


that  time — the  summer  of  1913 — the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  communicated  to  the 
Italian  government  its  intention  of  making 
war  on  Servia  and  claimed  under  the  terms  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  the  co-operation  of  Italy  and 
Germany.  The  Italian  government  repudiated 
the  obligation  imputed  to  it  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  flatly  declared  that  the  Triple  Al- 
liance had  nothing  to  do  with  a war  of  aggres- 
sion. That  Austria-Hungary  did  not  proceed 
to  declare  war  against  Servia  at  that  time — 
perhaps  because  she  was  discouraged  by  Ger- 
many as  well  as  by  Italy — makes  it  all  the 
more  intelligible,  in  view  of  her  bellicose  atti- 
tude, that  she  should  have  been  urgent  and  in- 
sistent in  pushing  Bulgaria  forward  to  smite 
their  common  rival. 

This  conclusion  is  confirmed  by  the  positive 
statement  of  the  Russian  government.  The 
communication  accompanying  the  declaration 
of  war  against  Bulgaria,  dated  October  18, 
1915,  contains  the  following  passage: 

xxi 


$ 


INTRODUCTION 


“The  victorious  war  of  the  united  Balkan 
people  against  their  ancient  enemy,  Tur- 
key, assured  to  Bulgaria  an  honorable 
place  in  the  Slavic  family.  But  under 
Austro-German  suggestion,  contrary  to 
the  advice  of  the  Russian  Emperor  and 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Bulgarian 
government,  the  Coburg  Prince  on  June 
29,  1913,  moved  Bulgarian  armies  against 
the  Serbians.” 

The  “Coburg  Prince”  is  of  course  Ferdi- 
nand, King  of  Bulgaria.  That  he  acted  under 
Austro-Hungarian  influences  in  attacking  his 
Balkan  Allies  on  that  fateful  Sunday,  June  29, 
1913,  is  no  longer  susceptible  of  doubt.  But 
whatever  other  inferences  may  be  drawn  from 
that  conclusion  it  certainly  makes  the  course  of 
Bulgaria  in  launching  the  second  Balkan  War, 
though  its  moral  character  remains  unchanged, 
look  less  hopeless  and  desperate  than  it  other- 
wise appeared.  Had  she  not  Austria-Hungary 
behind  her?  And  had  not  Austria-Hungary 
at  that  very  time  informed  her  Italian  ally  that 
she  intended  making  war  against  Servia? 

But,  whatever  the  explanation,  the  thunder- 

xxii 


INTRODUCTION 


bolt  forged  in  1913  was  not  launched  till  July 
28,  1914,  when  Austria-Hungary  formally  de- 
clared war  on  Servia.  The  occasion  was  the 
assassination,  a month  earlier,  of  the  heir  to 
the  throne,  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his 
wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg,  in  the  streets 
of  Sarajevo.  The  occasion,  however,  was  not 
the  cause  of  the  war.  The  cause  was  that 
which  moved  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  announce 
a war  on  Servia  in  the  summer  of  1913/,  namely, 
dissatisfaction  with  the  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment of  Servia  as  a result  of  the  first  Balkan 
War  and  alarm  at  the  Pan-Serb  agitation  and 
propaganda  which  followed  the  Servian  vic- 
tories over  Turkey.  These  motives  had  subset 
quently  been  much  intensified  by  the  triumph  of 
Servia  over  Bulgaria  in  the  second  Balkan  W'ar. 

The  relations  of  Austria-Hungary  to  Servia 
had  been  acutely  strained  since  October,  1908, 
when  the  former  annexed  the  Turkish  prov- 
inces of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  under 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin  she  had  been 

xxiii 


INTRODUCTION 


administering-  since  1878.  The  inhabitants  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are  Serb,  and  Serb 
also  are  the  inhabitants  of  Dalmatia  on  the 
west  and  Croatia  on  the  north,  which  the  Dual 
Monarchy  had  already  brought  under  its 
sceptre.  The  new  annexation  therefore  seemed 
a fatal  and  a final  blow  to  the  national  aspira- 
tions of  the  Serb  race  and  it  was  bitterly  re- 
sented by  those  who  had  already  been  gathered 
together  and  “redeemed”  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Servia.  A second  disastrous  consequence  of 
the  annexation  was  that  it  left  Servia  hope- 
lessly land-locked.  The  Serb  population  of 
Dalmatia  and  Herzegovina  looked  out  on  the 
Adriatic  along  a considerable  section  of  its 
eastern  coast,  but  Servia’s  long-cherished  hope 
of  becoming  a maritime  state  by  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Serb  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina was  now  definitively  at  an  end.  She 
protested,  she  appealed,  she  threatened;  but 
with  Germany  behind  the  Dual  Monarchy  and 
Russia  still  weak  from  the  effects  of  the  war 


XXIV 


INTRODUCTION 


with  Japan,  she  was  quickly  compelled  to  sub- 
mit to  superior  force. 

During  the  war  of  the  Balkan  Allies  against 
Turkey  Servia  made  one  more  effort  to  get  to 
the  Adriatic, — this  time  by  way  of  Albania. 
.She  marched  her  forces  over  the  mountains 
of  that  almost  impassable  country  and  reached 
the  sea  at  Durazzo.  But  she  was  forced  back 
by  the  European  powers  at  the  demand  of 
Austria-Hungary,  as  some  weeks  later  on  the 
same  compulsion  she  had  to  withdraw  from 
the  siege  of  Scutari.  Then  she  turned  toward 
the  Aegean,  and  the  second  Balkan  War  gave 
her  a new  opportunity.  The  treaty  of  Buka- 
rest  and  the  convention  with  Greece  assured 
her  of  an  outlet  to  the  sea  at  Saloniki.  But 
this  settlement  proved  scarcely  less  objection- 
able to  Austria-Hungary  than  the  earlier 
dream  of  Servian  expansion  to  the  Adriatic  by 
the  annexation  of  the  Turkish  provinces  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

The  fact  is  that,  if  we  look  at  the  matter 


XXV 


INTRODUCTION 


dispassionately  and  in  a purely  objective  spirit, 
we  shall  find  that  there  really  was  a hopeless 
incompatibility  between  the  ideals,  aims,  poli- 
cies, and  interests  of  the  Servians  and  the  Serb 
race  and  those  of  the  Austrians  and  Hun- 
garians. Any  aggrandizement  of  the  King- 
dom of  Servia,  any  enlargement  of  its  terri- 
tory, any  extension  to  the  sea  and  especially  to 
the  Adriatic,  any  heightening  and  intensifying 
of  the  national  consciousness  of  its  people  in- 
volved some  danger  to  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
For  besides  the  Germans  who  control  Austria, 
and  the  Hungarians  who  control  Hungary,  the. 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  embraces  many 
millions  of  Slavs,  and  the  South  Slavs  are  of 
the  same  family  and  speak  practically  the  same 
language  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Servia.  And  Austria  and  Hungary  can  not 
get  to  their  outlets  on  the  Adriatic — Trieste 
and  Fiume — without  passing  through  territory 
inhabited  by  these  South  Slavs. 

If,  therefore,  Austria  and  Hungary  were 


XXVI 


INTRODUCTION 


not  to  be  left  land-locked  they  must  at  all  haz- 
ards prevent  the  absorption  of  their  South  Slav 
subjects  by  the  Kingdom  of  Servia.  Pan- 
Serbism  at  once  menaced  the  integrity  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  and  jeopardized  its 
position  on  the  Adriatic.  Hence  the  cardinal 
features  in  the  Balkan  policy  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary were  a ruthless  repression  of  national 
aspiration  among  its  South  Slav  subjects — the 
inhabitants  of  Croatia,  Dalmatia,  Bosnia,  and 
Herzegovina;  a watchful  and  jealous  opposi- 
tion to  any  increase  of  the  territory  or  re- 
sources of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia;  and  a stern 
and  unalterable  determination  to  prevent  Ser- 
vian expansion  to  the  Adriatic. 

The  new  Servia  which  emerged  from  the 
Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913  was  an  object  of 
anxiety  and  even  of  alarm  to  the  statesmen  of 
Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth.  The  racial  and  na- 
tional aspirations  already  astir  among  the 
South  Slavs  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  were 
quickened  and  intensified  by  the  great  victories 


XXV 11 


INTRODUCTION 


won  by  their  Servian  brethren  over  both  Turks 
and  Bulgarians  and  by  the  spectacle  of  the 
territorial  aggrandizement  which  accrued  from 
those  victories  to  the  independent  Kingdom  of 
Servia.  Might  not  this  Greater  Servia  prove 
a magnet  to  draw  the  kindred  Slavs  of  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina,  Dalmatia,  and  Croatia  away 
from  their  allegiance  to  an  alien  empire  ? The 
diplomacy  of  Vienna  had  indeed  succeeded  in 
excluding  Servia  from  the  Adriatic  but  it  had 
neither  prevented  its  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment nor  blocked  its  access  to  the  Aegean. 

Access  to  the  Aegean  was  not,  however,  as 
serious  a matter  as  access  to  the  Adriatic. 
Yet  the  expansion  of  Servia  to  the  south  over 
the  Macedonian  territory  she  had  wrested  from 
Turkey,  as  legalized  in  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest, 
nullified  the  Austro-Hungarian  dream  of  ex- 
pansion through  Novi  Bazar  and  Macedonia 
to  the  Aegean  and  the  development  from 
Saloniki  as  a base  of  a great  and  profitable 
commerce  with  all  the  Near  and  Middle  East. 

xxviii 


INTRODUCTION 


Here  were  the  conditions  of  a national 
tragedy.  They  have  developed  into  a great 
international  war,  the  greatest  and  most  ter- 
rible ever  waged  on  this  planet. 

It  may  be  worth  while  in  concluding  to  note 
the  relations  of  the  Balkan  belligerents  of 
1912- 1913  to  the  two  groups  of  belligerents  in 
the  present  world-conflict. 

The  nemesis  of  the  treaties  of  London  and 
Bukarest  and  the  fear  of  the  Great  Powers 
pursue  the  Balkan  nations  and  determine  their 
alignments.  The  declaration  of  war  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary against  Servia,  which  started  the 
present  cataclysm,  fixed  the  enemy  status  of 
Servia  and  also  Montenegro.  The  good  rela- 
tions long  subsisting  between  Emperor  Wil- 
liam and  the  Porte  were  a guarantee  to  the 
Central  Powers  of  the  support  of  Turkey, 
which  quickly  declared  in  their  favor.  The 
desire  of  avenging  the  injury  done  her  by  the 
treaty  of  Bukarest  and  the  prospect  of  terri- 
torial aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of  her 


XXIX 


INTRODUCTION 


sister  Slav  nation  on  the  west  drew  Bulgaria 
(which  was  influenced  also  by  the  victories  of 
the  Germanic  forces)  into  the  same  group  in 
company  with  Turkey,  her  enemy  in  both  the 
Balkan  Wars  of  1912-1913.  Bulgaria’s  op- 
portunity for  revenge  soon  arrived.  It  was 
the  Bulgarian  army,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Austro-German  forces,  that  overran  Servia 
and  Montenegro  and  drove  the  national  armies 
beyond  their  own  boundaries  into  foreign  ter- 
ritory. If  the  fortunes  of  war  turn  and  the 
Entente  Powers  get  the  upper  hand  in  the 
Balkans,  these  expelled  armies  of  Servia  and 
Montenegro,  who  after  rest  and  reorganiza- 
tion and  re-equipping  in  Corfu  have  this  sum- 
mer been  transported  by  France  and  England 
to  Saloniki,  may  have  the  satisfaction  of  de- 
vastating the  territory  of  the  sister  Slav  state 
of  Bulgaria,  quite  in  the  divisive  and  interne- 
cine spirit  of  all  Balkan  history.  The  fate  and 
future  of  Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Montenegro 
now  depend  on  the  issue  of  the  great  European 


XXX 


INTRODUCTION 


conflict.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  Turkey, 
into  which  meanwhile  Russian  forces,  travers- 
ing the  Caucasus,  have  driven  a dangerous 
wedge  through  Armenia  towards  Mesopo- 
tamia. Roumania  has  thus  far  maintained  the 
policy  of  neutrality  to  which  she  adhered  so 
successfully  in  the  first  Balkan  war — a policy 
which  in  view  of  her  geographical  situation, 
with  Bulgaria  to  the  south,  Russia  to  the 
north,  and  Austria-Hungary  to  the  west,  she 
cannot  safely  abandon  till  fortune  has  declared 
more  decisively  for  one  or  the  other  group  of 
belligerents.  The  only  remaining  party  to  the 
Balkan  Wars  is  Greece,  and  the  situation  of 
Greece,  though  not  tragic  like  that  of  Servia, 
must  be  exceedingly  humiliating  to  the  Greek 
nation  and  to  the  whole  Hellenic  race. 

When  the  war  broke  out,  Mr.  Venizelos  was 
still  prime  minister  of  Greece.  His  policy 
was  to  go  loyally  to  the  assistance  of  Servia, 
as  required  by  the  treaty  between  the  two 
countries;  to  defend  New  Greece  against  Bui- 


XXXI 


INTRODUCTION 


garia,  to  whom,  however,  he  was  ready  to 
make  some  concessions  on  the  basis  of  a quid 
pro  quo;  and  to  join  and  co-operate  actively 
with  the  Entente  Powers  on  the  assurance  of 
receiving  territorial  compensation  in  Asia 
Minor.  King  Constantine,  on  the  other  hand, 
seems  to  have  held  that  the  war  of  the  Great 
Powers  in  the  Balkans  practically  abrogated 
the  treaty  between  Greece  and  Servia  and  that, 
in  any  event,  Greek  resistance  to  the  Central 
Powers  was  useless.  The  positive  programme 
of  the  King  was  to  maintain  neutrality  between 
the  two  groups  of  belligerents  and  at  the  same 
time  to  keep  the  Greek  army  mobilized.  Be- 
tween these  two  policies  the  Greek  nation 
wavered  and  hesitated;  but  the  King,  who  en- 
joyed the  complete  confidence  of  the  general 
staff,  had  his  way  and  the  cabinet  of  Mr. 
Venizelos  was  replaced  by  another  in  sympathy 
with  the  policy  of  the  neutrality  of  Greece  and 
the  mobilization  of  the  Greek  army. 

It  was,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 


XXX11 


INTRODUCTION 


case,  an  exceedingly  difficult  policy  to  carry  out 
successfully.  Each  group  of  the  belligerents 
wanted  special  favors;  the  nation  was  divided 
on  the  subject  of  neutrality;  the  expense  of 
keeping  the  army  mobilized  was  ruinous  to  the 
country;  and  the  views  and  sympathies  of  the 
greatest  statesman  Modern  Greece  had  ever 
had  remained  out  of  office,  as  they  had  been  in 
office,  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  the 
victorious  warrior-King  and  doubtless  also  of 
the  Queen,  the  sister  of  the  German  Emperor. 

This  condition  was  one  of  unstable  equilib- 
rium which  could  not  long  continue.  It  was 
upset  on  May  26,  1916,  by  a Bulgarian  in- 
vasion of  Greek  territory  and  the  seizure  of 
Fort  Rupel,  one  of  the  keys  to  the  Struma 
Valley  and  to  eastern  Macedonia.  The  cities 
of  Seres  and  Drama  with  their  large  Greek 
population,  and  even  Kavala  are  now  in  dan- 
ger, and  the  Greek  people  seem  greatly  stirred 
by  the  situation.  Mr.  Venizelos  in  a newspaper 
article  bitterly  asks: 

xxxiii 


INTRODUCTION 


“Who  could  have  imagined  a Greek  army 
witnessing  the  Bulgarian  flag  replacing 
that  of  Greece?  Is  it  for  this  that  our 
mobilization  is  maintained?” 

But,  while  Greece  has  been  invaded  by  Bul- 
garia, with  the  support  of  Germany  (who, 
however,  has  given  a written  promise  that  the 
Greek  territory  now  occupied  shall  be  re- 
stored), Greek  sovereignty  has  since  suffered 
another  severe  shock  by  the  intervention  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  who,  under 
the  Protocol  of  London,  are  the  Protecting 
Powers  of  the  Kingdom.  These  Powers  de- 
mand of  the  Greek  government  that  the  army 
shall  be  completely  and  immediately  demobil- 
ized, that  the  present  cabinet  shall  be  replaced 
by  another  which  shall  guarantee  benevolent 
neutrality  toward  the  Entente  Powers,  that  the 
Chamber  shall  be  immediately  dissolved  and 
new  elections  held,  and  that  certain  public 
functionaries  obnoxious  to  the  legations  of  the 
Allies  shall  be  replaced.  And  statements  from 
Athens  dated  June  21  announce  that  Greece, 


XXXIV 


INTRODUCTION 


under  the  menace  of  an  embargo  maintained 
by  the  allied  navies,  has  yielded  to  these 
demands. 

With  Greece  humiliated  by  the  Protecting 
Powers  and  her  territory  occupied  by  Bulgaria, 
with  Servia  and  Montenegro  overrun  and 
occupied  by  the  German-Austrian-Bulgarian 
forces,  with  Roumania  waiting  to  see  which  of 
the  belligerent  groups  will  be  finally  victorious, 
with  Bulgaria  now  basking  in  the  sunshine  of 
the  Central  Powers  but  an  object  of  hatred  to 
all  the  Allied  Powers  and  especially  to  Russia, 
one  may  be  pardoned  for  refusing  to  make  any 
guess  whatever  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  re- 
sultant diagonal  of  the  parallelogram  of  Euro- 
pean forces  will  ultimately  run  through  the 
Balkans.  Fortunately  also  such  prediction  has 
no  place  in  an  account  of  the  Balkan  Wars  of 
1912-1913. 

To-day  the  Balkan  nations  are  the  pawns  of 
the  Great  Powers  who  are  directly  responsible 
for  the  deplorable  conditions  that  now  exist 


XXXV 


INTRODUCTION 


among  them.  Yet  in  a very  real  sense  their 
present  tragic  situation  is  the  nemesis  of  the 
political  sins  of  the  Balkan  nations  themselves. 

These  sins  are  those  of  all  undeveloped  po- 
litical communities.  Even  the  most  highly 
civilized  nations  may  temporarily  fall  under 
their  sway,  and  then  civilization  reverts  to 
barbarism,  as  the  terrible  condition  of  Europe 
to-day  actually  demonstrates.  But  the  acute 
disease  from  which  Europe  suffers  is  more  or 
less  chronic  in  the  Balkans,  where  elemental 
human  nature  has  never  been  thoroughly  dis- 
ciplined and  chastened  in  the  school  of  peace- 
ful political  life  and  experience.  Each  for 
himself  without  regard  to  others  or  even  with- 
out thought  of  a future  day  of  reckoning  seems 
to  be  the  maxim  of  national  conduct  among 
the  Balkan  peoples.  The  spirit  of  strife  and 
division  possesses  them ; they  are  dominated  by 
the  uncontrolled  instinct  of  national  egoism  and 
greed.  The  second  Balkan  War,  alike  in  its 
origin,  course,  and  conclusion,  was  a bald  ex- 


xxxvi 


INTRODUCTION 


hibition  of  the  play  of  these  primitive  and 
hateful  passions. 

The  history  of  the  world,  which  is  also  the 
high  tribunal  of  the  world,  proves  that  no  na- 
tion can  with  impunity  ignore  the  rights  of 
other  nations  or  repudiate  the  ideal  of  a com- 
mon good  or  defy  the  rule  of  righteousness  by 
which  political  communities  achieve  it — justice, 
moderation,  and  the  spirit  of  hopeful  and 
unwearying  conciliation.  In  their  war  against 
Turkey  in  1912  the  Balkan  nations,  for 
the  first  time  in  history,  laid  aside  their  mutual 
antagonisms  and  co-operated  in  a common 
cause.  This  union  and  concord  marked  at 
least  the  beginning  of  political  wisdom.  And 
it  was  vindicated,  if  ever  any  policy  was  vindi- 
cated, by  the  surprise  and  splendor  of  the 
results. 

My  hope  for  the  Balkan  nations  is  that  they 
may  return  to  this  path  from  which  they  were 
too  easily  diverted  in  1913.  They  must  learn, 
while  asserting  each  its  own  interests  and  ad- 


XXXVII 


INTRODUCTION 


vancing  each  its  own  welfare,  to  pay  scrupu- 
lous regard  to  the  rights  and  just  claims  of 
others  and  to  co-operate  wisely  for  the  common 
good  in  a spirit  of  mutual  confidence  and  good 
will.  This  high  policy,  as  expedient  as  it  is 
sound,  was  to  a considerable  extent  embodied 
in  the  leadership  of  Venizelos  and  Pashitch 
and  Gueshofif.  And  where  there  is  a leader 
with  vision  the  people  in  the  end  will  follow 
him.  May  the  final  settlement  of  the  European 
War  put  no  unnecessary  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  the  normal  political  development  of  all  the 
Balkan  Nations! 

J.  G.  S. 


President’s  Office 
Cornell  University 
July  13,  1916 


Postscript.  I remarked  in  the  foregoing 
Introduction,  that  Roumania  would  not  aban- 
don her  neutrality  till  fortune  had  declared 
more  decisively  for  one  or  the  other  group  of 
xxxviii 


INTRODUCTION 


belligerents.  That  was  written  seven  weeks 
ago.  And  within  the  last  few  days  Roumania 
has  joined  the  Allies  and  declared  war  against 
Austria-Hungary.  I also  noted  that  the  un- 
stable equilibrium  which  had  been  maintained 
in  Greece  between  the  party  of  King  Con- 
stantine and  the  party  of  Venizelos  had  already 
been  upset  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  former. 
Roumania’s  adhesion  to  the  cause  of  the  Allies 
is  bound  to  accelerate  this  movement.  It  would 
not  be  surprising  if  Greece  were  any  day  now 
to  follow  the  example  of  Roumania.  Had 
Greece  in  1914  stood  by  Venizelos  and  joined 
the  Allies  the  chances  are  that  Roumania  would 
at  that  time  have  adopted  the  same  course. 
But  the  opposition  of  King  Constantine  delayed 
that  consummation,  directly  in  the  case  of 
Greece,  and  indirectly  in  the  case  of  Roumania. 
Now  that  the  latter  has  cast  in  her  lot  with 
the  Allies  and  the  former  is  likely  at  any 
time  to  follow  her  example,  I may  be  permitted 
to  quote  the  forecast  which  I made  in  the 


XXXIX 


INTRODUCTION 


Preface  to  the  Second  Edition  of  this  volume 
under  date  of  November  26,  1914: 

“If  this  terrible  conflagration,  which  is 
already  devastating  Europe  and  convulsing 
all  the  continents  and  vexing  all  the  oceans 
of  the  globe,  spreads  to  the  Balkans,  one 
may  hazard  the  guess  that  Greece,  Monte- 
negro, Servia,  and  Roumania  will  stand 
together  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  and  that 
Bulgaria  if  she  is  not  carried  away  by 
marked  Austro-German  victories  will 
remain  neutral.’’ 

J.  G.  S. 

September  1,  1916. 


xl 


I 

TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN 
STATES 


The  Balkan  Peninsula  before  the  Wars  of  1912-1913. 


I 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN 
STATES 

The  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from  Europe 
was  long  ago  written  in  the  book  of  fate. 
There  was  nothing  uncertain  about  it  except  the 
date  and  the  agency  of  destiny. 

THE  TURKISH  EMPIRE  IN  EUROPE 

A little  clan  of  oriental  shepherds,  the  Turks 
had  in  two  generations  gained  possession  of  the 
whole  of  the  northwest  corner  of  Asia  Minor 
and  established  themselves  on  the  eastern  shore 
of  the  Bosphorus.  The  great  city  of  Brusa, 
whose  groves  to-day  enshrine  the  stately  beauty 
of  their  mosques  and  sultans’  tombs,  capitulated 
to  Orkhan,  the  son  of  the  first  Sultan,  in  1326; 
and  Nicaea,  the  cradle  of  the  Greek  church  and 
temporary  capital  of  the  Greek  Empire,  surren- 


3 


4 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


dered  in  1330.  On  the  other  side  of  the  Bos- 
phorus Orkhan  could  see  the  domes  and  palaces 
of  Constantinople  which,  however,  for  another 
century  was  to  remain  the  seat  of  the  Byzantine 
Empire. 

The  Turks  crossed  the  Hellespont  and, 
favored  by  an  earthquake,  marched  in  1358 
over  the  fallen  walls  and  fortifications  into  the 
city  of  Gallipoli.  In  1361  Adrianople  suc- 
cumbed to  the  attacks  of  Orkhan’s  son,  Murad 
I,  whose  sway  was  soon  acknowledged  in 
Thrace  and  Macedonia,  and  who  was  destined 
to  lead  the  victorious  Ottoman  armies  as  far 
north  as  the  Danube. 

But  though  the  provinces  of  the  corrupt  and 
effete  Byzantine  Empire  were  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  Turks,  the  Slavs  were  still  unsub- 
dued. Lazar  the  Serb  threw  down  the  gauntlet 
to  Murad.  On  the  memorable  field  of  Kossovo, 
in  1389,  the  opposing  forces  met — Murad  sup- 
ported by  his  Asiatic  and  European  vassals  and 
allies,  and  Lazar  with  his  formidable  army  of 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  5 

Serbs,  Bosnians,  Albanians,  Poles,  Magyars, 
and  Vlaehs.  Few  battles  in  the  world  have 
produced  such  a deep  and  lasting  impression  as 
this  battle  of  Kossovo,  in  which  the  Christian 
nations  after  long  and  stubborn  resistance 
were  vanquished  by  the  Moslems.  The 
Servians  still  sing  ballads  which  cast  a halo  of 
pathetic  romance  round  their  great  disaster. 
And  after  more  than  five  centuries  the  Mon- 
tenegrins continue  to  wear  black  on  their  caps 
in  mourning  for  that  fatal  day. 

In  the  next  two  centuries  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire moved  on  toward  the  zenith  of  its  glory. 
Mohammed  II  conquered  Constantinople  in 
1453.  And  in  1529  Suleyman  the  Magnificent 
was  at  the  gates  of  Vienna.  Suleyman’s  reign 
forms  the  climax  of  Turkish  history.  The 
Turks  had  become  a central  European  power 
occupying  Hungary  and  menacing  Austria. 
Suleyman’s  dominions  extended  from  Mecca  to 
Buda-Pesth  and  from  Bagdad  to  Algiers.  He 
commanded  the  Mediterranean,  the  Euxine, 


6 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


and  the  Red  Sea,  and  his  navies  threatened 
the  coasts  of  India  and  Spain. 

But  the  conquests  of  the  Turks  were  purely 
military.  They  did  nothing  for  their  subjects, 
whom  they  treated  with  contempt,  and  they 
wanted  nothing  from  them  but  tribute  and 
plunder.  As  the  Turks  were  always  numeri- 
cally inferior  to  the  aggregate  number  of  the 
peoples  under  their  sway,  their  one  standing 
policy  was  to  keep  them  divided' — divide  et 
impera.  To  fan  racial  and  religious  differences 
among  their  subjects  was  to  perpetuate  the  rule 
of  the  masters.  The  whole  task  of  govern- 
ment, as  the  Turks  conceived  it,  was  to  collect 
tribute  from  the  conquered  and  keep  them  in 
subjection  by  playing  off  their  differences 
against  one  another. 

But  a deterioration  of  Turkish  rulers  set  in 
soon  after  the  time  of  Suleyman  with  a corres- 
ponding decline  in  the  character  and  efficiency 
of  the  army.  And  the  growth  of  Russia  and 
the  reassertion  of  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Aus- 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  7 

tria  were  fatal  to  the  maintenance  of  an  alien 
and  detested  empire  founded  on  military  domi- 
nation alone.  By  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 
century  the  Turks  had  been  driven  out  of 
Austria,  Hungary,  Transylvania,  and  Podolia, 
and  the  northern  boundaries  of  their  Empire 
were  fixed  by  the  Carpathians,  the  Danube,  and 
the  Save.  How  marked  and  rapid  was  the  fur- 
ther decline  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  twice  in  the  eigh- 
teenth century  Austria  and  Russia  discussed 
the  project  of  dividing  it  between  them.  But  the 
inevitable  disintegration  of  the  Turkish  domin- 
ion was  not  to  inure  to  the  glorification  of  any 
of  the  Great  Powers,  though  Russia  certainly 
contributed  to  the  weakening  of  the  common 
enemy.  The  decline  and  diminution  of  the  Ot- 
toman Empire  continued  throughout  the  nine- 
teenth century.  What  happened,  however,  was 
the  revolt  of  subject  provinces  and  the  creation 
out  of  the  territory  of  European  Turkey  of  the 
independent  states  of  Greece,  Servia,  Rou- 


8 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


mania,  and  Bulgaria.  And  it  was  Bulgarians, 
Greeks,  and  Servians,  with  the  active  assistance 
of  the  Montenegrins  and  the  benevolent  neu- 
trality of  the  Roumanians,  who,  in  the  war  of 
1912-1913,  drove  the  Turk  out  of  Europe, 
leaving  him  nothing  but  the  city  of  Constanti- 
nople and  a territorial  fringe  bordered  by  the 
Chataldja  line  of  fortifications. 

THE  EARLIER  SLAV  EMPIRES 

There  is  historic  justice  in  the  circumstance 
that  the  Turkish  Empire  in  Europe  met  its 
doom  at  the  hands  of  the  Balkan  nations  them- 
selves. For  these  nationalities  had  been  com- 
pletely submerged  and  even  their  national 
consciousness  annihilated  under  centuries  of 
Moslem  intolerance,  misgovernment,  oppres- 
sion, and  cruelty. 

None  suffered  worse  than  Bulgaria,  which 
lay  nearest  to  the  capital  of  the  Mohammedan 
conqueror.  Yet  Bulgaria  had  had  a glorious, 
if  checkered,  history  long  before  there  existed 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  9 


any  Ottoman  Empire  either  in  Europe  or  in 
Asia.  From  the  day  their  sovereign  Boris 
accepted  Christianity  in  864  the  Bulgarians  had 
made  rapid  and  conspicuous  progress  in  their 
ceaseless  conflicts  with  the  Byzantine  Empire. 
The  Bulgarian  church  was  recognized  as  inde- 
pendent by  the  Greek  patriarch  at  Constanti- 
nople; its  primates  subsequently  received  the 
title  of  patriarch,  and  their  see  was  established 
at  Preslav,  and  then  successively  westward  at 
Sofia,  Vodena,  Presba,  and  finally  Ochrida, 
which  looks  out  on  the  mountains  of  Albania. 
Under  Czar  Simeon,  the  son  of  Boris,  “Bul- 
garia,” says  Gibbon,  “assumed  a rank  among 
the  civilized  powers  of  the  earth.”  His  domin- 
ions extended  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the 
Adriatic  and  comprised  the  greater  part  of 
Macedonia,  Greece,  Albania,  Servia,  and  Dal- 
matia ; leaving  only  to  the  Byzantine  Empire — 
whose  civilization  he  introduced  and  sedulously 
promoted  among  the  Bulgarians — the  cities  of 
Constantinople,  Saloniki,  and  Adrianople  with 


10 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


the  territory  immediately  surrounding  them. 
But  this  first  Bulgarian  Empire  was  short- 
lived, though  the  western  part  remained  inde- 
pendent under  Samuel,  who  reigned,  with 
Ochrida  as  his  capital,  from  976  to  1014.  Four 
years  later  the  Byzantine  Emperor,  Basil  II, 
annihilated  the  power  of  Samuel,  and  for  a 
hundred  and  fifty  years  the  Bulgarian  people 
remained  subject  to  the  rule  of  Constantinople. 
In  1186  under  the  leadership  of  the  brothers 
Asen  they  regained  their  independence.  And 
the  reign  of  Czar  Asen  II  (1218-1240)  was  the 
most  prosperous  period  of  all  Bulgarian  his- 
tory. He  restored  the  Empire  of  Simeon,  his 
boast  being  that  he  had  left  to  the  Byzantines 
nothing  but  Constantinople  and  the  cities  round 
it,  and  he  encouraged  commerce,  cultivated 
arts  and  letters,  founded  and  endowed  churches 
and  monasteries,  and  embellished  his  capital, 
Trnovo,  with  beautiful  and  magnificent  build- 
ings. After  Asen  came  a period  of  decline 
culminating  in  a humiliating  defeat  by  the  Ser 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  n 


vians  in  1330.  The  quarrels  of  the  Christian 
races  of  the  Balkans  facilitated  the  advance  of 
the  Moslem  invader,  who  overwhelmed  the 
Serbs  and  their  allies  on  the  memorable  field 
of  Kossovo  in  1389,  and  four  years  later  cap- 
tured and  burned  the  Bulgarian  capital,  Trnovo, 
Czar  Shishman  himself  perishing  obscurely  in 
the  common  destruction.  For  five  centuries 
Bulgaria  remained  under  Moslem  despotism, 
we  ourselves  being  the  witnesses  of  her  eman- 
cipation in  the  last  thirty-five  years. 

The  fate  of  the  Serbs  differed  only  in  degree 
from  that  of  the  Bulgarians.  Converted  to 
Christianity  in  the  middle  of  the  ninth  century, 
the  major  portion  of  the  race  remained  till  the 
twelfth  century  under  either  Bulgarian  or 
Byzantine  sovereignty.  But  Stephen  Nemanyo 
brought  under  his  rule  Herzegovina,  Montene- 
gro, and  part  of  modern  Servia  and  old  Servia, 
and  on  his  abdication  in  1195  in  favor  of  his 
son  launched  a royal  dynasty  which  reigned 
over  the  Serb  people  for  two  centuries.  Of 


12 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


that  line  the  most  distinguished  member  was 
Stephen  Dushan,  who  reigned  from  1331  to 
1355.  He  wrested  the  whole  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  from  the  Byzantine  Emperor,  and 
took  Belgrade,  Bosnia,  and  Herzegovina  from 
the  King  of  Hungary.  He  encouraged  litera- 
ture, gave  to  his  country  a highly  advanced 
code  of  laws,  and  protected  the  church  whose 
head — the  Archbishop  of  Ipek — he  raised  to 
the  dignity  of  patriarch.  On  Easter  Day  1346 
he  had  himself  crowned  at  Uskub  as  “Emperor 
of  the  Greeks  and  Serbs.”  A few  years  later 
he  embarked  on  an  enterprise  by  which,  had  he 
been  successful,  he  might  have  changed  the 
course  of  European  history.  It  was  nothing 
less  than  the  capture  of  Constantinople  and  the 
union  of  Serbs,  Bulgarians,  and  Greeks  into  an 
empire  which  might  defend  Christendom 
against  the  rising  power  of  Islam.  Dushan  was 
within  forty  miles  of  his  goal  with  an  army  of 
80,000  men  when  he  died  suddenly  in  camp  on 
the  20th  of  December,  1355.  Thirty-four  years 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  13 

later  Dushan’s  countrymen  were  annihilated  by 
the  Turks  at  Kossovo ! All  the  Slavonic  peo- 
ples of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  save  the  brave 
mountaineers  of  Montenegro  came  under  Mos- 
lem subjection.  And  under  Moslem  subjection 
they  remained  till  the  nineteenth  century. 

TURKISH  OPPRESSION  OF  SLAVS 

It  is  impossible  to  give  any  adequate  descrip- 
tion of  the  horrors  of  Turkish  rule  in  these 
Christian  countries  of  the  Balkans.  Their 
people,  disqualified  from  holding  even  the 
smallest  office,  were  absolutely  helpless  under 
the  oppression  of  their  foreign  masters,  who 
ground  them  down  under  an  intolerable  load  of 
taxation  and  plunder.  The  culminating  cruelty 
was  the  tribute  of  Christian  children  from  ten 
to  twelve  years  of  age  who  were  sent  to  Con- 
stantinople to  recruit  the  corps  of  janissaries. 
It  is  not  surprising  that  for  the  protection  of 
their  wives  and  children  and  the  safeguarding 
of  their  interests  the  nobles  of  Bosnia  and  the 


14 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Pomaks  of  Southeastern  Bulgaria  embraced 
the  creed  of  their  conquerors;  the  wonder  is 
that  the  people  as  a whole  remained  true  to 
their  Christian  faith  even  at  the  cost  of  daily 
martyrdom  from  generation  to  generation. 
Their  fate  too  grew  worse  as  the  Turkish 
power  declined  after  the  unsuccessful  siege  of 
Vienna  in  1683.  For  at  first  Ottoman  troops 
ravaged  Bulgaria  as  they  marched  through  the 
land  on  their  way  to  Austria;  and  later  dis- 
banded soldiers  in  defiance  of  Turkish  author- 
ity plundered  the  country  and  committed 
nameless  atrocities.  Servia  was  to  some  extent 
protected  by  her  remote  location,  but  that  very 
circumstance  bred  insubordination  in  the  janis- 
saries, who  refused  to  obey  the  local  Turkish 
governors  and  gave  themselves  up  to  looting, 
brigandage,  and  massacre.  The  national  spirit 
of  the  subject  races  was  completely  crushed. 
The  Servians  and  Bulgarians  for  three  or  four 
centuries  lost  all  consciousness  of  a fatherland. 
The  countrymen  of  Simeon  and  Dushan  became 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  15 

mere  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for 
their  foreign  masters.  Servia  and  Bulgaria 
simply  disappeared.  As  late  as  1834  Kinglake 
in  travelling  to  Constantinople  from  Belgrade 
must  have  passed  straight  across  Bulgaria.  Yet 
in  “Eothen,”  in  which  he  describes  his  travels, 
he  never  even  mentions  that  country  or  its 
people. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  that  this  history  of 
Turkish  horrors  should  have  burned  itself  into 
the  heart  and  soul  of  the  resurrected  Servia  and 
Bulgaria  of  our  own  day.  But  there  is  another 
circumstance  connected  with  the  ruthless  des- 
truction and  long  entombment  of  these  nation- 
alities which  it  is  difficult  for  foreigners,  even 
the  most  intelligent  foreigners,  to  understand 
or  at  any  rate  to  grasp  in  its  full  significance. 
Yet  the  sentiments  to  which  that  circumstance 
has  given  rise  and  which  it  still  nourishes  are 
perhaps  as  potent  a factor  in  contemporary 
Balkan  politics  as  the  antipathy  of  the  Christian 
nations  to  their  former  Moslem  oppressors. 


i6 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


GREEK  ECCLESIASTICAL  DOMINATION  OF  SLAVS 

I refer  to  the  special  and  exceptional  position 
held  by  the  Greeks  in  the  Turkish  dominions. 
Though  the  Moslems  had  possessed  themselves 
of  the  Greek  Empire  from  the  Bosphorus  to  the 
Danube,  Greek  domination  still  survived  as  an 
intellectual,  ecclesiastical,  and  commercial  force. 
The  nature  and  effects  of  that  supremacy,  and 
its  results  upon  the  fortunes  of  other  Balkan 
nations,  we  must  now  proceed  to  consider. 

The  Turkish  government  classifies  its  sub- 
jects not  on  the  basis  of  nationality  but  on  the 
basis  of  religion.  A homogeneous  religious 
group  is  designated  a millet  or  nation.  Thus 
the  Moslems  form  the  millet  of  Islam.  And  at 
the  present  time  there  are  among  others  a 
Greek  millet,  a Catholic  millet,  and  a Jewish 
millet.  But  from  the  first  days  of  the  Ottoman 
conquest  until  very  recent  times  all  the  Chris- 
tian population,  irrespective  of  denominational 
differences,  was  assigned  by  the  Sultans  to  the 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  17 

Greek  millet,  of  which  the  patriarch  of  Con- 
stantinople was  the  head.  The  members  of  this 
millet  were  all  called  Greeks ; the  bishops  and 
higher  clergy  were  exclusively  Greek;  and  the 
language  of  their  churches  and  schools  was 
Greek,  which  was  also  the  language  of  litera- 
ture, commerce,  and  polite  society.  But  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  patriarch  was  not  restricted 
even  to  ecclesiastical  and  educational  matters. 
It  extended  to  a considerable  part  of  civil  law — 
notably  to  questions  of  marriage,  divorce,  and 
inheritance  when  they  concerned  Christians 
only. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  possession  by  the  Greek 
patriarch  of  Constantinople  of  this  enormous 
power  over  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Turks 
enabled  him  to  carry  on  a propaganda  of  hellen- 
ization.  The  disappearance  for  three  centuries 
of  the  national  consciousness  in  Servia  and  Bul- 
garia was  not  the  sole  work  of  the  Moslem 
invader;  a more  fatal  blight  to  the  national 
languages  and  culture  were  the  Greek  bishops 


i8 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


and  clergy  who  conducted  their  churches  and 
schools.  And  if  Kinglake  knew  nothing  of 
Bulgaria  as  late  as  1834  it  was  because  every 
educated  person  in  that  country  called  himself 
a Greek.  For  it  cannot  be  too  strongly  em- 
phasized that  until  comparatively  recent  times 
all  Christians  of  whatever  nation  or  sect  were 
officially  recognized  by  the  Turks  as  members 
of  the  Greek  millet  and  were  therefore  desig- 
nated Greeks. 

The  hostility  of  the  Slavonic  peoples  in  the 
Balkans,  and  especially  of  the  Bulgarians,  to 
the  Greeks,  grows  out  of  the  ecclesiastical  and 
educational  domination  which  the  Greek  clergy 
and  bishops  so  long  and  so  relentlessly  exer- 
cised over  them.  Of  course  the  Turkish  Sul- 
tans are  responsible  for  the  arrangement.  But 
there  is  no  evidence  that  they  had  any  other 
intention  than  to  rid  themselves  of  a disagree- 
able task.  For  the  rest  they  regarded  Greeks 
and  Slavs  with  equal  contempt.  But  the  Greeks 
quickly  recognized  the  racial  advantage  of  their 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


19 


ecclesiastical  hegemony.  And  it  was  not  in 
human  nature  to  give  it  up  without  a struggle. 
The  patriarchate  retained  its  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion over  all  orthodox  populations  till  1870, 
when  the  Sultan  issued  a firman  establishing  the 
Bulgarian  exarchate. 

There  were  two  other  spheres  in  which  Greek 
influence  was  paramount  in  the  Turkish  Empire. 
The  Turk  is  a soldier  and  farmer;  the  Greek  is 
pre-eminent  as  a trader,  and  his  ability  secured 
him  a disproportionate  share  of  the  trade  of  the 
empire.  Again,  the  Greeks  of  Constantinople 
and  other  large  cities  gradually  won  the  con- 
fidence of  the  Turks  and  attained  political 
importance.  During  the  eighteenth  century  the 
highest  officials  in  the  empire  were  invariably 
Phanariots,  as  the  Constantinople  Greeks  were 
termed  from  the  quarter  of  the  city  in  which 
they  resided. 

In  speaking  of  the  Greeks  I have  not  had  in 
mind  the  inhabitants  of  the  present  kingdom  of 
Greece.  Their  subjection  by  the  Turks  was  as 


20 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


complete  as  that  of  the  Serbs  and  Bulgarians, 
though  of  course  they  were  exempt  from  eccle- 
siastical domination  at  the  hands  of  an  alien 
clergy  speaking  a foreign  language.  The 
enmity  of  the  Bulgarians  may  to-day  be  visited 
upon  the  subjects  of  King  Constantine,  but  it 
was  not  their  ancestors  who  imposed  upon  Bul- 
garia foreign  schools  and  churches  but  the 
Greeks  of  Constantinople  and  Thrace,  over 
whom  the  government  of  Athens  has  never 
had  jurisdiction. 

SERVIAN  INDEPENDENCE 

So  much  of  the  Balkan  countries  under  Turk- 
ish rule.  Their  emancipation  did  not  come  till 
the  nineteenth  century.  The  first  to  throw  off 
the  yoke  was  Servia.  Taking  advantage  of  the 
disorganization  and  anarchy  prevailing  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire  the  Servian  people  rose  in  a 
body  against  their  oppressors  in  January,  1804. 
Under  the  able  leadership  first  of  Kara-George 
and  afterward  of  Milosh  Obrenovich,  Servian 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  2 I 


autonomy  was  definitely  established  in  1817. 
The  complete  independence  of  the  country  was 
recognized  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878. 
The  boundaries  of  the  new  state,  however,  fell 
far  short  of  Servian  aspirations,  excluding  as 
they  did  large  numbers  of  the  Servian  popula- 
tion. The  first  ruling  prince  of  modern  Servia 
was  Milosh  Obrenovich;  and  the  subsequent 
rulers  have  belonged  either  to  the  Obrenovich 
dynasty  or  to  its  rival  the  dynasty  of  Kara- 
George.  King  Peter,  who  came  to  the  throne 
in  1903,  is  a member  of  the  latter  family. 

GREEK  INDEPENDENCE 

Scarcely  had  Servia  won  her  freedom  when 
the  Greek  war  of  independence  broke  out. 
Archbishop  Germanos  called  the  Christian  pop- 
ulation of  the  Morea  under  the  standard  of  the 
cross  in  1821.  For  three  years  the  Greeks,  with 
the  assistance  of  European  money  and  volun- 
teers (of  whom  Lord  Byron  was  the  most 
illustrious),  conducted  a successful  campaign 


22 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


against  the  Turkish  forces;  but  after  the  Sultan 
had  in  1824  summoned  to  his  aid  Mehemet 
Ali,  Pasha  of  Egypt,  with  his  powerful  fleet  and 
disciplined  army,  the  laurels  which  the  Greek 
patriots  had  won  were  recovered  by  the  oppres- 
sor ; and,  with  the  recapture  of  Athens  in  May, 
1827,  the  whole  country  once  more  lay  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Turks.  The  Powers  now 
recognized  that  nothing  but  intervention  could 
save  Greece  for  European  civilization.  The 
Egyptian  fleet  was  annihilated  at  Navarino  in 
October,  1828,  by  the  fleets  of  England,  France, 
and  Russia.  Greece  was  constituted  an  inde- 
pendent monarchy,  though  the  Powers  who 
recognized  its  independence  traced  the  frontier 
of  the  emancipated  country  in  a jealous  and 
niggardly  spirit.  Prince  Otto  of  Bavaria  was 
designated  the  first  King  and  reigned  for  thirty 
years.  He  was  succeeded  in  1863  by  King 
George  who  lived  to  see  the  northern  boundary 
of  his  kingdom  advanced  to  Saloniki,  where, 
like  a faithful  sentinel  at  his  post,  he  fell,  on 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  23 


March  18,  1913,  by  the  hand  of  an  assassin 
just  as  he  had  attained  the  glorious  fruition  of 
a reign  of  fifty  years. 

BULGARIAN  INDEPENDENCE 

There  had  been  a literary  revival  preceding 
the  dawn  of  independence  in  Greece.  In  Bul- 
garia, which  was  the  last  of  the  Balkan  states 
to  become  independent,  the  national  regenera- 
tion was  also  fostered  by  a literary  and  educa- 
tional movement,  of  which  the  founding  of  the 
first  Bulgarian  school— that  of  Gabrovo — in 
1835  was  undoubtedly  the  most  important 
event.  In  the  next  five  years  more  than  fifty 
Bulgarian  schools  were  established  and  five 
Bulgarian  printing-presses  set  up.  The  Bul- 
garians were  beginning  to  re-discover  their  own 
nationality.  Bulgarian  schools  and  books  pro- 
duced a reaction  against  Greek  culture  and  the 
Greek  clergy  who  maintained  it.  Not  much 
longer  would  Greek  remain  the  language  of  the 
upper  classes  in  Bulgarian  cities ; not  much 


24 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


longer  would  ignorant  peasants,  who  spoke  only 
Bulgarian,  call  themselves  Greek.  The  days  of 
the  spiritual  domination  of  the  Greek  patriarch- 
ate were  numbered.  The  ecclesiastical  ascend- 
ency of  the  Greeks  had  crushed  Bulgarian 
nationality  more  completely  than  even  the  civil 
power  of  the  Turks.  The  abolition  of  the 
spiritual  rule  of  foreigners  and  the  restoration 
of  the  independent  Bulgarian  church  became  the 
leading  object  of  the  literary  reformers,  edu- 
cators, and  patriots.  It  was  a long  and  arduous 
campaign — a campaign  of  education  and  awak- 
ening at  home  and  of  appeal  and  discussion 
in  Constantinople.  Finally  the  Sultan  in- 
tervened and  in  1870  issued  a firman  establish- 
ing the  Bulgarian  exarchate,  conferring  on  it 
immediate  jurisdiction  over  fifteen  dioceses,  and 
providing  for  the  addition  of  other  dioceses  on  a 
vote  of  two-thirds  of  their  Christian  population. 
The  new  Bulgarian  exarch  was  immediately 
excommunicated  by  the  Greek  patriarch.  But 
the  first  and  most  important  official  step  had 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  25 

been  taken  in  the  development  of  Bulgarian 
nationality. 

The  revolt  against  the  Turks  followed  in 
1876.  It  was  suppressed  by  acts  of  cruelty  and 
horror  unparalleled  even  in  the  Balkans.  Many 
thousands  of  men,  women,  and  children  were 
massacred  and  scores  of  villages  destroyed.  I 
remember  vividly — for  I was  then  in  Eng- 
land— how  Gladstone’s  denunciation  of  those 
atrocities  aroused  a wave  of  moral  indignation 
and  wrath  which  swept  furiously  from  one  end 
of  Great  Britain  to  the  other,  and  even  aroused 
the  governments  and  peoples  of  the  Continent 
of  Europe.  The  Porte  refusing  to  adopt  satis- 
factory measures  of  reform,  Russia  declared 
war  and  her  victorious  army  advanced  to  the 
very  gates  of  Constantinople.  The  Treaty  of 
San  Stefano,  which  Russia  then  enforced  upon 
Turkey,  created  a “Big  Bulgaria”  that  extended 
from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Albanian  Mountains 
and  from  the  Danube  to  the  Aegean,  leaving  to 
Turkey,  however,  Adrianople,  Saloniki,  and  the 


26 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Chalcidician  Peninsula.  But  this  treaty  was 
torn  to  pieces  by  the  Powers,  who  feared  that 
“Big  Bulgaria”  would  become  a mere  Russian 
dependency,  and  they  substituted  for  it  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  Under  this  memorable  in- 
strument, which  dashed  to  the  ground  the 
racial  and  national  aspirations  of  the  Bulgarians 
which  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  had  so  com- 
pletely satisfied,  their  country  was  restricted  to 
a “tributary  principality”  lying  between  the 
Danube  and  the  Balkans,  Eastern  Roumelia  to 
the  south  being  excluded  from  it  and  made  an 
autonomous  province  of  Turkey.  This  breach 
in  the  political  life  of  the  race  was  healed  in 
1885  by  the  union  of  Eastern  Roumelia  with 
Bulgaria ; and  the  Ottoman  sovereignty,  which 
had  become  little  more  than  a form,  was  com- 
pletely ended  in  1908  when  the  ruler  of  the 
enlarged  principality  of  Bulgaria  publicly  pro- 
claimed it  an  independent  kingdom.  In  spite 
of  a protest  from  the  Porte  the  independence  of 
Bulgaria  was  at  once  recognized  by  the  Powers. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  27 


If  Bulgaria  owed  the  freedom  with  which  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  dowered  her  to  the  swords, 
and  also  to  the  pens,  of  foreigners,  her  complete 
independence  was  her  own  achievement.  But  it 
was  not  brought  about  till  a generation  after  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  had  recognized  the  indepen- 
dence of  Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Roumania 
and  delegated  to  Austria-Hungary  the  adminis- 
tration of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Yet  the 
progress  made  by  Bulgaria  first  under  Prince 
Alexander  and  especially  since  1887  under 
Prince  Ferdinand  (who  subsequently  assumed 
the  title  of  King  and  later  of  Czar)  is  one  of 
the  most  astonishing  phenomena  in  the  history 
of  Modern  Europe. 

THE  BALKAN  COUNTRIES 

Thus  in  consequence  of  the  events  we  have 
here  so  hastily  sketched  Turkey  had  lost  since 
the  nineteenth  century  opened  a large  portion  of 
the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Along  the  Danube  and 
the  Save  at  the  north  Bulgaria  and  Servia  had 


28 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


become  independent  kingdoms  and  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  had  at  first  practically  and  later 
formally  been  annexed  to  Austria-Hungary.  At 
the  extreme  southern  end  of  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula the  Greeks  had  carved  out  an  independent 
kingdom  extending  from  Cape  Matapan  to  the 
Vale  of  Tempe  and  the  Gulf  of  Arta.  All  that 
remained  of  European  Turkey  was  the  territory 
lying  between  Greece  and  the  Slav  coun- 
tries of  Montenegro,  Bosnia,  Servia,  and  Bul- 
garia. The  Porte  has  divided  this  domain  into 
six  provinces  or  vilayets,  besides  Constantinople 
and  its  environs.  These  vilayets  are  Scutari 
and  Janina  on  the  Adriatic;  Kossovo  and 
Monastir,  adjoining  them  on  the  east;  next 
Saloniki,  embracing  the  centre  of  the  area;  and 
finally  Adrianople,  extending  from  the  Mesta 
River  to  the  Black  Sea.  In  ordinary  language 
the  ancient  classical  names  are  generally  used  to 
designate  these  divisions.  The  vilayet  of  Adri- 
anople roughly  corresponds  to  Thrace,  the 
Adriatic  vilayets  to  Epirus,  and  the  intervening 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES 


29 


territory  to  Macedonia.  Parts  of  the  domain  in 
question  are,  however,  also  known  under  other 
names.  The  district  immediately  south  of  Ser- 
via  is  often  called  Old  Servia;  and  the  Adriatic 
coast  lands  between  Montenegro  and  Greece  are 
generally  designated  Albania  on  the  north  and 
Epirus  on  the  south. 

The  area  of  Turkey  in  Europe  in  1912  was 
169,300  square  kilometers;  of  Bulgaria  96,300; 
of  Greece  64,600;  of  Servia  48,300;  and  of 
Montenegro  9,000.  The  population  of  Euro- 
pean Turkey  at  the  same  date  was  6,130,000; 
of  Bulgaria  4,329,000;  of  Greece  2,632,000; 
of  Servia  2,912,000;  and  of  Montenegro 
250,000.  To  the  north  of  the  Balkan  states, 
with  the  Danube  on  the  south  and  the  Black 
Sea  on  the  east,  lay  Roumania  having  an  area 
of  131,350  square  kilometers  and  a population 
of  7,070,000. 


30 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


CAUSES  OF  THE  FIRST  BALKAN  WAR 

What  was  the  occasion  of  the  war  between 
Turkey  and  the  Balkan  states  in  1912?  The 
most  general  answer  that  can  be  given  to  that 
question  is  contained  in  the  one  word  Mace- 
donia. Geographically  Macedonia  lies  between 
Greece,  Servia,  and  Bulgaria.  Ethnographically 
it  is  an  extension  of  their  races.  And  if,  as 
Matthew  Arnold  declared,  the  primary  impulse 
both  of  individuals  and  of  nations  is  the  ten- 
dency to  expansion,  Macedonia  both  in  virtue 
of  its  location  and  of  its  population  was  fore- 
ordained to  be  a magnet  to  the  emancipated 
Christian  nations  of  the  Balkans.  Of  course 
the  expansion  of  Greeks  and  Slavs  meant  the 
expulsion  of  Turks.  Hence  the  Macedonian 
question  was  the  quintessence  of  the  Near 
Eastern  Question. 

But  apart  altogether  from  the  expansionist 
ambitions  and  the  racial  sympathies  of  their 
kindred  in  Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Greece,  the 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  31 

population  of  Macedonia  had  the  same  right  to 
emancipation  from  Turkish  domination  and 
oppression  as  their  brethren  in  these  neighbor- 
ing states.  The  Moslems  had  forfeited  their 
sovereign  rights  in  Europe  by  their  unutterable 
incapacity  to  govern  their  Christian  subjects. 
Had  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  sanctioned,  instead  of 
undoing,  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  the  whole 
of  Macedonia  would  have  come  under  Bul- 
garian sovereignty ; and  although  Servia  and 
especially  Greece  would  have  protested  against 
the  Bulgarian  absorption  of  their  Macedonian 
brethren  (whom  they  had  always  hoped  to 
bring  under  their  own  jurisdiction  when  the 
Turk  was  expelled)  the  result  would  certainly 
have  been  better  for  all  the  Christian  inhabitants 
of  Macedonia  as  well  as  for  the  Mohammedans 
(who  number  800,000  persons  or  nearly  one 
third  of  the  entire  population  of  Macedonia). 
As  it  was  these  people  were  all  doomed  to  a 
continuation  of  Turkish  misgovernment,  op- 
pression, and  slaughter.  The  Treaty  of  Berlin 


32 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


indeed  provided  for  reforms,  but  the  Porte 
through  diplomacy  and  delay  frustrated  all  the 
efforts  of  Europe  to  have  them  put  into  effect. 
For  fifteen  years  the  people  waited  for  the  ful- 
filment of  the  European  promise  of  an  amelior- 
ation of  their  condition,  enduring  meanwhile 
the  scandalous  misgovernment  of  Abdul  Hamid 
II.  But  after  1893  revolutionary  societies  be- 
came active.  The  Internal  Organization  was 
a local  body  whose  programme  was  “Macedonia 
for  the  Macedonians.”  But  both  . in  Bulgaria 
and  in  Greece  there  were  organized  societies 
which  sent  insurgent  bands  into  Macedonia  to 
maintain  and  assert  their  respective  national  in- 
terests. This  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  war 
between  Turkey  and  Greece  in  1897,  and  the 
reverses  of  the  Greeks  in  that  war  inured  to 
the  advantage  of  the  Bulgarian  propaganda  in 
Macedonia.  Servian  bands  soon  after  began 
to  appear  on  the  scene.  These  hostile  activities 
in  Macedonia  naturally  produced  reprisals  at 
the  hands  of  the  Turkish  authorities.  In  one 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  33 

district  alone  100  villages  were  burned,  over 
8,000  houses  destroyed,  and  60,000  peasants 
left  without  homes  at  the  beginning  of  winter. 
Meanwhile  the  Austrian  and  Russian  govern- 
ments intervened  and  drew  up  elaborate 
schemes  of  reform,  but  their  plans  could  not  be 
adequately  enforced  and  the  result  was  failure. 
The  Austro-Russian  entente  came  to  an  end  in 
1908,  and  in  the  same  year  England  joined 
Russia  in  a project  aiming  at  a better  adminis- 
tration of  justice  and  involving  more  effective 
European  supervision.  Scarcely  had  this  pro- 
gramme been  announced  when  the  revolution 
under  the  Young  Turk  party  broke  out  which 
promised  to  the  world  a regeneration  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Hopeful  of  these  constitu- 
tional reformers  of  Turkey,  Europe  withdrew 
from  Macedonia  and  entrusted  its  destinies  to 
its  new  master.  Never  was  there  a more  bitter 
disappointment.  If  autocratic  Sultans  had 
punished  the  poor  Macedonians  with  whips, 
the  Young  Turks  flayed  them  with  scorpions. 


34 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Sympathy,  indignation,  and  horror  conspired 
with  nationalistic  aspirations  and  territorial  in- 
terests to  arouse  the  kindred  populations  of 
the  surrounding  states.  And  in  October,  1912, 
war  was  declared  against  Turkey  by  Bulgaria, 
Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Greece. 

THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE 

This  brings  us  to  the  so-called  Balkan 
Alliance  about  which  much  has  been  written 
and  many  errors  ignorantly  propagated.  For 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  against 
Turkey  the  development  of  this  Alliance  into  a 
Confederation  of  the  Balkan  states,  on  the 
model  of  the  American  or  the  German  constitu- 
tion, was  a theme  of  constant  discussion  in 
Europe  and  America.  As  a matter  of  fact 
there  existed  no  juridical  ground  for  this  ex- 
pectation, and  the  sentiments  of  the  peoples  of 
the  four  Christian  nations,  even  while  they 
fought  together  against  the  Moslem,  were 
saturated  with  such  an  infusion  of  suspicion 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  35 

and  hostility  as  to  render  nugatory  any  pro- 
gramme of  Balkan  confederation.  An  alliance 
had  indeed  been  concluded  between  Greece  and 
Bulgaria  in  May,  1912,  but  it  was  a defensive, 
not  an  offensive  alliance.  It  provided  that  in 
case  Turkey  attacked  either  of  these  states,  the 
other  should  come  to  its  assistance  with  all  its 
forces,  and  that  whether  the  object  of  the  at- 
tack were  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  nation 
or  the  rights  guaranteed  it  by  international  law 
or  special  conventions.  Without  the  knowledge 
of  the  Greek  government,  an  offensive  alliance 
against  Turkey  had  in  March,  1912,  been  con- 
cluded between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  which 
determined  their  respective  military  obligations 
in  case  of  war  and  the  partition  between  them, 
in  the  event  of  victory,  of  the  conquered  Turk- 
ish provinces  in  Europe.  A similar  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  between  Greece  and 
Turkey  was  under  consideration,  but  before 
the  plan  was  matured  Bulgaria  and  Servia  had 
decided  to  declare  war  against  Turkey.  This 


36 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


decision  had  been  hastened  by  the  Turkish  mas- 
sacres at  Kochana  and  Berane,  which  aroused 
the  deepest  indignation,  especially  in  Bulgaria. 
Servia  and  Bulgaria  informed  Greece  that  in 
three  days  they  would  mobilize  their  forces  for 
the  purpose  of  imposing  reforms  on  Turkey, 
and,  if  within  a specified  time  they  did  not  re- 
ceive a satisfactory  reply,  they  would  invade 
the  Ottoman  territory  and  declare  war.  They 
invited  Greece  on  this  short  notice  to  co-operate 
with  them  by  a simultaneous  mobilization.  It 
was  a critical  moment  not  only  for  the  little 
kingdom  of  King  George,  but  for  that  great 
cause  of  Hellenism  which  for  thousands  of 
years  had  animated,  and  which  still  animated, 
the  souls  of  the  Greek  population  in  all  Aegean 
lands. 


GREECE  AND  THE  LEAGUE 

King  George  himself  was  a ruler  of  large 
experience,  of  great  practical  wisdom,  and  of 
fine  diplomatic  skill.  He  had  shortly  before 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  37 

selected  as  prime  minister  the  former  Cretan 
insurgent,  Mr.  Eleutherios  Venizelos.  It  is 
significant  that  the  new  premier  had  also  taken 
the  War  portfolio.  He  foresaw  the  impending 
conflict — as  every  wise  statesman  in  Europe  had 
foreseen  it — and  began  to  make  preparations 
for  it.  For  the  reorganization  of  the  army  and 
navy  he  secured  French  and  English  experts, 
the  former  headed  by  General  Eydoux,  the  lat- 
ter by  Admiral  Tufnel.  By  1914  it  was  esti- 
mated that  the  military  and  naval  forces  of 
the  country  would  be  thoroughly  trained  and 
equipped,  and  war  was  not  expected  before  that 
date.  But  now  in  1912  the  hand  of  the  Greek 
government  was  forced.  And  a decision  one 
way  or  the  other  was  inevitable. 

Mr.  Venizelos  had  already  proved  himself  an 
agitator,  an  orator,  and  a politician.  He  was 
now  to  reveal  himself  not  only  to  Greece  but  to 
Europe  as  a wise  statesman  and  an  effective 
leader  of  his  people.  The  first  test  came  in  his 
answer  to  the  invitation  to  join  Bulgaria  and 


38 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Servia  within  three  days  in  a war  against 
Turkey.  Of  all  possibilities  open  to  him  Mr. 
Venizelos  rejected  the  programme  of  continued 
isolation  for  Greece.  There  were  those  who 
glorified  it  as  splendid  and  majestic : to  him 
under  the  existing  circumstances  it  seemed 
stupid  in  itself  and  certain  to  prove  disastrous 
in  its  results.  Greece  alone  would  never  have 
been  able  to  wage  a war  against  Turkey.  And  if 
Greece  declined  to  participate  in  the  inevitable 
conflict,  which  the  action  of  the  two  Slav  states 
had  only  hastened,  then  whether  they  won  or 
Turkey  won,  Greece  was  bound  to  lose.  It 
was  improbable  that  the  Ottoman  power  should 
come  out  of  the  contest  victorious;  but,  if  the 
unexpected  happened,  what  would  be  the  posi- 
tion, not  only  of  the  millions  of  Greeks  in  the 
Turkish  Empire,  but  of  the  little  kingdom  of 
Greece  itself  on  whose  northern  boundary  the 
insolent  Moslem  oppressor,  flushed  with  his  tri- 
umph over  Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Montenegro, 
would  be  immovably  entrenched  ? On  the  other 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  39 

hand,  if  these  Christian  states  themselves 
should  succeed,  as  seemed  likely,  in  destroying 
the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe,  the  Kingdom 
of  Greece,  if  she  now  remained  a passive  spec- 
tator of  their  struggles,  would  find  in  the  end 
that  Macedonia  had  come  into  the  possession  of 
the  victorious  Slavs,  and  the  Great  Idea  of 
the  Greeks — the  idea  of  expansion  into  Hel- 
lenic lands  eastward  toward  Constantinople 
— exploded  as  an  empty  bubble.  It  was  Mr. 
Venizelos’s  conclusion  that  Greece  could  not 
avoid  participating  in  the  struggle.  Neutrality 
would  have  entailed  the  complete  bankruptcy  of 
Hellenism  in  the  Orient.  There  remained  only 
the  alternative  of  co-operation — co-operation 
with  Turkey  or  co-operation  with  the  Christian 
states  of  the  Balkans. 

GREEK  AND  BULGARIAN  ANTIPATHIES 

How  near  Greece  was  to  an  alliance  with 
Turkey  the  world  may  never  know.  At  the 
time  nothing  of  the  sort  was  even  suspected.  It 


40 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


was  not  until  Turkey  had  been  overpowered 
by  the  forces  of  the  four  Christian  states  and 
the  attitude  of  Bulgaria  toward  the  other  three 
on  the  question  of  the  division  of  the  conquered 
territories  had  become  irreconcilable  and  men- 
acing that  Mr.  Venizelos  felt  it  proper  to 
communicate  to  the  Greek  people  the  history  of 
the  negotiations  by  which  the  Greek  govern- 
ment had  bound  their  country  to  a partner  now 
felt  to  be  so  unreasonable  and  greedy.  Feeling 
in  Greece  was  running  high  against  Bulgaria. 
The  attacks  on  Mr.  Venizelos’s  government 
were  numerous  and  bitter.  He  was  getting  lit- 
tle or  no  credit  for  the  victory  that  had  been 
won  against  Turkey,  while  his  opponents  de- 
nounced him  for  sacrificing  the  fruits  of  that 
victory  to  Bulgaria.  The  Greek  nation  espe- 
cially resented  the  occupation  by  Bulgarian 
troops  of  the  Aegean  coast  lands  with  their 
large  Hellenic  population  which  lay  between 
the  Struma  and  the  Mesta  including  the  cities 
of  Seres  and  Drama  and  especially  Kavala  with 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  41 

its  fine  harbor  and  its  hinterland  famed  for 
crops  of  choice  tobacco. 

It  was  on  the  fourth  of  July,  1913,  a few 
days  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  between 
Bulgaria  and  her  late  allies,  that  Mr.  Venizelos 
made  his  defence  in  an  eloquent  and  powerful 
speech  at  a special  session  of  the  Greek  parlia- 
ment. The  accusation  against  him  was  not 
only  that  during  the  late  war  he  had  sacrificed 
Greek  interests  to  Bulgaria  but  that  he  had 
committed  a fatal  blunder  in  joining  her  in 
the  campaign  against  Turkey.  His  reply  was 
that  since  Greece  could  not  stand  alone  he  had 
to  seek  allies  in  the  Balkans,  and  that  it  was  not 
his  fault  if  the  choice  had  fallen  on  Bulgaria. 
He  had  endeavored  to  maintain  peace  with 
Turkey.  Listen  to  his  own  words : 

“I  did  not  seek  war  against  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  I would  not  have  sought  war  at  a 
later  date  if  I could  have  obtained  any  adjust- 
ment of  the  Cretan  question — that  thorn  in  the 
side  of  Greece  which  can  no  longer  be  left  as 


42 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


it  is  without  rendering  a normal  political  life 
absolutely  impossible  for  us.  I endeavored  to 
adjust  this  question,  to  continue  the  policy  of 
a close  understanding  with  the  neighboring 
empire,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  in  this  way  the 
introduction  of  reforms  which  would  render 
existence  tolerable  to  the  millions  of  Greeks 
within  the  Ottoman  Empire.” 

THE  CRETAN  PROBLEM 

It  was  this  Cretan  question,  even  more  than 
the  Macedonian  question,  which  in  1897  had 
driven  Greece,  single-handed  and  unprepared, 
into  a war  with  Turkey  in  which  she  was  des- 
tined to  meet  speedy  and  overwhelming  defeat. 
It  was  this  same  “accursed  Cretan  question,” 
as  Mr.  Venizelos  called  it,  which  now  drew  the 
country  into  a military  alliance  against  her 
Ottoman  neighbor  who,  until  too  late,  refused 
to  make  any  concession  either  to  the  just  claims 
of  the  Cretans  or  to  the  conciliatory  proposals 
of  the  Greek  government. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  43 

Lying  midway  between  three  continents,  the 
island  of  Crete  has  played  a large  part  both  in 
ancient  and  modern  history.  The  explorations 
and  excavations  of  Sir  Arthur  Evans  at  Cnos- 
sus  seem  to  prove  that  the  Homeric  civilization 
of  Tiryns  and  Mycenae  was  derived  from 
Crete,  whose  earliest  remains  carry  us  back 
three  thousand  years  before  the  Christian  era. 
And  if  Crete  gave  to  ancient  Greece  her  earliest 
civilization  she  has  insisted  on  giving  herself  to 
modern  Greece.  It  is  a natural  union;  for  the 
Cretans  are  Greeks,  undiluted  with  Turk,  Al- 
banian, or  Slav  blood,  though  with  some  admix- 
ture of  Italian.  The  one  obstacle  to  this  mar- 
riage of  kindred  souls  has  been  Turkey.  For 
Crete  was  taken  from  the  Venetians  by  the 
Turks  in  1669,  after  a twenty  years’  siege  of 
Candia,  the  capital.  A portion  of  the  inhabit- 
ants embraced  the  creed  of  their  conquerors,  so 
that  at  the  present  time  perhaps  two-thirds  of 
the  population  are  Christian  and  one-third  Mos- 
lem. The  result  has  been  to  make  Crete  the 


44 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


worst  governed  province  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire. In  Turkey  in  Europe  diversity  of  race 
has  kept  the  Christians  quarreling  with  one 
another;  in  Crete  diversity  of  religion  plunges 
the  same  race  into  internecine  war  as  often  as 
once  in  ten  years.  The  island  had  been  the 
scene  of  chronic  insurrections  all  through  the 
nineteenth  century.  Each  ended  as  a rule  with 
a promise  of  the  Sultan  to  confer  upon  the  Cre- 
tans some  form  of  local  self-government,  with 
additional  privileges,  financial  or  other.  But 
these  promises  were  never  fulfilled.  Things 
went  from  bad  to  worse.  The  military  inter- 
vention of  Greece  in  1897  led  to  war  with 
Turkey  in  which  she  was  disastrously  defeated. 
The  European  Powers  had  meantime  inter- 
vened and  they  decided  that  Crete  should  be 
endowed  with  autonomy  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Sultan,  and  in  1898  they  appointed 
Prince  George  of  Greece  as  High  Commis- 
sioner. Between  the  political  parties  of  the 
island  and  the  representatives  of  the  Powers 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  45 

the  Prince,  who  worked  steadily  for  the  welfare 
of  Crete,  had  a difficult  task,  and  in  1906  he 
withdrew,  his  successor  being  Mr.  Zaimis,  a 
former  prime  minister  of  Greece.  The  new 
commissioner  was  able  to  report  to  the  pro- 
tecting Powers  in  1908  that  a gendarmerie  had 
been  established,  that  tranquility  was  being 
maintained,  and  that  the  Moslem  population 
enjoyed  safety  and  security.  Thereupon  the 
Powers  began  to  withdraw  their  forces  from  the 
island.  And  the  project  for  annexation  with 
Greece,  which  had  been  proclaimed  by  the  Cre- 
tan insurgents  under  Mr.  Venizelos  in  1905 
and  which  the  insular  assembly  had  hastened 
to  endorse,  was  once  more  voted  by  the  assem- 
bly, who  went  on  to  provide  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  island  in  the  name  of  the  King  of 
Greece.  I have  not  time  to  follow  in  detail  the 
history  of  this  programme  of  annexation.  Suf- 
fice it  to  say  that  the  Cretans  ultimately  went 
so  far  as  to  elect  members  to  sit  in  the  Greek 
parliament  at  Athens,  and  that  Turkey  had 


46  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

given  notice  that  their  admission  to  the  cham- 
ber would  be  regarded  as  a casus  belli.  I saw 
them  on  their  arrival  in  Athens  in  October, 
1912,  where  they  received  a most  enthusiastic 
welcome  from  the  Greeks,  while  everybody 
stopped  to  admire  their  picturesque  dress,  their 
superb  physique,  and  their  dignified  demeanor. 

If  Mr.  Venizelos  excluded  these  delegates 
from  the  chamber  he  would  defy  the  senti- 
ments of  the  Greek  people.  If  he  admitted 
them,  Turkey  would  proclaim  war. 

MR.  VENIZELOS’s  SOLUTION 

The  course  actually  pursued  by  Mr.  Venize- 
los in  this  predicament  he  himself  explained  to 
the  parliament  in  the  speech  delivered  at  the 
close  of  the  war  against  Turkey  from  which  I 
have  already  quoted.  He  declared  to  his  aston- 
ished countrymen  that  in  his  desire  to  reach  a 
close  understanding  with  Turkey  he  had  ar- 
rived at  the  point  where  he  no  longer  demanded 
a union  of  Crete  with  Greece,  “knowing  it  was 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  47 

too  much  for  the  Ottoman  Empire.”  What  he 
did  ask  for  was  the  recognition  of  the  right  of 
the  Cretan  deputies  to  sit  in  the  Greek  chamber, 
while  Crete  itself  should  remain  an  autonomous 
state  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan.  Nay, 
Mr.  Venizelos  was  so  anxious  to  prevent  war 
with  Turkey  that  he  made  another  concession, 
for  which,  he  frankly  confessed,  his  political 
opponents  if  things  had  turned  out  differently 
would  have  impeached  him  for  high  treason. 
He  actually  proposed,  in  return  for  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  right  of  the  Cretan  deputies  to 
sit  in  the  Greek  chamber,  that  Greece  should 
pay  on  behalf  of  Crete  an  annual  tribute  to  the 
Porte. 

Happily  for  Mr.  Venizelos’s  government  the 
Young  Turk  party  who  then  governed  the 
Ottoman  Empire  rejected  all  these  proposals. 
Meanwhile  their  misgovernment  and  massacre 
of  Christians  in  Macedonia  were  inflaming  the 
kindred  Slav  nations  and  driving  them  into 
war  against  Turkey.  When  matters  had 


48  the  BALKAN  WARS 

reached  a crisis,  the  reactionary  and  incom- 
petent Young  Turk  party  were  forced  out  of 
power  and  a wise  and  prudent  statesman,  the 
venerable  Kiamil  Pasha,  succeeded  to  the  office 
of  Grand  Vizier.  He  was  all  for  conciliation 
and  compromise  with  the  Greek  government, 
whom  he  had  often  warned  against  an  alliance 
with  Bulgaria,  and  he  had  in  readiness  a solu- 
tion of  the  Cretan  question  which  he  was  certain 
would  be  satisfactory  to  both  Greece  and  Tur- 
key. But  these  concessions  were  now  too  late. 
Greece  had  decided  to  throw  in  her  lot  with 
Servia  and  Bulgaria.  And  a decree  was  issued 
for  the  mobilization  of  the  Greek  troops. 

THE  WAR 

There  is  not  time,  nor  have  I the  qualifica- 
tions, to  describe  the  military  operations  which 
followed.  In  Greece  the  Crown  Prince  was 
appointed  commanding  general,  and  the  event 
proved  him  one  of  the  great  captains  of  our 
day.  The  prime  minister,  who  was  also  minis- 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  49 

ter  of  war,  furnished  him  with  troops  and 
munitions  and  supplies.  The  plains  and  hills 
about  Athens  were  turned  into  mock  battle- 
fields for  the  training  of  raw  recruits ; and 
young  Greeks  from  all  parts  of  the  world 
— tens  of  thousands  of  them  from  America — 
poured  in  to  protect  the  fatherland  and  to  fight 
the  secular  enemy  of  Europe.  The  Greek  gov- 
ernment had  undertaken  to  raise  an  army  of 
125,000  men  to  co-operate  with  the  Allies;  it 
was  twice  as  large  a number  as  even  the  friends 
of  Greece  dreamed  possible;  yet  before  the  war 
closed  King  Constantine  had  under  his  banner 
an  army  of  250,000  men  admirably  armed, 
clothed,  and  equipped; — each  soldier  indeed 
having  munitions  fifty  per  cent  in  excess  of  the 
figure  fixed  by  the  general  staff. 

GREEK  MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

The  Greek  army,  which  had  been  concen- 
trated at  Larissa,  entered  Macedonia  by  the 
Meluna  Pass  and  the  valley  of  the  Xerias  River. 


50 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


The  Turks  met  the  advancing  force  at  Elassona, 
but  retired  after  a few  hours’  fighting.  They 
took  their  stand  at  the  pass  of  Sarandaporon, 
from  which  they  were  driven  by  a day’s  hard 
fighting  on  the  part  of  the  Greek  army  and  the 
masterly  tactics  of  the  Crown  Prince.  On 
October  23  the  Greeks  were  in  possession  of 
Serfidje.  Thence  they  pushed  forward  on  both 
sides  of  the  Aliakmon  River  toward  Veria, 
which  the  Crown  Prince  entered  with  his  staff 
on  the  morning  of  October  30.  They  had  cov- 
ered 150  miles  from  Larissa,  with  no  facilities 
but  wagons  for  feeding  the  army  and  supplying 
ammunition.  But  at  Veria  they  struck  the  line 
of  railway  from  Monastir  to  Saloniki.  Not  far 
away  was  Jenitsa,  where  the  Turkish  army 
numbering  from  35,000  to  40,000  had  concen- 
trated to  make  a stand  for  the  protection  of 
Saloniki.  The  battle  of  Jenitsa  was  fiercely 
contested  but  the  Greeks  were  victorious  though 
they  lost  about  2000  men.  This  victory  opened 
the  way  to  Saloniki.  The  Turkish  armies 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  51 

which  defended  it  having  been  scattered  by  the 
Greek  forces,  that  city  surrendered  to  Crown 
Prince  Constantine  on  the  eighth  of  November. 
It  was  only  three  weeks  since  the  Greek  army 
had  left  Larissa  and  it  had  disposed  of  about 
60,000  Turks  on  the  way. 

On  the  outbreak  of  war  Greece  had  declared 
a blockade  of  all  Turkish  ports.  To  the  usual 
list  of  contraband  articles  there  were  added 
not  only  coal,  concerning  which  the  practice  of 
belligerent  nations  had  varied,  but  also  machine 
oil,  which  so  far  as  I know  was  then  for  the 
first  time  declared  contraband  of  war.  As  Tur- 
key imported  both  coal  and  lubricants,  the  pur- 
pose of  this  policy  was  of  course  to  paralyze 
transportation  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Inci- 
dentally I may  say  the  prohibition  of  lubricating 
oil  caused  much  inconvenience  to  American 
commerce;  not,  however,  primarily  on  its  own 
account,  but  because  of  its  confusion,  in  the 
minds  of  Greek  officials,  with  such  harmless 
substances  as  cotton  seed  oil  and  oleo.  The 


52 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Greek  navy  not  only  maintained  a very  effective 
blockade  but  also  took  possesson  of  all  the 
Aegean  Islands  under  Turkish  rule,  excepting 
Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanese,  which  Italy  held  as 
a temporary  pledge  for  the  fulfilment  by  Tur- 
key of  some  of  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  by 
which  they  had  closed  their  recent  war.  It 
will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the  navy  was  a 
most  important  agent  in  the  campaign,  and 
Greece  was  the  only  one  of  the  Allies  that  had  a 
navy.  The  Greek  navy  was  sufficient  not  only 
to  terrorize  the  Turkish  navy,  which  it  reduced 
to  complete  impotence,  but  also  to  paralyze 
Turkish  trade  and  commerce  with  the  outside 
world,  to  embarrass  railway  transportation 
within  the  Empire,  to  prevent  the  sending  of 
reinforcements  to  Macedonia  or  the  Aegean 
coast  of  Thrace,  and  to  detach  from  Turkey 
those  Aegean  Islands  over  which  she  still  exer- 
cised effective  jurisdiction. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  53 


SERB  MILITARY  OPERATIONS 

On  land  the  other  Allies  had  been  not  less 
active  than  Greece.  Montenegro  had  fired  the 
first  shot  of  the  war.  And  the  brave  soldiers  of 
King  Nicholas,  the  illustrious  ruler  of  the  one 
Balkan  state  which  the  Turks  had  never  con- 
quered, were  dealing  deadly  blows  to  their  secu- 
lar enemy  both  in  Novi  Bazar  and  Albania. 

As  the  Greeks  had  pressed  into  southern 
Macedonia,  so  the  Servian  armies  advanced 
through  old  Servia  into  northern  and  central 
Macedonia.  In  their  great  victory  over  the 
Turkish  forces  at  Kumanovo  they  avenged  the 
defeat  of  their  ancestors  at  Kossovo  five  hun- 
dred years  before.  Still  marching  southward 
they  again  defeated  the  enemy  in  two  great 
engagements,  the  one  at  Prilip  and  the  other  at 
Monastir.  The  latter  city  had  been  the  object 
of  the  Greek  advance  to  Fiorina,  but  when  the 
prize  fell  to  Servia,  though  the  Greeks  were 
disappointed,  it  made  no  breach  in  the  friend- 


54 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


ship  of  the  two  Allies.  Already  no  doubt  they 
were  both  gratified  that  the  spheres  of  their 
military  occupation  were  conterminous  and  that 
no  Turkish  territory  remained  for  Bulgaria  to 
occupy  west  of  the  Vardar  River. 

BULGARIAN  MILITARY  OPERATIONS 

While  Greece  and  Servia  were  scattering, 
capturing,  or  destroying  the  Turkish  troops 
stationed  in  Macedonia,  and  closing  in  on  that 
province  from  north  and  south  like  an  irre- 
sistible vise,  it  fell  to  Bulgaria  to  meet  the 
enemy’s  main  army  in  the  plains  of  Eastern 
Thrace.  The  distribution  of  the  forces  of  the 
Allies  was  the  natural  result  of  their  respective 
geographical  location.  Macedonia  to  the  west 
of  the  Vardar  and  Bregalnitza  Rivers  was  the 
only  part  of  Turkey  which  adjoined  Greece  and 
Servia.  Thrace,  on  the  other  hand,  marched 
with  the  southern  boundary  of  Bulgaria  from 
the  sources  of  the  Mesta  River  to  the  Black 
Sea,  and  its  eastern  half  was  intersected  diag- 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  55 

onally  by  the  main  road  from  Sofia  to  Adrian- 
ople  and  Constantinople.  Along  this  line  the 
Bulgarians  sent  their  forces  against  the  com- 
mon enemy  as  soon  as  war  was  declared.  The 
swift  story  of  their  military  exploits,  the  record 
of  their  brilliant  victories,  struck  Europe  with 
amazement.  Here  was  a country  which  only 
thirty-five  years  earlier  had  been  an  unknown 
and  despised  province  of  Turkey  in  Europe  now 
overwhelming  the  armies  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire in  the  great  victories  of  Kirk  Kilisse,  Lule 
Burgas,  and  Chorlu.  In  a few  weeks  the  irre- 
sistible troops  of  King  Ferdinand  had  reached 
the  Chataldja  line  of  fortifications.  Only 
twenty-five  miles  beyond  lay  Constantinople 
where  they  hoped  to  celebrate  their  final 
triumph. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  TURKEY 

The  Great  Powers  of  Europe  had  other 
views.  Even  if  the  Bulgarian  delay  at  Chat- 
aldja— a delay  probably  due  to  exhaustion — - 


56 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


had  not  given  the  Turks  time  to  strengthen 
their  defences  and  reorganize  their  forces,  it  is 
practically  certain  that  the  Bulgarian  army 
would  not  have  been  permitted  to  enter  Con- 
stantinople. But  with  the  exception  of  the 
capital  and  its  fortified  fringe,  all  Turkey  in 
Europe  now  lay  at  the  mercy  of  the  Allies.  The 
entire  territory  was  either  already  occupied  by 
their  troops  or  could  be  occupied  at  leisure. 
Only  at  three  isolated  points  was  the  Ottoman 
power  unsubdued.  The  city  of  Adrianople, 
though  closely  besieged  by  the  Bulgarians, 
still  held  out,  and  the  great  fortresses  of 
Scutari  in  Northern  Albania  and  Janina  in 
Epirus  remained  in  the  hands  of  their  Turkish 
garrisons. 

The  power  of  Turkey  had  collapsed  in  a few 
weeks.  Whether  the  ruin  was  due  to  inefficiency 
and  corruption  in  government  or  the  injection 
by  the  Young  Turk  party  of  politics  into  the 
army  or  exhaustion  resulting  from  the  recent 
war  with  Italy  or  to  other  causes  more  obscure, 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  57 

we  need  not  pause  to  inquire.  The  disaster  it- 
self, however,  had  spread  far  enough  in  the 
opinion  of  Europe,  and  a Peace  Conference 
was  summoned  in  December.  Delegates  from 
the  belligerent  states  and  ambassadors  from  the 
Great  Powers  came  together  in  London.  But 
their  labors  in  the  cause  of  peace  proved  un- 
availing. Turkey  was  unwilling  to  surrender 
Adrianople  and  Bulgaria  insisted  on  it  as  a 
sine  qua  non.  The  Peace  Conference  broke  up 
and  hostilities  were  resumed.  The  siege  of 
Adrianople  was  pressed  by  the  Bulgarians  with 
the  aid  of  60,000  Servian  troops.  It  was  taken 
by  storm  on  March  26.  Already,  on  March  6, 
Janina  had  yielded  to  the  well  directed  attacks 
of  King  Constantine.  And  the  fighting  ended 
with  the  spectacular  surrender  on  April  23  of 
Scutari  to  King  Nicholas,  who  for  a day  at 
least  defied  the  united  will  of  Europe. 

Turkey  was  finally  compelled  to  accept  terms 
of  peace.  In  January,  while  the  London  Peace 
Conference  was  still  in  session,  Kiamil  Pasha, 


53 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


who  had  endeavored  to  prepare  the  nation  for 
the  territorial  sacrifice  he  had  all  along  recog- 
nized as  inevitable,  was  driven  from  power  and 
his  war  minister,  Nazim  Pasha,  murdered 
through  an  uprising  of  the  Young  Turk  party 
executed  by  Enver  Bey,  who  himself  demanded 
the  resignation  of  Kiamil  and  carried  it  to  the 
Sultan  and  secured  its  acceptance.  The  insur- 
gents set  up  Mahmud  Shevket  Pasha  as  Grand 
Vizier  and  made  the  retention  of  Adrianople 
their  cardinal  policy.  But  the  same  inexorable 
fate  overtook  the  new  government  in  April  as 
faced  Kiamil  in  January.  The  Powers  were  in- 
sistent on  peace,  and  the  successes  of  the  Allies 
left  no  alternative  and  no  excuse  for  delay.  The 
Young  Turk  party  who  had  come  to  power  on 
the  Adrianople  issue  were  accordingly  com- 
pelled to  ratify  the  cession  to  the  allies  of  the 
city  with  all  its  mosques  and  tombs  and  historic 
souvenirs.  The  Treaty  of  London,  which 
proved  to  be  short-lived,  was  signed  on  May  30. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  BALKAN  STATES  59 


THE  TERMS  OF  PEACE 

The  treaty  of  peace  provided  that  beyond  a 
line  drawn  from  Enos  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Maritza  River  on  the  Aegean  Sea  to  Midia  on 
the  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  all  Turkey  should 
be  ceded  to  the  Allies  except  Albania,  whose 
boundaries  were  to  be  fixed  by  the  Great 
Powers.  It  was  also  stipulated  that  the  Great 
Powers  should  determine  the  destiny  of  the 
Aegean  Islands  belonging  to  Turkey  which 
Greece  now  claimed  by  right  of  military  occupa- 
tion and  the  vote  of  their  inhabitants  (nearly 
all  of  whom  were  Greek).  A more  direct 
concession  to  Greece  was  the  withdrawal  of 
Turkish  sovereignty  over  Crete.  The  treaty 
also  contained  financial  and  other  provisions, 
but  they  do  not  concern  us  here.  The  essential 
point  is  that,  with  the  exception  of  Constanti- 
nople and  a narrow  hinterland  for  its  protec- 
tion, the  Moslems  after  more  than  five  centuries 
of  possession  had  been  driven  out  of  Europe. 


6o 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


This  great  and  memorable  consummation 
was  the  achievement  of  the  united  nations  of 
the  Balkans.  It  was  not  a happy  augury  for 
the  immediate  future  to  recall  the  historic  fact 
that  the  past  successes  of  the  Moslems  had  been 
due  to  dissensions  and  divisions  among  their 
Christian  neighbors. 


Map  showing  the  Turkish  Territories  occupied  by  the  Armies  of  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Montenegro,  and  Servia  at  the  close 

of  the  War  against  Turkey. 


>aaaO  mj/s  i-ut  v«  Qarrrxio  aaorori^aaT  HaiaaryT  hht  dwiwohk  “iaM 

tYHMtjT  T2H!ADA  3/.W  3HT  30 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE 
ALLIES 


II 

THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE 
ALLIES 


The  Treaty  of  London  officially  eliminated 
Turkey  from  the  further  settlement  of  the 
Balkan  question.  Thanks  to  the  good  will  of 
the  Great  Powers  toward  herself  or  to  their 
rising  jealousy  of  Bulgaria  she  was  not  stripped 
of  her  entire  European  possessions  west  of  the 
Chataldja  lines  where  the  victorious  Bulgarians 
had  planted  their  standards.  The  Enos-Midia 
frontier  not  only  guaranteed  to  her  a consider- 
able portion  of  territory  which  the  Bulgarians 
had  occupied  but  extended  her  coast  line,  from 
the  point  where  the  Chataldja  lines  strike  the 
Sea  of  Marmora,  out  through  the  Dardanelles 
and  along  the  Aegean  littoral  to  the  mouth 
of  the  Maritza  River.  To  that  extent  the  Great 
Powers  may  be  said  to  have  re-established  the 
63 


64 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Turks  once  more  in  Europe  from  which  they 
had  been  practically  driven  by  the  Balkan  Allies, 
and  especially  the  Bulgarians.  All  the  rest  of 
her  European  possessions,  however,  Turkey 
was  forced  to  surrender  either  in  trust  to  the 
Great  Powers  or  absolutely  to  the  Balkan 
Allies. 

The  great  question  now  was  how  the  Allies 
should  divide  among  themselves  the  spoils  of 
war. 


RIVAL  AMBITIONS  OF  THE  ALLIES 

This  was  a difficult  matter  to  adjust.  Before 
the  war  began,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a 
Treaty  of  Partition  had  been  negotiated  be- 
tween Bulgaria  and  Servia,  but  conditions  had 
changed  materially  in  the  interval  and  Servia 
now  demanded  a revision  of  the  treaty  and 
refused  to  withdraw  her  troops  from  Central 
Macedonia,  which  the  treaty  had  marked  for 
reversion  to  Bulgaria.  In  consequence  the  rela- 
tions between  the  governments  and  peoples  of 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  65 

Servia  and  Bulgaria  were  dangerously  strained. 
The  Bulgarians  denounced  the  Servians  as  per- 
fidious and  faithless  and  the  Servians  responded 
by  excoriating  the  colossal  greed  and  intoler- 
ance of  the  Bulgarians.  The  immemorial 
mutual  hatred  of  the  two  Slav  nations  was 
stirred  to  its  lowest  depths,  and  it  boiled  and 
sputtered  like  a witches’  cauldron. 

In  Eastern  Macedonia  Bulgarians  and  Greeks 
were  each  eagerly  pushing  their  respective 
spheres  of  occupation  without  much  regard  to 
the  rights  or  feeling  of  the  other  Ally.  Though 
the  Bulgarians  had  not  forgiven  the  Greeks  for 
anticipating  them  in  the  capture  of  Saloniki  in 
the  month  of  November,  the  rivalry  between 
them  in  the  following  winter  and  spring  had 
for  its  stage  the  territory  between  the  Struma 
and  the  Mesta  Rivers — and  especially  the 
quadrilateral  marked  by  Kavala  and  Orphani 
on  the  coast  and  Seres  and  Drama  on  the  line 
of  railway  from  Saloniki  to  Adrianople.  The 
Greeks  had  one  advantage  over  the  Bulgarians : 


66 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


their  troops  could  be  employed  to  secure  exten- 
sions of  territory  for  the  Hellenic  kingdom  at  a 
time  when  Bulgaria  still  needed  the  bulk  of  her 
forces  to  fight  the  Turks  at  Chataldja  and 
Adrianople.  Hence  the  Greeks  occupied  towns 
in  the  district  from  which  Bulgarian  troops  had 
been  recalled.  Nor  did  they  hesitate  to  dislodge 
scattered  Bulgarian  troops  which  their  ally  had 
left  behind  to  establish  a claim  of  occupation. 
Naturally  disputes  arose  between  the  military 
commanders  and  these  led  to  repeated  armed 
encounters.  On  March  5 Greeks  and  Bulgar- 
ians fought  at  Nigrita  as  they  subsequently 
fought  at  Pravishta,  Leftera,  Panghaion,  and 
Anghista. 

This  conduct  of  the  Allies  toward  one 
another  while  the  common  enemy  was  still  in 
the  field  boded  ill  for  their  future  relations. 
“Our  next  war  will  be  with  Bulgaria,”  said 
the  man  on  the  street  in  Athens,  and  this 
bellicose  sentiment  was  reciprocated  alike  by  the 
Bulgarian  people  and  the  Bulgarian  army.  The 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  67 

secular  mutual  enmities  and  animosities  of  the 
Greeks  and  Bulgarians,  which  self-interest  had 
suppressed  long  enough  to  enable  the  Balkan 
Allies  to  make  European  Turkey  their  own, 
burst  forth  with  redoubled  violence  under  the 
stimulus  of  the  imperious  demand  which  the 
occasion  now  made  upon  them  all  for  an  equit- 
able distribution  of  the  conquered  territory. 
For  ages  the  fatal  vice  of  the  Balkan  nations 
has  been  the  immoderate  and  intolerant  asser- 
tion by  each  of  its  own  claims  coupled  with 
contemptuous  disregard  of  the  rights  of  others. 

\ ALBANIA  A CAUSE  OF  FRICTION 

There  were  also  external  causes  which  con- 
tributed to  the  deepening  tragedy  in  the 
Balkans.  Undoubtedly  the  most  potent  was  the 
dislocation  of  the  plans  of  the  Allies  by  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Albania.  This  new  ' 
kingdom  was  called  into  being  by  the  voice  of 
the  European  concert  at  the  demand  of  Austria- 
Hungary  supported  by  Italy.  1 


68 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


The  controlling  force  in  politics,  though  not 
the  only  force,  is  self-interest.  Austria- 
Hungary  had  long  sought  an  outlet  through 
Macedonia  to  the  Aegean  by  way  of  Saloniki. 
It  was  also  the  aim  of  Servia  to  reach  the 
Adriatic.  But  the  foreign  policy  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  which  has  millions  of  Serbs  under  its 
dominion,  has  steadily  opposed  the  aggrandize- 
ment of  Servia.  And  now  that  Servia  and  her 
allies  had  taken  possession  of  Macedonia  and 
blocked  the  path  of  Austria-Hungary  to 
Saloniki,  it  was  not  merely  revenge,  it 
was  self-interest  pursuing  a consistent  foreign 
policy,  which  moved  the  Dual  Monarchy 
to  make  the  cardinal  feature  of  its  Balkan 
programme  the  exclusion  of  Servia  from 
access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  Before  the  first 
Balkan  war  began  the  Adriatic  littoral  was 
under  the  dominion  of  Austria-Hungary  and 
Italy,  for  though  Montenegro  and  European 
Turkey  were  their  maritime  neighbors  neither 
of  them  had  any  naval  strength.  Naturally  ) 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  69 


these  two  dominant  powers  desired  that  after 
the  close  of  the  Balkan  war  they  should  not  be 
in  a worse  position  in  the  Adriatic  than  here- 
tofore. But  if  Servia  were  allowed  to  expand 
westward  to  the  Adriatic,  their  supremacy 
might  in  the  future  be  challenged.  For  Servia 
might  enter  into  special  relations  with  her  great 
sister  Slav  state,  Russia,  or  a confederation 
might  be  formed  embracing  all  the  Balkan 
states  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Adriatic : 
and,  in  either  event,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy 
would  no  longer  enjoy  the  unchallenged 
supremacy  on  the  Adriatic  coasts  which  was 
theirs  so  long  as  Turkey  held  dominion  over 
the  maritime  country  lying  between  Greece  and 
Montenegro.  As  a necessity  of  practical  poli- 
tics, therefore,  there  emerged  the  Austro- 
Italian  policy  of  an  independent  Albania.  But 
natural  and  essential  as  this  policy  was  for  Italy 
and  Austria-Hungary,  it  was  fatal  to  Servia’s 
dream  of  expansion  to  the  Adriatic;  it  set 
narrow  limits  to  the  northward  extension  of 


70 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Greece  into  Epirus,  and  the  southward  exten- 
sion of  Montenegro  below  Scutari;  it  impelled 
these  Allies  to  seek  compensation  in  territory 
that  Bulgaria  had  regarded  as  her  peculiar 
preserve ; and  as  a consequence  it  seriously 
menaced  the  existence  of  the  Balkan  Alliance 
torn  as  it  already  was  by  mutual  jealousies, 
enmities,  aggressions,  and  recriminations. 

RECOIL  OF  SERVIA  TOWARD  THE  AEGEAN 

The  first  effect  of  the  European  fiat  regard- 
ing an  independent  Albania  was  the  recoil  of 
Servia  against  Bulgaria.  Confronted  by  the 
force  majeure  of  the  Great  Powers  which 
estopped  her  advance  to  the  Adriatic,  Servia 
turned  her  anxious  regard  toward  the  Gulf  of 
Saloniki  and  the  Aegean  Sea.  Already  her 
victorious  armies  had  occupied  Macedonia  from 
the  Albanian  frontier  eastward  beyond  the 
Vardar  River  to  Strumnitza,  Istib,  and  Koch- 
ana,  and  southward  below  Monastir  and  Ghev- 
gheli,  where  they  touched  the  boundary  of  the 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  71 


Greek  occupation  of  Southern  Macedonia.  An 
agreement  with  the  Greeks,  who  held  the  city 
of  Saloniki  and  its  hinterland  as  well  as  the 
whole  Chalcidician  Peninsula,  would  ensure 
Servia  an  outlet  to  the  sea.  And  the  merchants 
of  Saloniki — mostly  the  descendants  of  Jews 
expelled  from  Spain  in  the  fifteenth  century — 
were  shrewd  enough  to  recognize  the  advan- 
tage to  their  city  of  securing  the  commerce  of 
Servia,  especially  as  they  were  destined  to  lose, 
in  consequence  of  hostile  tariffs  certain  to  be 
established  by  the  conquerors,  a considerable 
portion  of  the  trade  which  had  formerly  flowed 
to  them  without  let  or  hindrance  from  a large 
section  of  European  Turkey.  The  government 
of  Greece  was  equally  favorably  disposed  to 
this  programme;  for,  in  the  first  place,  it  was 
to  its  interest  to  cultivate  friendly  relations 
with  Servia,  in  view  of  possible  embroilments 
with  Bulgaria ; and,  in  the  second  place,  it  had 
to  countercheck  the  game  of  those  who  wanted 
either  to  make  Saloniki  a free  city  or  to  incor- 


72 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


porate  it  in  a Big  Bulgaria,  and  who  were  using 
with  some  effect  the  argument  that  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  city  to  Greece  meant  the  throttling 
of  its  trade  and  the  annihilation  of  its  pros- 
perity. The  interests  of  the  city  of  Saloniki, 
the  interests  of  Greece,  and  the  interests  of 
Servia  all  combined  to  demand  the  free  flow  of 
Servian  trade  by  way  of  Saloniki.  And  if  no 
other  power  obtained  jurisdiction  over  any 
Macedonian  territory  through  which  that 
trade  passed,  it  would  be  easy  for  the  Greek 
and  Servian  governments  to  come  to  an 
understanding. 

TREATY  RESTRICTIONS 

Just  here,  however,  was  the  rub.  The  secret 
treaty  of  March,  1912,  providing  for  the  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  of  Bulgaria  and 
Servia  against  the  Ottoman  Empire  regulated, 
in  case  of  victory,  the  division  of  the  conquered 
territory  between  the  Allies.  And  the  extreme 
limit,  on  the  south  and  east,  of  Turkish  territory 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  73 


assigned  to  Servia  by  this  treaty  was  fixed  by  a 
line  starting  from  Ochrida  on  the  borders  of 
Albania  and  running  northeastward  across 
the  Vardar  River  a few  miles  above  Veles  and 
thence,  following  the  same  general  direction, 
through  Ovcepolje  and  Egri  Palanka  to 
Golema  Vreh  on  the  frontier  of  Bulgaria — a 
terminus  some  twenty  miles  southeast  of  the 
meeting  point  of  Servia,  Macedonia,  and  Bul- 
garia. During  the  war  with  Turkey  the 
Servian  armies  had  paid  no  attention  to  the 
Ochrida-Golema  Vreh  line.  The  great  victory 
over  the  Turks  at  Kumanovo,  by  which  the 
Slav  defeat  at  Kossovo  five  hundred  years 
earlier  was  avenged,  was,  it  is  true,  won  at  a 
point  north  of  the  line  in  question.  But  the 
subsequent  victories  of  Prilip  and  Monastir 
were  gained  to  the  south  of  it — far,  indeed, 
into  the  heart  of  the  Macedonian  territory 
recognized  by  the  treaty  as  Bulgarian. 

If  you  look  at  a map  you  will  see  that  the 
boundary  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria,  starting 


74 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


from  the  Danube,  runs  in  a slighhtly  undulating 
line  due  south.  Now  what  the  military  forces 
of  King  Peter  did  during  the  war  of  the 
Balkan  states  with  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  to 
occupy  all  European  Turkey  south  of  Servia 
between  the  prolongation  of  that  boundary  line 
and  the  new  Kingdom  of  Albania  till  they  met 
the  Hellenic  army  advancing  northward  under 
Crown  Prince  Constantine,  when  the  two  gov- 
erments  agreed  on  a common  boundary  for 
New  Servia  and  New  Greece  along  a line  start- 
ing from  Lake  Presba  and  running  eastward 
between  Monastir  and  Fiorina  to  the  Vardar 
River  a little  to  the  south  of  Ghevgheli. 

THE  APPLE  OF  DISCORD 

But  this  arrangement  between  Greece  and 
Servia  would  leave  no  territory  for  Bulgaria 
in  Central  and  Western  Macedonia!  Yet 
Servia  had  solemnly  bound  herself  by  treaty  not 
to  ask  for  any  Turkish  territory  below  the 
Ochrida-Golema  Vreh  line.  There  was  no 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  75 


similar  treaty  with  Greece,  but  Bulgaria 
regarded  the  northern  frontier  of  New  Greece 
as  a matter  for  adjustment  between  the  two 
governments.  Servia,  withdrawn  behind  the 
Ochrida-Golema  Vreh  line  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  the  treaty,  would  at  any  rate  have 
nothing  to  say  about  the  matter.  And,  although 
the  Bulgarian  government  never  communicated, 
officially  or  unofficially,  its  own  views  to  Greece 
or  Servia,  I believe  we  should  not  make  much 
mistake  in  asserting  that  a line  drawn  from 
Ochrida  to  Saloniki  (which  Bulgaria  in  spite 
of  the  Greek  occupation  continued  to  claim) 
would  roughly  represent  the  limit  of  its  volun- 
tary concession.  Now  if  you  imagine  a base 
line  drawn  from  Saloniki  to  Golema  Vreh,  you 
have  an  equilateral  triangle  resting  on  Ochrida 
as  apex.  And  this  equilateral  triangle  repre- 
sents approximately  what  Bulgaria  claimed  in 
the  western  half  of  Macedonia  as  her  own. 

The  war  between  the  Allies  was  fought  over 
the  possession  of  this  triangle.  The  larger  por- 


76 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


tion  of  it  had  in  the  war  against  Turkey  been 
occupied  by  the  forces  of  Servia;  and  the 
nation,  inflamed  by  the  military  spirit  of  the 
army,  had  made  up  its  mind  that,  treaty  or  no 
treaty,  it  should  not  be  evacuated.  On  the 
south,  especially  above  Vodena,  the  Greeks  had 
occupied  a section  of  the  fatal  triangle.  And 
the  two  governments  had  decided  that  they 
would  not  tolerate  the  driving  of  a Bulgarian 
wedge  between  New  Servia  and  New  Greece. 
Bulgaria,  on  the  other  hand,  was  inexorable  in 
her  demands  on  Servia  for  the  fulfilment  of  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Partition.  At  the  same 
time  she  worried  the  Greek  government  about 
the  future  of  Saloniki,  and  that  at  a time  when 
the  Greek  people  were  criticizing  Mr.  Venizelos 
for  having  allowed  the  Bulgarians  to  occupy 
regions  in  Macedonia  and  Thrace  inhabited  by 
Greeks,  notably  Seres,  Drama,  and  Kavala,  and 
the  adjacent  country  between  the  Struma  and 
the  Mesta.  These  were  additional  causes  of 
dissension  between  the  Allies.  But  the  primary 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  77 

disruptive  force  was  the  attraction,  the  incom- 
patible attraction,  exerted  on  them  all  by  that 
central  Macedonian  triangle  whose  apex  rested 
on  the  ruins  of  Czar  Samuel’s  palace  at  Ochrida 
and  whose  base  extended  from  Saloniki  to 
Golema  Vreh. 

THE  CLAIM  OF  BULGARIA 

From  that  base  line  to  the  Black  Sea  nearly 
all  European  Turkey  (with  the  exception  of 
the  Chalcidician  Peninsula,  including  Saloniki 
and  its  hinterland)  had  been  occupied  by  the 
military  forces  of  Bulgaria.  Why  then  was 
Bulgaria  so  insistent  on  getting  beyond  that 
base  line,  crossing  the  Vardar,  and  possessing 
herself  of  Central  Macedonia  up  to  Ochrida 
and  the  eastern  frontier  of  Albania? 

The  answer,  in  brief,  is  that  it  has  been  the 
undeviating  policy  of  Bulgaria,  ever  since  her 
own  emancipation  by  Russia  in  1877,  to  free 
the  Bulgarians  still  under  the  Ottoman  yoke 
and  unite  them  in  a common  fatherland.  The 


78 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Great  Bulgaria  which  was  created  by  Russia 
in  the  treaty  she  forced  on  Turkey — the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano — was  constructed  under 
the  influence  of  the  idea  of  a union  of  the 
Bulgarian  race  in  a single  state  under  a com- 
mon government.  This  treaty  was  afterward 
torn  to  pieces  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  which 
set  up  for  the  Bulgarians  a very  diminutive 
principality.  But  the  Bulgarians,  from  the 
palace  down  to  the  meanest  hut,  have  always 
been  animated  by  that  racial  and  national  idea. 
The  annexation  of  Eastern  Roumelia  in  1885 
was  a great  step  in  the  direction  of  its  realiza- 
tion. And  it  was  to  carry  that  programme  to 
completion  that  Bulgaria  made  war  against 
Turkey  in  1912.  Her  primary  object  was  the 
liberation  of  the  Bulgarians  in  Macedonia  and 
their  incorporation  in  a Great  Bulgaria.  And 
the  Treaty  of  Partition  with  Servia  seemed,  in 
the  event  of  victory  over  Turkey,  to  afford  a 
guarantee  of  the  accomplishment  of  her  long- 
cherished  purpose.  It  was  a strange  irony  of 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  79 


fate  that  while  as  a result  of  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  belligerents  Bulgaria,  at  the 
close  of  the  war  with  Turkey,  found  herself  in 
actual  occupation  of  all  European  Turkey  from 
the  Black  Sea  up  to  the  River  Struma  and 
beyond, — that  is,  all  Thrace  to  Chataldja  as 
well  as  Eastern  Macedonia — her  allies  were  in 
possession  of  the  bulk  of  Macedonia,  including 
the  entire  triangle  she  had  planned  to  inject  be- 
tween the  frontiers  of  New  Servia  and  New 
Greece ! 

The  Bulgarians  claimed  this  triangle  on 
ethnological  grounds.  Its  inhabitants,  they 
asseverated,  were  their  brethren,  as  genuinely 
Bulgarian  as  the  subjects  of  King  Ferdinand. 

RACIAL  PROPAGANDA  IN  MACEDONIA 

Of  all  perplexing  subjects  in  the  world  few 
can  be  more  baffling  than  the  distribution  of 
races  in  Macedonia.  The  Turks  classify  the 
population,  not  by  language  or  by  physical 
characteristics,  but  by  religion.  A Greek  is  a 
member  of  the  Orthodox  Church  who  recog- 


8o 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


nizes  the  patriarch  of  Constantinople;  a Bul- 
garian, on  the  other  hand,  is  one  of  the  same 
religious  faith  who  recognizes  the  exarch;  and 
since  the  Servians  in  Turkey  have  no  inde- 
pendent church  but  recognize  the  patriarchate 
they  are  often,  as  opposed  to  Bulgarians,  called 
Greeks.  Race,  being  thus  merged  in  religion — 
in  something  that  rests  on  the  human  will  and 
not  on  physical  characteristics  fixed  by  nature — • 
can  in  that  part  of  the  world  be'  changed  as 
easily  as  religion.  A Macedonian  may  be  a 
Greek  to-day,  a Bulgarian  to-morrow,  and  a 
Servian  next  day.  We  have  all  heard  of  the 
captain  in  the  comic  opera  who  “in  spite  of 
all  temptations  to  belong  to  other  nations”  re- 
mained an  Englishman.  There  would  have 
been  nothing  comic  in  this  assertion  had  the 
redoubtable  captain  lived  in  Macedonia.  In 
that  land  a race  is  a political  party  composed  of 
members  with  common  customs  and  religion 
who  stand  for  a “national  idea”  which  they 
strenuously  endeavor  to  force  on  others. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  gi 

Macedonia  is  the  land  of  such  racial  propa- 
ganda. As  the  Turkish  government  forbids 
public  meetings  for  political  purposes,  the  pro- 
paganda takes  an  ecclesiastical  and  linguistic 
form.  Each  “race”  seeks  to  convert  the  people  to 
its  faith  by  the  agency  of  schools  and  churches, 
which  teach  and  use  its  own  language.  Up  to 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
Greeks,  owing  to  their  privileged  ecclesiastical 
position  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  had  exclusive 
spiritual  and  educational  jurisdiction  over  the 
members  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  Macedonia. 
The  opposition  of  the  Bulgarians  led,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  to  the  establishment  in  1870 
of  the  exarchate,  that  is,  of  an  independent 
Bulgarian  Orthodox  Church  with  the  exarch 
at  its  head.  The  Bulgarian  propaganda  in 
Macedonia  demanded  the  appointment  of 
bishops  to  conduct  churches  and  schools  under 
the  authority  of  the  exarchate.  In  1891  the 
Porte  conceded  Bulgarian  bishops  to  Ochrida 
and  Uskub,  in  1894  to  Veles  and  Nevrokop, 


82 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


and  in  1898  to  Monastir,  Strumnitza,  and 
Dibra.  As  has  been  well  said,  the  church  of  the 
exarchate  was  really  occupied  in  creating 
Bulgarians : it  offered  to  the  Slavonic  popula- 
tion of  Macedonia  services  and  schools 
conducted  in  a language  which  they  under- 
stood and  showed  a genuine  interest  in  their 
education.  By  1900  Macedonia  had  785 
Bulgarian  schools,  39,892  pupils,  and  1,250 
teachers. 

The  Servian  propaganda  in  Macedonia  was 
at  a disadvantage  in  comparison  with  the  Bul- 
garian because  it  had  not  a separate  ecclesias- 
tical organization.  As  we  have  already  seen, 
the  orthodox  Serbs  owe  allegiance  to  the  Greek 
patriarch  in  Constantinople.  And  at  first  they 
did  not  push  their  propaganda  as  zealously  or 
as  successfully  as  the  Bulgarians.  In  fact  the 
national  aspirations  of  the  people  of  Servia 
had  been  in  the  direction  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina ; but  after  these  provinces  were  assigned 
to  Austria  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  a marked 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  83 


change  of  attitude  occurred  in  the  Servian  gov- 
ernment and  nation.  They  now  claimed  as 
Servian  the  Slavonic  population  of  Macedonia 
which  hitherto  Bulgaria  had  cultivated  as  her 
own.  The  course  of  politics  in  Bulgaria,  nota- 
bly her  embroilment  with  Russia,  inured  to  the 
advantage  of  the  Servian  propaganda  in  Mace- 
donia, which  after  1890  made  great  headway. 
The  Servian  government  made  liberal  contribu- 
tions for  Macedonian  schools.  And  before  the 
nineteenth  century  closed  the  Servian  propa- 
ganda could  claim  178  schools  in  the  vilayets  of 
Saloniki  and  Monastir  and  in  Uskub  with  321 
teachers  and  7,200  pupils. 

These  Slav  propagandists  made  serious  en- 
croachments upon  the  Greek  cause,  which,  only 
a generation  earlier,  had  possessed  a practical 
monopoly  in  Macedonia.  Greek  efforts  too 
were  for  a time  almost  paralyzed  in  conse- 
quence of  the  disastrous  issue  of  the  Greco- 
Turkish  war  in  1897.  Nevertheless  in  1901  the 
Greeks  claimed  927  schools  in  the  vilayets  of 


84  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

Saloniki  and  Monastir  with  1,397  teachers  and 
57,607  pupils. 

RACIAL  FACTS  AND  FALLACIES 

The  more  bishops,  churches,  and  schools  a 
nationality  could  show,  the  stronger  its  claim 
on  the  reversion  of  Macedonia  when  the  Turk 
should  be  driven  out  of  Europe ! There  was  no 
doubt  much  juggling  with  statistics.  And 
though  schools  and  churches  were  provided  by 
Greeks,  Servians,  and  Bulgarians  to  satisfy 
the  spiritual  and  intellectual  needs  of  their 
kinsmen  in  Macedonia,  there  was  always  the 
ulterior  (which  was  generally  the  dominant) 
object  of  staking  out  claims  in  the  domain  soon 
to  drop  from  the  paralyzed  hand  of  the  Turk. 
The  bishops  may  have  been  good  shepherds  of 
their  flocks,  but  the  primary  qualification  for 
the  office  was,  I imagine,  the  gift  of  aggres- 
sive political  leadership.  The  Turkish  govern- 
ment now  favored  one  nationality  and  now 
another  as  the  interests  of  the  moment  seemed 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  85 


to  suggest.  With  an  impish  delight  in  playing 
off  Slav  against  Greek  and  Servian  against 
Bulgarian,  its  action  on  applications  for 
bishoprics  was  generally  taken  with  a view  to 
embarrassing  the  rival  Christian  nationalities. 
And  it  could  when  necessary  keep  the  propa- 
gandists within  severe  limits.  The  Bulgarians 
grew  bold  after  securing  so  many  bishoprics 
in  the  nineties  and  the  bishop  at  Uskub  thought 
to  open  new  schools  and  churches.  But  the 
Turkish  governor — the  Vali — summoned  him 
and  delivered  this  warning:  “O  Bulgarian, 

sit  upon  the  eggs  you  have,  and  do  not  burst 
your  belly  by  trying  to  lay  more.” 

How  are  we  to  determine  the  racial  com- 
plexion of  a country  in  which  race  is  certified 
by  religion,  in  which  religion  is  measured  by 
the  number  of  bishops  and  churches  and 
schools,  in  which  bishops  and  churches  and 
schools  are  created  and  maintained  by  a propa- 
ganda conducted  by  competing  external  pow- 
ers, and  in  which  the  results  of  the  propaganda 


86 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


are  determined  largely  by  money  and  men  sent 
from  Sofia,  Athens,  and  Belgrade,  subject 
always  to  the  caprice  and  manipulation  of  the 
Sultan’s  government  at  Constantinople? 

In  Southern  Macedonia  from  the  Thessalian 
frontier  as  far  north  as  the  parallel  of  Saloniki, 
the  population  is  almost  exclusively  Greek,  as  is 
also  the  whole  of  the  Chalcidician  Peninsula, 
while  further  east  the  coast  region  between  the 
Struma  and  the  Mesta  is  also  predominantly 
Greek.  Eastern  Macedonia  to  the  north  of  the 
line  of  Seres  and  Drama  and  south  of  the  King- 
dom of  Bulgaria  is  generally  Bulgarian.  On 
the  northwest  from  the  city  of  Uskub  up  to  the 
confines  of  Servia  and  Bosnia,  Macedonia  is 
mixed  Serb,  Bulgarian,  and  Albanian,  with  the 
Serb  element  preponderating  as  you  travel 
northward  and  the  Albanian  westward. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  87 


PERSONAL  OBSERVATIONS  AND  EXPERIENCES 

The  difficulty  comes  when  we  attempt  to 
give  the  racial  character  of  Central  Macedonia, 
which  is  equally  remote  from  Greece,  Bulgaria, 
and  Servia.  I travelled  through  this  district 
last  summer.  On  June  29,  when  the  war  broke 
out  between  the  Allies  I found  myself  in  Uskub. 
Through  the  courtesy  of  the  Servian  authorities 
I was  permitted  to  ride  on  the  first  military 
train  which  left  the  city.  Descending  at  Veles 
I drove  across  Central  Macedonia  by  way  of 
Prilip  to  Monastir,  spending  the  first  night,  for 
lack  of  a better  bed,  in  the  carriage,  which  was 
guarded  by  Servian  sentries.  From  Monastir  I 
motored  over  execrable  roads  to  Lake  Presba 
and  Lake  Ochrida  and  thence  beyond  the  city  of 
Ochrida  to  Struga  on  the  Black  Drin,  from 
which  I looked  out  on  the  mountains  of 
Albania. 

Coming  from  Athens  where  for  many 
months  I had  listened  to  patriotic  stories  of 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


the  thorough  permeation  of  Macedonia  by 
Greek  settlements  my  first  surprise  was  my 
inability  to  discover  a Greek  majority  in  Central 
Macedonia.  In  most  of  the  cities  a fraction  of 
the  population  indeed  is  Greek  and  as  a rule  the 
colony  is  prosperous.  This  is  especially  true  in 
Monastir,  which  is  a stronghold  of  Greek  influ- 
ence. But  while  half  the  population  of  Mon- 
astir is  Mohammedan  the  so-called  Bulgarians 
form  the  majority  of  the  Christian  population, 
though  both  Servians  and  Roumanians  have 
conducted  energetic  propaganda.  In  Veles  two- 
thirds  of  the  population  are  Christians  and 
nearly  all  of  these  are  called  Bulgarians.  In 
Ochrida  the  lower  town  is  Mohammedan  and 
the  upper  Christian,  and  the  Christian  popula- 
tion is  almost  exclusively  of  the  Bulgarian 
Church. 

It  does  not  follow,  however,  that  the  people 
of  Central  Macedonia,  even  if  Bulgarian 
churches  are  in  the  ascendant  among  them,  are 
really  connected  by  ties  of  blood  and  language 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  89 


with  Bulgaria  rather  than  with  Servia.  If 
history  is  invoked  we  shall  have  to  admit  that 
under  Dushan  this  region  was  a part  of  the 
Serb  empire  as  under  Simeon  and  Asen  it  was 
part  of  the  Bulgarian.  If  an  appeal  is  made  to 
anthropology  the  answer  is  still  uncertain.  For 
while  the  Mongolian  features — broad  flat  faces, 
narrow  eyes,  and  straight  black  hair — which 
characterize  the  subjects  of  King  Ferdinand  can 
be  seen — I myself  have  seen  them — as  far  west 
as  Ochrida,  they  may  also  be  found  all  over 
Northern  Servia  as  far  as  Belgrade  though  the 
Servian  physical  type  is  entirely  different. 
There  is  no  fixed  connection  between  the  an- 
thropological unit  and  the  linguistic  or  political 
unit.  Furthermore,  while  there  are  well- 
marked  groups  who  call  themselves  Serbs  or 
Bulgarians  there  is  a larger  population  not  so 
clearly  differentiated  by  physique  or  language. 
Undoubtedly  they  are  Slavs.  But  whether 
Serb  or  Bulgarian,  or  intermediate  between  the 
two,  no  one  to-day  can  demonstrate.  Central 


po 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Macedonia  has  its  own  dialects,  any  one  of 
which  under  happy  literary  auspices  might 
have  developed  into  a separate  language.  And 
the  men  who  speak  them  to-day  can  more  or 
less  understand  either  Servian  or  Bulgarian. 
Hence  as  the  anonymous  and  highly  authorita- 
tive author  of  “Turkey  in  Europe,”  who  calls 
himself  Odysseus,  declares : 

“The  practical  conclusion  is  that  neither 
Greeks,  Servians,  nor  Bulgarians  have  a right 
to  claim  Central  Macedonia.  The  fact  that  they 
all  do  so  shows  how  weak  each  claim  must  be.” 
Yet  it  was  Bulgaria’s  intransigent  assertion 
of  her  claim  to  Central  Macedonia  which  led  to 
the  war  between  the  Allies. 

It  will  be  instructive  to  consider  the  atti- 
tude of  each  of  the  governments  concerned  on 
the  eve  of  the  conflict.  I hope  I am  in  a posi- 
tion correctly  to  report  it.  Certainly  I had 
unusual  opportunities  to  learn  it.  For  besides 
the  official  position  I held  in  Athens  during  the 
entire  course  of  both  Balkan  wars  I visited  the 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  91 

Balkan  states  in  June  and  was  accorded  the 
privilege  of  discussing  the  then  pending  crisis 
with  the  prime  ministers  of  Roumania,  Servia, 
and  Bulgaria.  It  would  of  course  be  improper 
to  quote  them;  nay  more,  I feel  myself  under 
special  obligation  sacredly  to  respect  the  confi- 
dence they  reposed  in  me.  But  the  frank  dis- 
closures they  made  in  these  conversations 
gave  me  a point  of  view  for  the  compre- 
hension of  the  situation  and  the  estimate  of 
facts  which  I have  found  simply  invaluable. 
And  if  Mr.  Venizelos  in  Athens,  or  Mr.  Maior- 
esco  in  Bukarest,  or  Mr.  Pashitch  in  Belgrade, 
or  Dr.  Daneff,  who  is  no  longer  prime  minister 
of  Bulgaria,  should  ever  chance  to  read  what  I 
am  saying,  I hope  each  will  feel  that  I have 
fairly  and  impartially  presented  the  attitude 
which  their  respective  governments  had  taken 
at  this  critical  moment  on  the  vital  issue  then 
confronting  them. 


92 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  SERVIA 

I have  already  indicated  the  situation  of 
Servia.  Compelled  by  the  Great  Powers  to 
withdraw  her  troops  from  Albania,  after  they 
had  triumphantly  made  their  way  to  the  Adri- 
atic, she  was  now  requested  by  Bulgaria  to 
evacuate  Central  Macedonia  up  to  the  Ochrida- 
Golema  Vreh  line  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  between  the  two  countries 
which  was  ratified  in  March,  1912.  The  Servian 
government  believed  that  for  the  loss  of  Albania, 
which  the  treaty  assumed  would  be  annexed  to 
Servia,  they  were  entitled  to  compensation  in 
Macedonia.  And  if  now,  instead  of  compensa- 
tion for  the  loss  of  an  outlet  on  the  Adriatic, 
they  were  to  withdraw  their  forces  from  Cen- 
tral Macedonia  and  allow  Bulgaria  to  establish 
herself  between  New  Servia  and  New  Greece, 
they  would  block  their  own  way  to  Saloniki, 
which  was  the  only  prospect  now  left  of  a Ser- 
vian outlet  to  the  sea.  Nor  was  this  the  whole 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES 


93 


story  by  any  means.  The  army,  which  comprised 
all  able-bodied  Servians,  was  in  possession  of 
Central  Macedonia;  and  the  military  leaders, 
with  the  usual  professional  bias  in  favor  of 
imperialism,  dictated  their  expansionist  views 
to  the  government  at  Belgrade.  If  Bulgaria 
would  not  voluntarily  grant  compensation  for 
the  loss  of  Albania,  the  Servian  people  were 
ready  to  take  it  by  force.  They  had  also  a 
direct  claim  against  Bulgaria.  They  had  sent 
60,000  soldiers  to  the  siege  of  Adrianople, 
which  the  Bulgarians  had  hitherto  failed  to 
capture.  And  the  Servians  were  now  asking,  in 
bitter  irony,  whether  they  had  gone  to  war 
solely  for  the  benefit  of  Bulgaria;  whether  be- 
sides helping  her  to  win  all  Thrace  and  Eastern 
Macedonia  they  were  now  to  present  her  with 
Central  Macedonia,  and  that  at  a time  when  the 
European  Concert  had  stripped  them  of  the 
expected  prize  of  Albania  with  its  much  desired 
Adriatic  littoral ! This  argument  was  graphic- 
ally presented  on  a map  of  which  I secured  a 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


94 

copy  in  Belgrade.  The  legend  on  this  map 
reads  as  follows : 

“Territories  occupied  by  Servia  55,000 
square  miles.  Servia  cedes  to  her  allies  in  the 
east  and  south  3,800  square  miles.  Servia  cedes 
to  Albania  15,200  square  miles.  Servia  retains 
36,000  square  miles.  Territories  occupied  by 
Bulgaria  to  Enos-Midia,  51,200  square  miles. 
The  Bulgarians  demand  from  the  Servians  still 
10,240  square  miles.  According  to  Bulgarian 
pretensions  Bulgaria  should  get  61,520  square 
miles  and  Servia  only  25,760 !’’ 

PROPOSED  REVISION  OF  TREATY  AND 
ARBITRATION 

When  the  treaty  between  Servia  and  Bul- 
garia was  negotiated,  it  seems  to  have  been 
assumed  that  the  theatre  of  a war  with  Turkey 
would  be  Macedonia  and  that  Thrace — the 
country  from  the  Mesta  to  the  Black  Sea — 
would  remain  intact  to  Turkey.  And  if  the 
rest  of  Turkey  in  Europe  up  to  the  Adriatic 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  95 

were  conquered  by  the  two  Allies,  the  Ochrida- 
Golema  Vreh  line  would  make  a fairly  equit- 
able division  between  them  of  the  spoils  of  war. 
But  with  Albania  denied  to  Servia  and  Thrace 
occupied  by  Bulgaria,  conditions  had  wholly 
changed.  The  Servian  government  declared 
that  the  changed  conditions  had  abrogated  the 
Treaty  of  Partition  and  that  it  was  for  the  two 
governments  now  to  adjust  themselves  to  the 
logic  of  events!  On  May  28  Mr.  Pashitch, 
the  Servian  prime  minister,  formally  de- 
manded a revision  of  the  treaty.  A personal 
interview  with  the  Bulgarian  prime  minister, 
Mr.  Gueshoff,  followed  on  June  2 at  Tsaribrod. 
And  Mr.  Gueshoff  accepted  Mr.  Pashitch’s  sug- 
gestion (which  originated  with  Mr.  Venizelos, 
the  Greek  prime  minister)  of  a conference  of 
representatives  of  the  four  Allies  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. For  it  should  be  added  that,  in  the 
Treaty  of  Partition,  the  Czar  had  been  named 
as  arbiter  in  case  of  any  territorial  dispute 
between  the  two  parties. 


96 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


What  followed  in  the  next  few  days  has 
never  been  clearly  disclosed.  But  it  was  of 
transcendent  importance.  I have  always 
thought  that  if  Mr.  Gueshoff,  one  of  the  au- 
thors of  the  Balkan  Alliance,  had  been  allowed 
like  Mr.  Venizelos  and  Mr.  Pashitch,  to  finish 
his  work,  there  would  have  been  no  war  be- 
tween the  Allies.  I did  not  enjoy  the  personal 
acquaintance  of  Mr.  Gueshoff,  but  I regarded 
him  as  a wise  statesman  of  moderate  views,  who 
was  disposed  to  make  reasonable  concessions  for 
the  sake  of  peace.  But  a whole  nation  in  arms, 
flushed  with  the  sense  of  victory,  is  always 
dangerous  to  the  authority  of  civil  government. 
If  Mr.  Gueshoff  was  ready  to  arrange  some 
accommodation  with  Mr.  Pashitch,  the  military 
party  in  Bulgaria  was  all  the  more  insistent  in 
its  demands  on  Servia  for  the  evacuation  of 
Central  Macedonia.  Even  in  Servia  Mr. 
Pashitch  had  great  difficulty  in  repressing  the 
jingo  ardor  of  the  army,  whose  bellicose  spirit 
was  believed  to  find  expression  in  the  attitude 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  97 

of  the  Crown  Prince.  But  the  provocation  in 
Bulgaria  was  greater,  because,  when  all  was 
said  and  done,  Servia  was  actually  violating  an 
agreement  with  Bulgaria  to  which  she  had 
solemnly  set  her  name.  Possibly  the  military 
party  gained  the  ear  of  King  Ferdinand.  Cer- 
tainly it  was  reported  that  he  was  consulting 
with  leaders  of  the  opposition.  Presumably 
they  were  all  dissatisfied  with  the  conciliatory 
attitude  which  Mr.  Gueshoff  had  shown  in  the 
Tsaribrod  conference.  Whatever  the  expia- 
tion, Mr.  Gueshoff  resigned  on  June  9. 

DELAY  AND  OPPOSITION  OF  BULGARIA 

On  that  very  day  the  Czar  summoned  the 
Kings  of  Bulgaria  and  Servia  to  submit  their 
disputes  to  his  decision.  While  this  demand 
was  based  on  a specific  provision  of  the  Servo- 
Bulgarian  treaty,  His  Majesty  also  urged  it 
on  the  ground  of  devotion  to  the  Slav  cause. 
This  pro-Slav  argument  provoked  much  criti- 
cism in  Austro-Hungarian  circles  which  re- 


98  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

sented  bitterly  the  assumption  of  Slav  hege- 
mony in  Balkan  affairs.  However,  on  June  12 
Bulgaria  and  Servia  accepted  Russian  arbitra- 
tion. But  the  terms  were  not  agreed  upon. 
While  Mr.  Venizelos  and  Mr.  Pashitch  impa- 
tiently awaited  the  summons  to  St.  Petersburg 
they  could  get  no  definite  information  of  the 
intentions  of  the  Bulgarian  government.  And 
the  rivalry  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  for 
predominance  in  the  Balkans  was  never  more 
intense  than  at  this  critical  moment. 

On  June  14  Dr.  Daneff  was  appointed 
prime  minister  in  succession  to  Mr.  Gueshoff. 
He  had  represented  Bulgaria  in  the  London 
Peace  Conference  where  his  aggressive  and 
uncompromising  attitude  had  perturbed  his 
fellow  delegates  from  the  other  Balkan  states 
and  provoked  some  criticism  in  the  European 
press.  He  was  known  as  a Russophil.  And 
he  seems  now  to  have  got  assurance  from 
Russia  that  she  would  maintain  the  Bulgarian 
view  of  the  treaty  with  Servia,  although  she 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  99 

had  at  one  time  favored  the  Servian  demand 
for  an  extensive  revision  of  it.  Certainly  Dr. 
Daneff  voiced  the  views  and  sentiments  of  the 
Bulgarian  army  and  nation.  I was  in  Sofia  the 
week  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  between 
the  Allies.  And  the  two  points  on  which  every- 
body insisted  were,  first,  that  Servia  must  be 
compelled  to  observe  the  Treaty  of  Partition, 
and,  secondly,  that  Central  Macedonia  must  be 
annexed  to  Bulgaria.  For  these  things  all 
Bulgarians  were  ready  to  fight.  And  flushed 
with  their  great  victories  over  the  main  army 
of  Turkey  they  believed  it  would  be  an  easy 
task  to  overpower  the  forces  of  Servia  and 
Greece.  For  the  Greeks  they  entertained  a sort 
of  contempt ; and  as  for  the  Servians,  had  they 
not  already  defeated  them  completely  at  Sliv- 
nitza  in  1886  ? Men  high  in  the  military  service 
of  the  nation  assured  me  that  the  Bulgarian 
army  would  be  in  Belgrade  in  eight  days  after 
war  was  declared.  The  Greeks  too  would 
quickly  be  driven  out  of  Saloniki.  The  idea  of 


100 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


a conference  to  decide  the  territorial  question 
in  dispute  between  the  Allies  found  no  favor  in 
any  quarter. 

Now  it  is  important  that  full  justice  should 
be  done  to  Bulgaria.  As  against  Servia,  if 
Servia  had  stood  alone,  she  might  have  appealed 
to  the  sanctity  and  inviolability  of  treaties. 
Circumstances  had  indeed  changed  since  the 
treaty  was  negotiated.  But  was  that  a good 
reason,  Bulgaria  might  have  asked,  why  she 
should  be  excluded  from  Central  Macedonia 
which  the  treaty  guaranteed  to  her?  Was  that 
a good  reason  why  she  should  not  emanci- 
pate her  Macedonian  brethren  for  whose  sake 
she  had  waged  a bloody  and  costly  war  with 
Turkey?  The  Bulgarians  saw  nothing  in  the 
problem  but  their  treaty  with  Servia  and  appar- 
ently cared  for  no  territorial  compensation 
without  Central  Macedonia. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  ioi 


Bulgaria’s  uncompromising  policy 

The  Bulgarians  were  blind  to  all  facts  and 
considerations  but  the  abstract  terms  of  the 
treaty  with  Servia.  It  was  a fact,  however,  that 
the  war  against  Turkey  had  been  fought  by 
four  Allies.  It  was  a fact  that  the  Ottoman 
government  had  ceded  European  Turkey  (ex- 
cept Albania)  to  these  four  Allies.  No  two  of 
the  Allies  could  divide  between  themselves  the 
common  possession.  A division  made  by  the 
four  Allies  might  contravene  the  terms  of  a 
treaty  which  existed  between  any  two  of  the 
Allies  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  In  any 
event  it  was  for  the  four  Allies  together  to 
effect  a distribution  of  the  territory  ceded  to 
them  by  Turkey.  For  that  purpose  a confer- 
ence was  an  essential  organ.  How  otherwise 
could  the  four  nations  reach  any  agreement? 
Yet  the  Bulgarians — army,  government,  and 
nation — were  obsessed  by  the  fixed  idea  that 
Bulgaria  enjoyed  not  only  a primacy  in  this 


102 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


matter  but  a sort  of  sovereign  monopoly  by 
virtue  of  which  it  was  her  right  and  privilege 
to  determine  how  much  of  the  common  spoils 
she  should  assign  Servia  (with  whom  she  had 
an  ante-bellum  treaty),  and,  after  Servia  had 
been  eliminated,  how  much  she  could  spare  to 
Greece  (with  whom  no  treaty  of  partition  ex- 
isted), and,  when  Greece  had  been  disposed  of, 
whether  any  crumbs  could  be  flung  to  Mon- 
tenegro, who  had  indeed  very  little  to  hope  for 
from  the  Bulgarian  government.  And  so  Bul- 
garia opposed  a conference  of  the  four  prime 
ministers  though  a conference  was  the  natural, 
obvious,  and  necessary  method  of  disposing  of 
the  common  business  pressing  upon  them. 

The  attitude  of  Bulgaria  left  no  alternative 
but  war.  Yet  the  Bulgarian  government  failed 
to  reckon  the  cost  of  war.  Was  it  not  madness 
for  Bulgaria  to  force  war  upon  Greece,  Servia, 
and  Montenegro  on  the  west  at  a time  when 
Roumania  was  making  demands  for  territorial 
compensation  on  the  north  and  Turkey  was 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  103 

sure  to  seize  the  occasion  to  win  back  territory 
which  Bulgaria  had  just  wrested  from  her  on 
the  south?  Never  was  a government  blinder 
to  the  significant  facts  of  a critical  situation. 
All  circumstances  conspired  to  prescribe  peace 
as  the  manifest  policy  for  Bulgaria,  yet  nearly 
every  step  taken  by  the  government  was  provo- 
cative of  war.  The  Bulgarian  army  had  cov- 
ered itself  with  glory  in  the  victorious  campaign 
against  the  Moslem.  A large  part  of  European 
Turkey  was  already  in  Bulgarian  hands.  To 
imperil  that  glory  and  those  possessions  by  the 
risk  of  a new  war,  when  the  country  was  ex- 
hausted and  new  enemies  lay  in  wait,  was  as 
foolish  as  it  was  criminal.  That  way  madness 
lay.  Yet  that  way  the  policy  pursued  by  the 
Bulgarian  government  infallibly  led.  Must  we 
assume  that  there  is  some  ground  for  suspect- 
ing that  Austria-Hungary  was  inciting  Bul- 
garia to  war?  We  must  leave  it  to  history  to 
answer.  If  the  result  was  a terrible  disaster, 
that  was  only  the  old  Greek  Nemesis  of  the 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


104 

gods  for  the  outraged  principles  of  reason  and 
moderation. 

THE  CONCILIATORY  SPIRIT  OF  GREECE 

Those  principles,  thanks  to  the  conciliatory 
spirit  of  Mr.  Venizelos,  the  prime  minister,  and 
the  steady  support  of  King  Constantine,  who 
was  also  commander-in-chief,  were  loyally  fol- 
lowed in  Greece.  A few  days  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war  against  the  Ottoman  Empire,  into 
which  Greece  was  precipitately  hastened  by  the 
unexpected  action  of  Servia  and  Bulgaria,  the 
Greek  foreign  minister  addressed  a communica- 
tion to  the  Allies  on  the  subject  of  the  division 
of  conquered  territory.  He  traced  the  line  of 
Greek  claims,  as  based  on  ethnological  grounds, 
and  added  that,  as  he  foresaw  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  a direct  adjustment,  he  thought  the 
disputed  points  should  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion. But  months  followed  months  without 
bringing  from  Bulgaria  any  clear  reply  to  this 
just  and  reasonable  proposal  of  the  Greek 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  105 

government.  Nevertheless,  Mr.  Venizelos  per- 
sisted in  his  attitude  of  conciliation  toward 
Bulgaria.  He  made  concessions,  not  only  in 
Thrace  but  in  Eastern  Macedonia,  for  which 
he  was  bitterly  criticized  on  the  ground  of 
sacrificing  vital  Greek  interests  to  Bulgaria. 
He  recognized,  as  his  critics  refused  to  do,  that 
the  Balkan  question  could  not  be  settled  on 
ethnological  principles  alone;  one  had  to  take 
account  also  of  geographical  necessities.  He 
saw  that  the  Greeks  in  Thrace  must  be  handed 
over  to  Bulgaria.  He  demanded  only  the 
Macedonian  territory  which  the  Greek  forces 
had  actually  occupied,  including  Saloniki  with 
an  adequate  hinterland.  As  the  attitude  of 
Bulgaria  became  more  uncompromising,  as  she 
pushed  her  army  of  occupation  further  west- 
ward, Mr.  Venizelos  was  even  ready  to  make 
the  River  Struma  the  eastern  boundary  of  New 
Greece,  and  to  abandon  to  Bulgaria  the  Aegean 
littoral  between  the  Struma  and  the  Mesta 
Rivers  including  Greek  cities  like  Kavala, 


106  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

Seres,  and  Drama.  But  these  new  concessions 
of  Mr.  Venizelos  were  in  danger  of  alienating 
from  him  the  support  of  the  Greek  nation  with- 
out yielding  anything  in  return  from  Bulgaria. 
The  outbreak  of  the  war  between  the  Allies 
saved  him  from  a difficult  political  position. 
Yet  against  that  war  Mr.  Venizelos  strove 
resolutely  to  the  end.  And  when  in  despite  of 
all  his  efforts  war  came,  he  was  justified  in 
saying,  as  he  did  say  to  the  national  parliament, 
that  the  Greeks  had  the  right  to  present  them- 
selves before  the  civilized  world  with  head  erect 
because  this  new  war  which  was  bathing  with 
blood  the  Balkan  Peninsula  had  not  been  pro- 
voked by  Greece  or  brought  about  by  the 
demand  of  Greece  to  receive  satisfaction  for 
all  her  ethnological  claims.  And  this  position 
in  which  he  had  placed  his  country  was,  he 
proudly  declared,  a “moral  capital”  of  the 
greatest  value. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  107 


BULGARIA  BEGINS  HOSTILITIES 

Bulgaria’s  belated  acceptance  of  Russian 
arbitration  was  not  destined  to  establish  peace. 
Yet  Dr.  Daneff,  the  prime  minister,  who 
received  me  on  June  27  and  talked  freely 
of  the  Balkan  situation  (perhaps  the  more 
freely  because  in  this  conversation  it  transpired 
that  we  had  been  fellow  students  together  at 
the  University  of  Heidelberg),  decided  on  June 
28  not  to  go  to  war  with  the  Allies.  Yet  that 
very  evening  at  eight  o’clock,  unknown  to  Dr. 
Daneff,  an  order  in  cipher  and  marked  “very 
urgent”  was  issued  by  General  Savoff  to  the 
commander  of  the  fourth  army  directing  him 
on  the  following  evening  to  attack  the  Servians 
“most  vigorously  along  the  whole  front.”  On 
the  following  afternoon,  the  29th,  General 
Savoff  issued  another  order  to  the  army  com- 
manders giving  further  instructions  for  attacks 
on  the  Servians  and  Greeks,  including  an  attack 
on  Saloniki,  stating  that  these  attacks  were 


io8  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

taking  place  “without  any  official  declaration  of 
war,”  and  that  they  were  undertaken  in  order 
to  accustom  the  Bulgarian  army  to  regard  their 
former  allies  as  enemies,  to  hasten  the  activities 
of  the  Russian  government,  to  compel  the 
former  allies  to  be  more  conciliatory,  and  to 
secure  new  territories  for  Bulgaria!  Who  was 
responsible  for  this  deplorable  lack  of  harmony 
between  the  civil  government  and  the  military 
authorities  has  not  yet  been  officially  disclosed. 
Did  General  Savoff  act  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility ? Or  is  there  any  truth  in  the  charge  that 
King  Ferdinand  after  a long  consultation  with 
the  Austro-FIungarian  Minister  instructed  the 
General  to  issue  the  order?  Dr.  Daneff  knew 
nothing  of  it,  and  though  he  made  every  effort 
to  stop  the  resulting  hostilities,  the  dogs  of  war 
had  been  let  loose  and  could  not  now  be  torn 
from  one  another’s  throats. 

There  had  been  sporadic  fighting  in  Mace- 
donia between  the  Allies  for  some  months  past. 
Greece  and  Servia  had  concluded  an  anti- 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  109 

Bulgarian  alliance  on  June  1.  They  also  entered 
into  a convention  with  Roumania  by  which  that 
power  agreed  to  intervene  in  case  of  war  be- 
tween the  late  Allies.  And  war  having  been 
declared,  Roumania  seized  Silistria  at  midnight, 
July  10.  Meanwhile  the  Servian  and  Greek 
forces  were  fighting  the  Bulgarians  hard  at 
Kilkis,  Doiran,  and  other  points  between  the 
Vardar  and  the  Struma,  And,  as  if  Bulgaria 
had  not  enemies  enough  on  her  back  already, 
the  Turkish  Army  on  July  12  left  the  Chat- 
aldja  fortifications,  crossed  the  Enos-Midia 
line,  and  in  less  than  two  weeks,  with 
Enver  Bey  at  its  head,  re-occupied  Adri- 
anople.  Bulgaria  was  powerless  to  stop  the 
further  advance  of  the  Turks,  nor  had  she 
forces  to  send  against  the  Roumanians  who 
marched  unopposed  through  the  neighboring 
country  till  Sofia  itself  was  within  their 
power. 

No  nation  could  stand  up  against  such  fear- 
ful odds.  Dr.  Daneff  resigned  on  July  15. 


no 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


And  the  new  ministry  had  to  make  the  best 
terms  it  could. 


TERMS  OF  PEACE 

A Peace  Conference  met  at  Bukarest  on  July 
28,  and  peace  was  signed  on  August  10.  By 
this  Treaty  of  Bukarest  Servia  secured  not 
only  all  that  part  of  Macedonia  already 
under  her  occupation  but  gained  also  an 
eastward  extension  beyond  the  Doiran-Istib- 
Kochana  line  into  purely  Bulgarian  territory. 
Greece  fared  still  better  under  the  treaty;  for 
it  gave  her  not  only  all  the  Macedonian  lands 
she  had  already  occupied  but  extended  her 
domain  on  the  Aegean  littoral  as  far  east  as 
the  mouth  of  the  Mesta  and  away  into  the 
interior  as  far  above  Seres  and  Drama  as  they 
are  from  the  sea, — thus  establishing  the 
northern  frontier  of  New  Greece  from  Lake 
Presba  (near  the  eastern  boundary  of  Albania) 
on  a northward-ascending  line  past  Ghevgheli 
and  Doiran  to  Kainchal  in  Thrace  on  the  other 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  m 

side  of  the  Mesta  River.  This  assignment  of 
territory  conquered  from  Turkey  had  the  ef- 
fect of  shutting  out  Bulgaria  from  the  West- 
ern Aegean;  and  the  littoral  left  to  Bulgaria 
between  the  Mesta  River  and  the  Turkish 
boundary  has  no  harbor  of  any  consequence 
but  Dedeagach,  which  is  much  inferior  to 
Kavala. 

The  new  Turkish  boundary  was  arranged  by 
negotiations  between  the  Bulgarian  and  Otto- 
man governments.  The  terminus  on  the  Black 
Sea  was  pushed  north  from  Midia  almost  up 
to  the  southern  boundary  of  Bulgaria.  Enos 
remained  the  terminus  on  the  Aegean.  But  the 
two  termini  were  connected  by  a curved  line 
which  after  following  the  Maritza  River  to  a 
point  between  Sufli  and  Dimotika  then  swung 
in  a semicircle  well  beyond  Adrianople  to  Bul- 
garia and  the  Black  Sea.  Thus  Bulgaria  was 
compelled  to  cede  back  to  the  Asiatic  enemy  not 
only  Adrianople  but  the  battlefields  of  Kirk 
Kilisse,  Lule  Burgas,  and  Chorlu  on  which 


112 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


her  brave  soldiers  had  won  such  magnificent 
victories  over  the  Moslems. 

THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ROUMANIA 

The  Treaty  of  Bukarest  marked  the  pre- 
dominance of  Roumania  in  Balkan  affairs.  And 
of  course  Roumania  had  her  own  reward.  She 
had  long  coveted  the  northeastern  corner  of 
Bulgaria,  from  Turtukai  on  the  Danube  to 
Baltchik  on  the  Black  Sea.  And  this  territory, 
even  some  miles  beyond  that  line,  Bulgaria  was 
now  compelled  to  cede  to  her  by  the  treaty. 
It  is  a fertile  area  with  a population  of  some 
300,000  souls,  many  of  whom  are  Turks. 

The  claim  of  Roumania  to  compensation  for 
her  neutrality  during  the  first  Balkan  war  was 
severely  criticized  by  the  independent  press 
of  western  Europe.  It  was  first  put  forward 
in  the  London  Peace  Conference,  but  rejected 
by  Dr.  Daneff,  the  Bulgarian  delegate.  But 
the  Roumanian  government  persisted  in  press- 
ing the  claim,  and  the  Powers  finally  decided  to 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  113 

mediate,  with  the  result  that  the  city  of  Silistria 
and  the  immediately  adjoining  territory  were 
assigned  to  Roumania.  Neither  state  was  sat- 
isfied with  the  award  and  the  second  Balkan 
war  broke  out  before  the  transfer  had  been 
effected.  This  gave  Roumania  the  opportunity 
to  enforce  her  original  claim,  and,  despite  the 
advice  of  Austria-Hungary,  she  used  it,  as  we 
have  already  seen. 

The  Roumanian  government  justifies  its 
position  in  this  matter  by  two  considerations. 
In  the  first  place,  as  Roumania  was  larger  and 
more  populous  than  any  of  the  Balkan  states, 
the  Roumanian  nation  could  not  sit  still  with 
folded  arms  while  Bulgaria  wrested  this  pre- 
eminence from  her.  And  if  Bulgaria  had  not 
precipitated  a war  among  the  Allies,  if  she  had 
been  content  with  annexing  the  portion  of 
European  Turkey  which  she  held  under  mili- 
tary occupation,  New  Bulgaria  would  have 
contained  a greater  area  and  a larger  popula- 
tion than  Roumania.  The  Roumanians  claim, 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


114 

accordingly,  that  the  course  they  pursued  was 
dictated  by  a legitimate  and  vital  national  in- 
terest. And,  in  the  second  place,  as  Greeks, 
Servians,  and  Bulgarians  based  their  respective 
claims  to  Macedonian  territory  on  the  racial 
character  of  the  inhabitants,  Roumania  asserted 
that  the  presence  of  a large  Roumanian  (or 
Vlach)  population  in  that  disputed  region  gave 
her  an  equally  valid  claim  to  a share  in  the 
common  estate. 

In  all  Macedonia  there  may  be  some  100,000 
Vlachs,  though  Roumanian  officials  put  the 
number  much  higher.  Many  of  them  are  high- 
land shepherds;  others  engage  in  transporta- 
tion with  trains  of  horses  or  mules;  those  in 
the  lowlands  are  good  farmers.  They  are 
found  especially  in  the  mountains  and  valleys 
between  Thessaly  and  Albania.  They  are  gen- 
erally favorable  to  the  Greek  cause.  Most  of 
them  speak  Greek  as  well  as  Roumanian;  and 
they  are  all  devoted  members  of  the  Greek 
Orthodox  Church.  Yet  there  has  been  a Rou- 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  115 

manian  propaganda  in  Macedonia  since  1886, 
and  the  government  at  Bukarest  has  devoted 
large  sums  to  the  maintenance  of  Roumanian 
schools,  of  which  the  maximum  number  at  any 
time  has  perhaps  not  exceeded  forty. 

Now  if  every  other  nation — Greek,  Servian, 
Bulgarian — which  had  hitherto  maintained  its 
propaganda  of  schools  and  churches  in  Mace- 
donia, was  to  bring  its  now  emancipated 
children  under  the  benign  sway  of  the  home 
government  and  also  was  to  annex  the 
Macedonian  lands  which  they  occupied,  why, 
Roumania  asked,  should  she  be  excluded  from 
participation  in  the  arrangement?  She  did  not, 
it  is  true,  join  the  Allies  in  fighting  the  common 
Moslem  oppressor.  But  she  maintained  a be- 
nevolent neutrality.  And  since  Macedonia  is 
not  conterminous  with  Roumania,  she  was  not 
seeking  to  annex  any  portion  of  it.  Yet  the 
rights  those  Roumanians  in  Macedonia  gave 
her  should  be  satisfied.  And  so  arguing,  the 
Roumanian  government  claimed  as  a quid  pro 


Ii6 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


quo  the  adjoining  northeastern  corner  of  Bul- 
garia, permitting  Bulgaria  to  recoup  herself  by 
the  uncontested  annexation  of  Thrace  and 
Eastern  Macedonia. 

Such  was  the  Roumanian  reasoning.  Cer- 
tainly it  bore  hard  on  Bulgaria.  But  none  of 
the  belligerents  showed  any  mercy  on  Bulgaria. 
War  is  a game  of  ruthless  self-interest.  It  was 
Bulgaria  who  appealed  to  arms  and  she  now  had 
to  pay  the  penalty.  Her  losses  enriched  all  her 
neighbors.  What  Lord  Bacon  says  of  individ- 
uals is  still  more  true  of  nations:  the  folly  of 
one  is  the  fortune  of  another,  and  none  prospers 
so  suddenly  as  by  others’  errors. 

THE  WORK  AND  REWARD  OF  MONTENEGRO 

I have  already  sufficiently  described  the  ter- 
ritorial gains  of  Roumania,  Servia,  and  Greece. 
But  I must  not  pass  over  Montenegro  in  silence. 
As  the  invincible  warriors  of  King  Nicholas 
opened  the  war  against  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
so  they  joined  Servia  and  Greece  in  the  strug- 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  ny 

gle  against  Bulgaria.  On  Sunday,  June  29, 

I saw  encamped  across  the  street  from  my  hotel 
in  Uskub  15,000  of  these  Montenegrin  soldiers 
who  had  arrived  only  a day  or  two  before  by 
train  from  Mitrowitza,  into  which  they  had 
marched  across  Novi  Bazar.  Tall,  lithe,  daring, 
with  countenances  bespeaking  clean  lives,  they 
looked  as  fine  a body  of  men  as  one  could  find 
anywhere  in  the  world,  and  their  commanding 
figures  and  manly  bearing  were  set  off  to  great 
advantage  by  their  striking  and  picturesque 
uniforms.  The  officers  told  me  next  day  that 
in  a few  hours  they  would  be  fighting  at 
Ghevgheli.  Their  splendid  appearance  seemed 
an  augury  of  victory  for  the  Serbs. 

Montenegro  too  received  her  reward  by  an  \ 
extension  of  territory  on  the  south  to  the 
frontier  of  Albania  (as  fixed  by  the  Great 
Powers)  and  a still  more  liberal  extension  on 
the  east  in  the  sandjak  of  Novi  Bazar.  ThisJ 
patriarchal  kingdom  will  probably  remain  un- 
changed so  long  as  the  present  King  lives, 


I iS  the  BALKAN  WARS 

the  much-beloved  King  Nicholas,  a genuinely 
Homeric  Father  of  his  People.  But  forces  of 
an  economic,  social,  and  political  character  are 
already  at  work  tending  to  draw  it  into  closer 
union  with  Servia,  and  the  Balkan  wars  have 
given  a great  impetus  to  these  forces.  A united 
Serb  state,  with  an  Adriatic  littoral  which  would 
include  the  harbors  of  Antivari  and  Dulcigno, 
may  be  the  future  which  destiny  has  in  store 
for  the  sister  kingdoms  of  Servia  and  Mon- 
tenegro. If  so,  it  is  likely  to  be  a mutually 
voluntary  union ; and  neither  Austria-Hungary 
nor  Italy,  the  warders  of  the  Adriatic,  would 
seem  to  have  any  good  ground  to  object  to 
such  a purely  domestic  arrangement. 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ALBANIA 

The  Albanians,  though  they  rather  opposed 
than  assisted  the  Allies  in  the  war  against  Tur- 
key, were  set  off  as  an  independent  nation  by 
the  Great  Powers  at  the  instigation  of  Austria' 
Hungary  with  the  support  of  Italy.  The 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  119 

determination  of  the  boundaries  of  the  new 
state  was  the  resultant  of  conflicting  forces  in 
operation  in  the  European  concert.  On  the 
north  while  Scutari  was  retained  for  Albania 
through  the  insistence  of  Austria-Hungary, 
Russian  influence  was  strong  enough  to  secure 
the  Albanian  centres  of  Ipek  and  Djakova  and 
Prisrend,  as  well  as  Dibra  on  the  east,  for  the 
allied  Serb  states.  This  was  a sort  of  compen- 
sation to  Servia  for  her  loss  of  an  Adriatic 
outlet  at  a time  when  the  war  between  the 
Allies,  which  was  destined  so  greatly  to  extend 
her  territories,  was  not  foreseen.  But  while  in 
this  way  Albanians  were  excluded  from  the  new 
state  on  the  north  and  east,  an  incongruous 
compensation  was  afforded  it  on  the  south  by 
an  unjustifiable  extension  into  northern  Epirus, 
whose  population  is  prevailingly  Greek. 

The  location  of  the  boundary  between  Albania 
and  New  Greece  was  forced  upon  the  Great 
Powers  by  the  stand  of  Italy.  During  the  first 
war  the  Greeks  had  occupied  Epirus  or  southern 


120 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Albania  as  far  north  as  a line  drawn  from  a 
point  a little  above  Khimara  on  the  coast  due 
east  toward  Lake  Presba,  so  that  the  cities  of 
Tepeleni  and  Koritza  were  included  in  the 
Greek  area.  But  Italy  protested  that  the  Greek 
occupation  of  territory  on  both  sides  of  the 
Straits  of  Corfu  would  menace  the  control  of 
the  Adriatic  and  insisted  that  the  boundary 
between  Albania  and  Greece  should  start  from 
a point  on  the  coast  opposite  the  southern  part 
of  the  island  of  Corfu.  Greece,  accordingly, 
was  compelled  to  evacuate  most  of  the  terri- 
tory she  had  occupied  above  Janina.  And  Al- 
bania subsequently  attempted  to  assert  her 
jurisdiction  over  it. 

But  the  task  of  Albania  is  bound  to  be  diffi- 
cult. For  though  the  Great  Powers  have  pro- 
vided it  with  a ruler — the  German  Prince 
William  of  Wied — there  is  no  organized  state. 
The  Albanians  are  one  of  the  oldest  races  in 
Europe,  if  not  the  oldest.  But  they  have  never 
created  a state.  And  to-day  they  are  hopelessly 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  121 

divided.  It  is  a land  of  universal  opposition' — 
north  against  south,  tribe  against  tribe,  bey 
against  bey.  The  majority  of  the  population 
are  Mohammedan  but  there  are  many  Roman 
Catholics  in  the  north  and  in  the  south  the 
Greek  Orthodox  Church  is  predominant.  The 
inhabitants  of  the  north,  who  are  called 
Ghegs,  are  divided  into  numerous  tribes  whose 
principal  occupation  is  fighting  with  one  an- 
other under  a system  of  perpetual  blood- 
feuds  and  inextinguishable  vendettas.  There 
are  no  tribes  in  the  south,  but  the  people, 
who  are  known  as  Tosks,  live  under  ter- 
ritorial magnates  called  beys,  who  are  prac- 
tically the  absolute  rulers  of  their  districts. 
The  country  as  a whole  is  a strange  farrago  of 
survivals  of  primitive  conditions.  And  it  is  not 
only  without  art  and  literature,  but  without 
manufactures  or  trade  or  even  agriculture.  It 
is  little  wonder  that  the  Greeks  of  Epirus  feel 
outraged  by  the  destiny  which  the  European 
Powers  have  imposed  upon  them — to  be  torn 


122 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


from  their  own  civilized  and  Christian  kindred 
and  subjected  to  the  sway  of  the  barbar- 
ous Mohammedans  who  occupy  Albania.  Nor 
is  it  surprising  that  since  Hellenic  armies  have 
evacuated  northern  Epirus  in  conformity  with 
the  decree  of  the  Great  Powers,  the  inhabitants 
of  the  district,  all  the  way  from  Santi  Quaranta 
to  Koritza,  are  declaring  their  independence 
and  fighting  the  Albanians  who  attempt  to 
bring  them  under  the  yoke. 

The  future  of  Albania  is  full  of  uncertainty. 
The  State,  however,  was  not  created  for  the 
Albanians,  who  for  the  rest,  are  not  in  a con- 
dition to  administer  or  maintain  it.  The  state 
was  established  in  the  interests  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Italy.  And  those  powers  are 
: likely  to  shape  its  future. 

THE  AEGEAN  ISLANDS  AND  CRETE 

For  the  sacrifice  demanded  of  Greece  in 
Epirus  the  Great  Powers  permitted  her  by  way 
of  compensation  to  retain  all  the  Aegean  Islands 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  123 

occupied  by  her  during  the  war,  except  Imbros, 
Tenedos,  and  the  Rabbit  Islands  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Dardanelles.  These  islands,  however, 
Greece  is  never  to  fortify  or  convert  into  naval 
bases.  This  allotment  of  the  Asiatic  Islands 
(which  includes  all  but  Rhodes  and  the  Dode- 
canese, temporarily  held  by  Italy  as  a pledge 
of  the  evacuation  of  Libya  by  the  Turkish 
officers  and  troops)  has  given  great  dissatis- 
faction in  Turkey,  where  it  is  declared  it  would 
be  better  to  have  a war  with  Greece  than  cede 
certain  islands  especially  Chios  and  Mitylene. 
The  question  of  the  disposition  of  the  islands 
had,  however,  been  committed  by  Turkey  to 
the  Great  Powers  in  the  Treaty  of  London. 
And  Turkish  unofficial  condemnation  of  the 
action  of  the  Powers  now  creates  a dangerous 
situation.  Mr.  Venizelos  declared  not  long 
ago,  with  the  enthusiastic  approval  of  the 
chamber,  that  the  security  of  Greece  lay  alone 
in  the  possession  of  a strong  navy. 

For  Mr.  Venizelos  personally  nothing  in  all 


124 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


these  great  events  can  have  been  more  gratify- 
ing than  the  achievement  of  the  union  of  Crete 
with  Greece.  This  was  consummated  on  De- 
cember 14,  when  the  Greek  flag  was  hoisted 
on  Canea  Fort  in  the  presence  of  King 
Constantine,  the  prime  minister,  and  the 
consuls  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  saluted  with 
10 1 guns  by  the  Greek  fleet. 

KING  CONSTANTINE 

Fortune  in  an  extraordinary  degree  has  fav- 
ored the  King  of  the  Hellenes— Fortune  and  his 
own  wise  head  and  valiant  arm  and  the  loyal 
support  of  his  people.  When  before  has  a 
Prince  taken  supreme  command  of  a nation’s 
army  and  in  the  few  months  preceding  and 
succeeding  his  accession  to  the  throne  by  suc- 
cessful generalship  doubled  the  area  and 
population  of  his  country? 


The  Balkan  Peninsula  after  the  Wars  of  1912-1913. 


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THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  125 


COST  OF  THE  WAR 

The  Balkan  wars  have  been  bloody  and 
costly.  We  shall  never  know  of  the  thousands 
of  men,  women,  and  children  who  died  from 
privation,  disease,  and  massacre.  But  the 
losses  of  the  dead  and  wounded  in  the  armies 
were  for  Montenegro  11,200,  for  Greece 
68,000,  for  Servia  71,000,  for  Bulgaria  156,- 
000,  and  for  Turkey  about  the  same  as  for  Bul- 
garia. The  losses  in  treasure  were  as  colossal 
as  in  blood.  Only  rough  computations  are 
possible.  But  the  direct  military  expenditures 
are  estimated  at  figures  varying  from  a billion 
and  a quarter  to  a billion  and  a half  of  dollars. 
This  of  course  takes  no  account  of  the  paralysis 
of  productive  industry,  trade,  and  commerce  or 
of  the  destruction  of  existing  economic  values. 

Yet  great  and  momentous  results  have  been 
achieved.  Although  seated  again  in  his  ancient 
capital  of  Adrianople,  the  Moslem  has  been 
expelled  from  Europe,  or  at  any  rate  is  no 


126 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


longer  a European  Power.  For  the  first  time 
in  more  than  five  centuries,  therefore,  condi- 
tions of  stable  equilibrium  are  now  possible 
for  the  Christian  nations  of  the  Balkans. 
Whether  the  present  alignment  of  those  states 
toward  one  another  and  towards  the  Great 
Powers  is  destined  to  continue  it  would  be 
foolhardy  to  attempt  to  predict. 

THE  FUTURE  OF  THE  BALKANS 

But  without  pretending  to  cast  a horoscope, 
certain  significant  facts  may  be  mentioned  in  a 
concluding  word.  If  the  Balkan  states  are 
left  to  themselves,  if  they  are  permitted  to  set- 
tle their  own  affairs  without  the  intervention 
of  the  Great  Powers,  there  is  no  reason  why  the 
existing  relations  between  Greece,  Servia,  Mon- 
tenegro, and  Roumania,  founded  as  they  are 
on  mutual  interest,  should  not  continue;  and 
if  they  continue,  peace  will  be  assured  in  spite 
of  Bulgaria’s  cry  for  revenge  and  readjust- 
ment. The  danger  lies  in  the  influence  of  the 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  127 

Great  Powers  with  their  varying  attractions 
and  repulsions.  France,  Germany,  and  Great 
Britain,  disconnected  with  the  Balkans  and  re- 
mote from  them,  are  not  likely  to  exert  much 
direct  individual  influence.  But  their  connec- 
tions with  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple 
Entente  would  not  leave  them  altogether  free 
to  take  isolated  action.  And  two  other  mem- 
bers of  those  European  groups — Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary — have  long  been  vitally  in- 
terested in  the  Balkan  question ; while  the 
opposition  to  Servian  annexation  on  the  Adri- 
atic littoral  and  of  Greek  annexation  in  Epirus 
now  for  the  first  time  reveals  the  deep  concern 
of  Italy  in  the  same  question. 

The  Serbs  are  Slavs.  And  the  unhappy  rela- 
tions between  Servia  and  Austria-Hungary 
have  always  intensified  their  pro-Russian 
proclivities.  The  Roumanians  are  a Romance 
people,  like  the  French  and  Italians,  and  they  > 
have  hitherto  been  regarded  as  a Balkan  exten- 
sion of  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  attitude  of 


128 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


Austria-Hungary,  however,  during  the  Balkan 
wars  has  caused  a cooling  of  Roumanian  friend- 
ship, so  that  its  transference  to  Russia  is 
no  longer  inconceivable  or  even  improbable. 
Greece  desires  to  be  independent  of  both  groups 
of  the  European  system,  but  the  action  of  Italy 
in  regard  to  Northern  Epirus  and  in  regard  to 
Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanese  has  produced  a 
feeling  of  irritation  and  resentment  among  the 
Greeks  which  nothing  is  likely  to  allay  or  even 
greatly  alleviate.  Bulgaria  in  the  past  has 
carried  her  desire  to  live  an  independent 
national  life  to  the  point  of  hostility  to  Russia, 
but  since  Stambuloff’s  time  she  has  shown  more 
natural  sentiments  towards  her  great  Slav  sister 
and  liberator.  Whether  the  desire  of  revenge 
against  Servia  (and  Greece)  will  once  more 
draw  her  toward  Austria-Hungary  only  time 
can  disclose. 

In  any  event  it  will  take  a long  time  for  all 
the  Balkan  states  to  recover  from  the  terrible 
exhaustion  of  the  two  wars  of  1912  and  1913. 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  129 

Their  financial  resources  have  been  depleted; 
their  male  population  has  been  decimated. 
Necessity,  therefore,  is  likely  to  co-operate  with 
the  community  of  interest  established  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bukarest  in  the  maintenance  of  condi- 
tions of  stable  equilibrium  in  the  Balkans.  Of 
course  the  peace-compelling  forces  operative  in 
the  Balkan  states  themselves  might  be  counter- 
acted by  hostile  activities  on  the  part  of  some  of 
the  Great  Powers.  And  there  is  one  danger- 
point  for  which  the  Great  Powers  themselves 
are  solely  responsible.  This,  as  I have  already 
explained,  is  Albania.  An  artificial  creation 
with  unnatural  boundaries,  it  is  a grave  ques- 
tion whether  this  so-called  state  can  either 
manage  its  own  affairs  or  live  in  peace  with  its 
Serb  and  Greek  neighbors.  At  this  moment 
the  Greeks  of  Epirus  (whom  the  Great  Powers 
have  transferred  to  Albania)  are  resisting  to 
the  death  incorporation  in  a state  which  out- 
rages their  deepest  and  holiest  sentiments  of 
religion,  race,  nationality,  and  humane  civiliza- 


THE  BALKAN  WARS 


130 

tion.  On  the  other  hand  the  Hoti  and  Gruda 
tribes  on  the  north  fiercely  resent  annexation  to 
Montenegro  (which  the  Great  Powers  have  de- 
creed) and  threaten  to  summon  to  their  support 
other  Malissori  tribes  with  whom  they  have 
had  a defensive  alliance  for  several  centuries. 
If  Prince  William  of  Wied  is  unable  to  cope 
with  these  difficulties,  Italy  and  Austria- 
Hungary  may  think  it  necessary  to  intervene 
in  Albania.  But  the  intervention  of  either 
would  almost  certainly  provoke  compensatory 
action  on  the  part  of  other  European  Powers, 
especially  Russia. 

One  can  only  hope  that  the  Great  Powers 
may  have  wisdom  granted  to  them  to  find  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  embarrassing  problem 
which  they  have  created  in  setting  up  the  new 
state  of  Albania.  That  the  Albanians  them- 
selves will  have  an  opportunity  to  develop  their 
own  national  independence  I find  it  impossible 
to  believe.  Yet  I heard  in  the  summer  of  1913 
at  Valona  from  the  lips  of  Ismail  Kemal  Bey, 


THE  WAR  BETWEEN  THE  ALLIES  131 

the  head  of  the  provisional  government,  a most 
impressive  statement  of  his  hopes  and  aspira- 
tions for  an  independent  Albania  and  his  faith 
and  confidence  in  its  future,  in  which  he  claimed 
to  voice  the  sentiments  of  the  Albanian  people. 
But,  as  I have  already  explained,  I think  it 
doubtful  whether  under  the  most  favorable 
external  circumstances  the  Albanians  are  at 
present  qualified  to  establish  and  maintain  an 
independent  state.  And  their  destiny  is  so 
inextricably  entangled  with  the  ambitions  of 
some  of  the  Great  Powers  that  the  experiment 
stands  no  chance  of  getting  a fair  trial.  I 
heartily  wish  the  circumstances  were  other  than 
they  are.  For  as  an  American  I sympathize 
with  the  aspirations  of  all  struggling  nationali- 
ties to  be  free  and  independent.  And  my  inter- 
est in  Albania  is  deepened,  as  the  interest  of  all 
Americans  must  be  deepened,  by  the  fact  that 
a large  number  of  Albanians  have  now  found  a 
home  in  the  United  States. 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid  II,  misgovernment,  32. 

Adrianople,  capture  by  Murad  I,  4;  left  to  Turkey, 
9,  25;  holds  out  against  Bulgaria,  56;  sine  qua  non 
at  Peace  Conference,  57;  captured,  57;  question  of 
retention  of,  58;  reoccupied  by  Turkish  army,  109; 
ceded  back  to  Turkey,  hi. 

Adriatic,  question  of  supremacy  over,  68. 

Aegean  Islands,  Greece  takes,  52;  left  to  decision  of 
Powers,  59;  given  to  Greece,  122. 

Albania,  Montenegrins,  53;  to  be  left  to  Powers,  59; 
cause  of  friction,  67;  problem  of,  118;  given  a 
ruler,  120;  danger-point  of  the  Balkans,  129;  northern 
tribes  oppose  absorption  by  Montenegro,  130;  future 
of,  131. 

Alexander,  Prince,  of  Bulgaria,  27. 

Area,  see  under  countries. 

Asen  brothers,  free  Bulgaria,  10. 

Athens,  recaptured,  22. 

Austria,  discusses  division  of  Turkey,  7;  given  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  27;  intervenes  in  Macedonia,  33; 
demands  independent  Albania,  67,  118;  opposes 
Servia,  68;  dislikes  Slav  hegemony,  97;  interests  in 
Balkans,  127. 

Balkan  Alliance,  see  Balkan  states. 

Balkan  states,  quarrel,  11;  peninsula  under  Moslems, 
13;  massacres  in,  25;  large  part  of  peninsula  lost  to 
Turkey,  27;  dissensions  among,  60;  alliance,  34;  rival 
ambitions  among,  64;  treaty  restrictions,  72;  causes 
of  war  between,  75;  previous  fighting  between,  108; 
make  peace,  no;  future,  126. 

Balkan  wars,  cause  of  first  war,  30;  cause  of  second  war, 
64;  division  of  fighting,  54;  cost,  125.  (For  progress, 
see  under  countries.) 


133 


134 


INDEX 


Basil  II,  conquers  Bulgaria,  io. 

Belgrade,  conquered  by  Dushan,  12. 

Berane,  massacre  at,  36. 

Berlin,  Treaty  of,  21 ; Congress  of,  78. 

Blockade,  Greek,  of  Turkey,  51, 

Boris,  accepts  Christianity,  9. 

Bosnia,  conquered  by  Dushan,  12;  delegated  to 
Austria,  27. 

Bosphorus,  Turks  on,  3. 

Brusa,  surrendered,  3. 

Bukarest,  see  Treaty  of,  and  Peace  Conference. 

Bulgaria,  independent,  8;  suffers  most,  8;  church,  pro- 
gress, area,  9;  under  Moslem  despotism,  11;  ravaged 
by  Turks,  decline,  14;  educational  movement,  23; 
exarchate  established,  24;  revolt  against  Turkey,  25; 
“Big  Bulgaria,”  25;  proclaimed  independent,  26; 
astounding  progress,  27;  area  and  population,  29; 
declares  war  against  Turkey,  34;  alliance  with  Greece, 
35 ; with  Servia,  35;  decide  to  mobilize,  36;  enters 
Thrace,  54;  success  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  Lule  Burgas,  and 
Chorlu,  55 ; capture  Adrianople,  57 ; disagreement 
with  Servia,  65 ; rivalry  with  Greece,  65 ; as  to  divi- 
sion of  Macedonia,  72;  demands  that  Servia  observe 
treaty,  76;  claims  of,  77;  exarchate  in  Macedonia,  81; 
alleged  majority  in  Macedonia,  88;  jingoism  in,  96; 
position  of,  as  to  arbitration  of  Czar,  99;  uncompro- 
mising policy,  101 ; her  mistake,  102;  opens  war,  107; 
defeat  by  Allies,  109;  makes  peace,  no;  present  atti- 
tude, 127. 

Byron,  Lord,  volunteer  in  Greece,  21. 

Byzantine  Empire,  falling  before  Turks,  4;  annihilates 
Bulgaria  under  Samuel,  10. 

Chataldja,  now  border  of  Turkey,  8;  Bulgarians  at,  55. 

Chorlu,  Bulgarians  victorious  at,  55. 

Christians,  defeated  by  Moslems,  5;  races  quarrel,  n; 
In  Macedonia,  31;  oppressed,  13. 

Constantine,  King,  20;  as  Crown  Prince,  commanding 
general,  48;  success,  50;  captures  Janina,  57;  ability 
and  achievements,  124. 


INDEX 


135 


Constantinople,  seat  of  Byzantine  Empire,  4;  captured 
by  Mohammed  II,  5;  left  to  Turkey,  8;  Russia  at 
gates  of,  25. 

Crete,  question  of,  42;  captured  by  Venetians,  43;  present 
condition,  43,  44;  becomes  autonomous,  44;  elects 
members  to  Greek  parliament,  45.;  process  of  annexa- 
tion to  Greece,  45,  124;  Turkish  sovereignty  with- 
drawn, 59. 

Czar,  arbiter  of  Treaty  of  Partition,  95;  summons  Ser- 
via  and  Bulgaria  to  submit  their  disputes,  97. 

Daneff,  Dr.,  prime  minister  of  Bulgaria,  98;  tries  to 
stop  war,  107;  rejects  Roumanian  claim,  112;  resigns, 
109. 

Dushan,  Stephen,  pules  Servia,  12. 

Eastern  Roumelia,  see  Roumelia. 

Elassona,  Greeks  win  at,  50. 

England,  fleet  at  Navarino,  22;  joins  Russia  to  reform 
Macedonia,  33;  influence,  127. 

Enver  Bey,  heads  Young  Turk  revolt,  58. 

“Eothen,”  does  not  mention  Bulgaria,  15. 

Epipus  holds  out,  56;  Greeks  of,  resist  incorporation 
in  Albania,  129. 

European,  aid  for  Greece,  21. 

Evans,  Sir  Arthur,  excavations  in  Crete,  43. 

Exarchate,  Bulgarian,  19;  Sultan’s  firman,  24;  in 
Macedonia,  81. 

Ferdinand,  Prince,  of  Bulgaria,  27;  King,  55,  108. 

France,  fleet  at  Navarino,  22;  influence,  127. 

Gabrovo,  school  of,  23. 

Gallipoli,  entry  of  Turks  into,  4. 

George,  King  of  Greece,  assassinated,  22 ; experienced 
ruler,  36;  Prince,  Commissioner  of  Crete,  44. 

Germany,  influence,  127. 

Gibbon,  quoted  as  to  Czar  Simeon,  9. 

Gladstone,  denunciation  of  Turkish  atrocities,  25. 

Great  Britain,  see  England. 

Greece,  becomes  independent,  7;  ecclesiastical  domina- 
tion of  Slavs,  16;  Greek  millet,  17;  ascendancy  in 


INDEX 


136 

Bulgaria,  18;  influence  in  Turkish  Empire,  19;  war  of 
independence,  21 ; Powers  make  her  independent,  22 ; 
boundaries,  28;  area  and  population,  29;  causes  of 
war  with  Turkey,  32;  declares  war,  34;  alliance  with 
Bulgaria,  35  ; reorganizes  army,  37;  near  alliance  with 
Turkey,  40 ; Cretan  question,  42 ; mobilization,  48 ; 
enters  Macedonia,  49;  conquers  at  Sarandaporon, 
Serfidje,  Elassona,  Veria,  and  Jenitsa,  50;  blockades 
Turkey,  51;  captures  Janina,  57;  rivalry  with  Bulgaria, 
65 ; favors  'Servian  egress  to  Aegean,  71 ; question  of 
division  of  Macedonia,  74;  propaganda  in  Macedonia, 
83;  position  of  division  of  territory,  104;  conciliatory 
methods,  105;  alliance  against  Bulgaria,  108;  treaty 
of  peace  and  extension  of  territory,  no;  annexation 
of  Crete,  124;  attitude  toward  Italy,  128. 

Gueshoff,  agrees  to  conference  of  Allies,  95 ; statesman, 
96;  resigns,  97. 

Hellenism,  cause  of,  36. 

Hellespont,  Turks  cross,  4. 

Herzegovina,  conquered  by  Stephen  Nemanyo,  n; 
delegated  to  Austria,  27. 

“Internal  Organization”  in  Macedonia,  32. 

Ipek,  Archbishop  of,  12. 

Islam,  millet  of,  16. 

Ismail  Kemal  Bey  on  Albania’s  future,  130. 

Italy  holds  Rhodes,  52;  demands  independent  Albania, 
67,  1 18;  desires  control  of  Adriatic,  69;  protests 
against  Greece  at  Corfu,  120. 

Janina,  holds  out,  56;  falls,  57. 

Janissaries,  13;  revolt,  14. 

Jenitsa,  Turks  defeated  at,  50. 

Kara-George,  leads  (Servians,  20;  dynasty,  21. 

Kiamil  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier,  48;  driven  out,  58. 

Kilkis,  battle  of,  109. 

Kirk  Kilisse,  Bulgarian  victory,  55. 

Kossovo,  field  of,  4;  avenged,  53. 

Kochana,  massacre  at,  36. 

Kumanovo,  Servians  defeat  Turks  at,  53. 


INDEX 


137 


Lazar,  the  Serb,  4. 

Literary  revival  in  Bulgaria,  23. 

London,  see  Treaty  of,  and  Peace  Conference. 

Lule  Burgas,  Bulgarian  victory,  55. 

Macedonia,  ruled  by  Murad  I,  4;  cause  of  first  Balkan 
war,  30;  question  of  its  division,  72;  racial  problem, 
79,  89;  religion  in,  81;  alleged  Bulgarian  majority  in, 
88;  claims  to  central  portion  of,  89. 

Mahmud  Shevket  Pasha,  Grand  Vizier,  58. 

Massacre,  in  1876,  25;  at  Kochana  and  Berane,  36; 
inflames  Slavs,  47. 

Mehemet  Ali,  fights  against  Greece,  22. 

Meluna  Pass,  Greeks  enter,  49. 

Millet,  a Turkish  term,  16. 

Mohammed  II,  conquers  Constantinople,  5. 

Mohammedan,  intolerance,  8;  Balkan  peninsula  under, 
13;  incapacity,  31. 

Monastir,  captured  by  Serbs,  53. 

Montenegro,  remembers  Kossovo,  5 ; conquered  by 
Nemanyo,  1 1 ; independent  by  Treaty  of  Berlin,  27; 
area  and  population,  29;  declares  war  against  Tur- 
key, 34;  fires  first  shot  of  war,  53;  captures  Scutari, 
57;  work  and  reward,  116;  inclination  toward  Servia, 
1 18. 

Moslem,  see  Mohammedan. 

Murad  I,  captures  Adrianople,  4. 

Navarino,  Battle  of,  22. 

Nazim  Pasha,  murdered,  58. 

Near  Eastern  Question,  Macedonia,  30. 

Nemanyo,  Stephen,  unites  Servia,  11. 

Nicaea,  surrender  of,  3. 

Nicholas,  King  of  Montenegro,  53 ; Homeric  Father, 
118. 

Nigrita,  Greeks  and  Bulgarians  fight  at,  66. 

Novi-Bazar,  Montenegrins  in,  53. 

Obrenovich,  Milosh,  leads  Servians,  20;  dynasty,  21. 

Ochrida,  location,  9;  given  bishop,  81;  religious  divi- 
sion, 88. 


INDEX 


138 

Orkhan,  Brusa  surrenders  to,  3. 

Otto,  of  Bavaria,  becomes  King  of  Greece,  22. 

Ottoman  Empire,  see  Turkey. 

Pashitch,  demands  revision  of  treaty,  95. 

Patriarch,  Greek,  of  Constantinople,  17. 

Patriarchate  restricted,  19,  24. 

Peace  Conference,  at  London,  57;  at  Bukarest,  no. 

Peace,  terms  of,  with  Turkey,  59;  between  Allies  no. 

Peter,  King,  21. 

Phanariots,  Turkish  term,  19. 

Pomaks,  become  Moslem,  14. 

Population,  see  under  countries. 

Porte,  see  Turkey. 

Powers,  intervene  in  Greece,  22;  recognize  Bulgarian 
independence,  26;  views  of  Balkan  success,  55;  meet 
at  London,  57;  lack  of  success,  57;  insist  on  peace, 
58;  give  Silistria  to  Roumania,  112;  in  Albania,  119. 

Prilip,  Serbs  capture,  53. 

Racial,  division,  30;  sympathies,  31;  problem  in  Mace- 
donia, 79;  fallacies  in  Macedonia,  84;  characteristics, 
89;  in  Albania,  121. 

Religion,  Turks  divide  subjects  by,  16;  contest  in 
Bulgaria,  24;  in  Crete,  43,  44;  in  Macedonia,  81;  in 
Albania,  121. 

Roumania,  becomes  independent,  7;  by  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin, 27;  convention  with  Greece  and  Servia,  109; 
seizes  Silistria,  109;  at  Treaty  of  Bukarest,  112; 
justification,  113;  attitude  toward  Triple  Alliance,  127. 

Roumelia  Eastern,  union  with  Bulgaria,  26;  annexa- 
tion, 78. 

Russia,  discusses  the  division  of  Turkey,  7;  fleet  at 
Navarino,  22;  declares  war  against  Turkey,  25;  in- 
tervention in  Macedonia,  33 ; rivalry  with  Austria, 
98;  interest  in  Balkans,  127. 

St.  Petersburg,  conference  of  allies  at,  95. 

Saloniki,  left  to  Turkey,  9;  conquered  by  Greeks,  51; 
desirability,  70. 

Samuel,  reigns  in  Bulgaria,  10. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  25;  destroyed  by  Powers,  26. 


INDEX 


139 


Sarandaporon,  Turks  driven  from,  50. 

Savoff,  General,  orders  attacks  on  Servians  and  Greeks, 
107. 

Scutari  holds  out,  56;  falls,  57;  to  Albania,  119. 

Serbs,  see  Servia. 

Serfidje,  Greeks  capture,  50. 

Servia,  remembers  Kossovo,  5 ; independent,  7 ; con- 
quers Bulgaria,  under  Asen,  10;  become  Christian, 
launch  a dynasty,  11;  decline,  14;  throws  off  Turkish 
yoke,  20;  independence  by  Treaty  of  Berlin,  27; 
area  and  population,  29;  bands  in  Macedonia,  32; 
declares  war  against  Turkey,  34;  alliance  with  Bul- 
garia, 35 ; decide  to  mobilize,  36;  enter  Macedonia, 
53 ; victorious,  at  Kumanovo,  Prilip,  and  Monastir, 
53;  differences  with  Bulgaria,  64;  desire  to  reach 
Adriatic,  68;  recoils  to  Aegean,  70;  question  of  di- 
vision of  Macedonia,  72;  propaganda  in  Macedonia, 
82;  attitude  of,  92;  jingoism  in,  96;  position  of,  100; 
alliance  against  Bulgaria,  108;  her  enlargement  of 
territory  under  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest,  no;  affilia- 
tions with  Russia,  127. 

Shishman,  Czar,  dies,  11. 

Silistria,  taken  by  Roumania,  109;  awarded  by  Powers, 
H3- 

Slavs,  unsubdued,  4;  all  under  Moslems,  13;  hostility  to 
Greeks,  18;  indignation  against  Turkey,  47;  racial 
characteristics  in  Macedonia,  89. 

Suleyman  the  Magnificent,  5. 

Thrace,  ruled  by  Murad  I,  4;  location,  54;  entered  by 
Bulgarians,  54. 

Treaty  of  Berlin,  recognizes  'Servian  independence, 
etc.,  21;  of  Bukarest,  no;  of  London,  short  lived, 
58;  eliminates  Turkey,  63;  of  Partition,  between  Ser- 
via and  Bulgaria,  64;  of  San  Stefano,  created  “Big 
Bulgaria,”  25 ; torn  up  by  Powers,  26. 

Triple  Alliance,  influence,  127. 

Triple  Entente,  influence,  127. 

Trnovo  capital  of  Bulgaria,  10;  burned,  n. 

Tsaribrod,  interview  at,  95. 

Turkey,  empire  in  Europe,  3;  armies  go  to  Danube,  4; 


140 


INDEX 


becomes  central  European  power,  5 ; treatment  of 
subjects,  6;  decline  and  division,  7;  driven  from 
Europe,  8 ; oppression,  13 ; troops  ravage  Bulgaria, 
14;  reconquers  Greece,  22;  European,  how  divided,  28; 
area  and  population,  29;  frustrates  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
32;  war  against  by  Balkans,  34;  blockaded  by  Greece, 
51;  at  mercy  of  Allies,  56;  at  Peace  Conference,  57; 
accepts  peace,  57;  driven  from  Europe,  59;  reoccupies 
Adrianople,  1094  final  boundary  of  Turkey  in  Europe, 
in;  no  longer  European  power,  135;  Asiatic,  next 
danger-point,  129. 

Uskub,  Dushan  crowned  at,  12;  given  Bishop,  81. 

Venizelos,  Prime  Minister  of  Greece,  37;  criticism  of 
and  defense,  40;  his  predicament,  46;  suggests  confer- 
ence of  Allies,  95;  conciliatory  position,  104. 

Veria,  Greeks  enter,,  50. 

Vienna,  Suleyman  at  gates  of,  5 ; siege  of,  14. 

Vilayet,  Turkish  term,  28. 

Vlachs,  in  Macedonia,  114. 

William,  of  Wied,  King  of  Albania,  120. 

Young  Turks,  rule,  33;  reject  proposals  of  Venizelos, 
47 ; forced  out,  48 ; depose  Kiamil  Pasha,  58. 

Zaimis,  succeeds  Prince  George  in  Crete,  45- 


949^7 


S394B  c.2  527 


